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Executive summary
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was 
adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was 
ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This 
report is the Finnish National Report for the Sixth Review Meeting in March/April 2014.
There are two nuclear power plants operating in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants. The Loviisa plant comprises of two VVER units (Russian type pressurised water 
reactors), operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units 
(boiling water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj. In addition, a new nuclear 
power plant unit is being constructed at the Olkiluoto site (PWR). At both sites there are 
interim storages for spent fuel as well as final disposal facilities for medium and low level 
radioactive wastes. Posiva, a joint company by Fortum and TVO, submitted a construction 
licence application for the spent nuclear fuel repository in the end of 2012. Furthermore, 
there is a Triga Mark II research reactor operated in Espoo by VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland who has commenced an environmental impact assessment procedure for 
the decommissioning of the reactor.
In this report, latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained including safety 
assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear power 
plants is also presented by using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in 
licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement 
are also covered. Major developments in Finland since the Fifth Review Meeting are as 
follows: updating of legislation and regulatory guides, carrying out the safety assessments 
related to the lessons learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, IRRS mission 
(IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service) carried out in Finland (STUK and other 
authorities), and continued construction of the new nuclear power plant unit.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is 
separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features emphasising Finnish 
safety management practices in the field of nuclear safety can be concluded:
•	 During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further 
developed and the revised regulatory guide system will be finalised in 2013. The overall 
revision of the regulatory guides takes into account international guidance such as 
IAEA standards and WENRA (Western European Regulators’ Association) reference 
levels for existing reactors and safety objectives for new reactors. In addition, the 
lessons learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are taken into account. No 
deviation from the convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish regulatory 
infrastructure including nuclear and radiation regulations.
•	 The licensees have shown good safety performance and rigorous safety management 
practices in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and 
modernisation of existing NPPs. During recent years, only minor operational events 
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(INES 1 and below) have been taken place and no major safety problems have appeared. 
The licensees’ practices are considered to comply with the Convention obligations.
•	 Safety assessment is a continuous process and living probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. Periodic 
safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2005–2007 in connection with 
the operating licence renewal, and the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto plant 
was carried out in 2007–2009. Several plant modifications have been carried out at 
the operating NPPs during the recent years to further improve the safety. Safety 
assessment carried out after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident also identified 
some further enhancement needs which are being planned and implemented.
•	 The resources of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) are adequate to 
fulfil the needs for independent regulation, and have been increased to meet the needs 
to oversee the construction of the new plant in Finland. The recent IRRS mission results 
will be used to further improve regulatory guidance and practices. VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety 
assessment work providing safety analysis capabilities and tools and performing safety 
analyses. There are also national research programmes which support and develop the 
competencies in nuclear safety and waste management also in universities.
The Fifth Review Meeting in 2011 identified some challenges and recorded some planned 
measures to improve safety in Finland. These issues are included and responded in this 
sixth national report of Finland. These items were (in brackets the Articles, in which the 
issues are addressed):
•	 revising the existing regulatory guide system (see Article 7)
•	 response to the Fukushima accident; improvements on national and plant level (see 
Articles 5, 7, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19)
•	 aging management of reactors in operation; renewal of I&C systems, reactor pressure 
vessel material embrittlement and use of risk-informed methods to further develop the 
plant safety (see Articles 14 and 18)
•	 challenges in new NPP construction project (Olkiluoto unit 3); competence, training and 
oversight of subcontractors, operating licence application review, compliance with QA 
programme, adequacy of oversight resources at site (vendor, licensee), and safety culture 
of organisations and personnel (see Articles 10, 11, 13, and Annex 4)
•	 preparation for the new build (see Annex 5)
•	 maintaining competence and responding to the growing needs for professional staff (see 
Articles 8 and 11)
•	 ensuring reliability of digital I&C, verification & validation (see Article 18)
•	 integration of safety and security arrangements (see Article 8)
•	 responding to increased demand for timely and effective communication to public (see 
Articles 8, 16, and 17)
•	 IRRS mission in 2012; results will be used to further improve regulatory practices (see 
Articles 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, and Annex 6).
Still some of these issues require further development to enhance safety, i.e., including 
provision for plant ageing, reliability of digital I&C and management of competence 
taking into account the new build projects and retirement. Other important issues cover 
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new technologies, security arrangements and the growing need for new research and 
development programmes. These are generic issues that require international attention in 
all countries using nuclear energy.
The existing regulatory guidance system (YVL Guides) is being restructured. The goal is 
to have updated legislation and new regulatory guides published during 2013. This task is 
highly prioritised because of new nuclear power plant projects in Finland.
The expected lifetime of the existing nuclear power plants requires renewal of systems 
and components and modernisation of technologies. The regulation of the existing nuclear 
power plants emphasises the management of ageing and the quality of plant operations. 
The I&C and other systems at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants are undergoing and 
planning modernisation, and extra care is needed to ensure operational safety during 
this work. Operating experience has shown that special attention has to be paid on the 
meticulous planning and controlled implementation and testing of the plant modifications 
and STUK is following this in its regulatory inspections.
Security arrangements in the use of nuclear power also call for efficient supervision. The 
procedures, preparations and information exchange related to antiterrorism activities 
need to be enhanced worldwide. In Finland, the need for strengthened security has been 
addressed in the amended legislation and regulatory guidance. IAEA’s International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was carried out in Finland in 2009 
and the follow-up in 2012. As a result, STUK has increased its resources in the security 
area and its co-operation with other authorities.
The retirement of large age groups in Finland will affect public administration and 
industry throughout, including STUK, utilities and the spent fuel management company 
Posiva as well as organisations providing technical support and education to them. The 
plans for new NPP construction projects and the above mentioned challenges and activities 
require additional manpower and efforts from the nuclear power utilities and regulatory 
body as well as from technical support organisations. Thus, ensuring an adequate national 
supply of experts in nuclear science and technology and ensuring high quality research 
infrastructure are continuous challenges in Finland. During 2010–2012 a committee set 
up by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy worked on a report aiming at giving 
recommendations and steps to be taken until the 2020’s for ensuring competence and 
resources needed for the nuclear sector. In addition, the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy set up at the end of January 2013 a working group to prepare a research 
and development strategy. Education and training programmes have been developed for 
newcomers at STUK as well as on national level to all organisations (such as utilities, 
waste management company and research organisations).
Due to the increasing interest in nuclear power in Finland, communication and 
information sharing on nuclear and radiation safety has become an increasingly important 
success factor for STUK and utilities. Regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear 
and understandable to general public. Interactions with media are important since media 
plays an important role in communication.
6STUK-B 164
Actions taken as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of 
March in 2011 (TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident), safety assessments in Finland were 
initiated after STUK received a letter from the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
on 15 March 2011. The Ministry asked STUK to carry out a study on how the Finnish 
NPPs have prepared against loss of electric power supply and extreme natural phenomena 
in order to ensure nuclear safety. STUK asked the licensees to carry out assessments 
and submitted the study report to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy on 
16 May 2011. Although immediate actions to ensure safety of public and environment 
were not considered necessary, STUK required the NPP licensees to carry out additional 
assessments and present action plans for safety improvements. Assessments were 
conducted and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 15 December 2011. STUK has 
reviewed the results of national assessments, and made licensee specific decisions on 19 
July 2012 on the suggested safety improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests and submitted the national report to 
European Commission at the end of 2011. An EU level peer review on the report was 
completed by April 2012. The recommendations of the EU peer review have been taken into 
account in the regulatory decisions and will be considered in the development of national 
regulations. A National Action Plan was prepared addressing the measures initiated on 
a national level and at the nuclear power plants as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident. The National Action Plan was sent to the European Nuclear Regulators 
Group (ENSREG) and peer reviewed in April 2013. In addition, Finland participated in 
the second Extraordinary Meeting of the Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) in August 
2012 and prepared a report introducing all Fukushima related actions. All STUK’s related 
decisions, the national report to European Commission, the report to the Extraordinary 
CNS, and the Finnish National Action Plan have been published on STUK’s website.
Based on the results of assessments conducted in Finland to date, it is concluded that no 
such hazards or deficiencies have been found that would require immediate actions at the 
Finnish NPPs. However, areas where safety can be further enhanced have been identified 
and there are plans on how to address these areas. The experiences from the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are also taken into consideration in the ongoing renewal of 
the legislation and Finnish Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides) and in the nuclear safety 
research programme (SAFIR 2014), see Articles 7 and 8.
In addition to the periodic safety reviews carried out at the nuclear power plants, an 
extraordinary review of site related issues was performed after the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident in connection with the so called European stress tests. Assessment of 
the safety margins and effects of exceeding the design basis values have been available 
and utilised for all identified relevant hazards (including extreme weather conditions) in 
connection with external events probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) which are mandatory 
for the Finnish NPPs. The stress tests did not reveal any new site-related external hazards 
or vulnerabilities of the plants to external events. No need for immediate action was 
recognised, but some additional studies of external hazards and feasibility studies for 
plant modifications to improve robustness against external events were found justified (see 
Article 17). For example at the Loviisa NPP, protection against high seawater level will be 
enhanced and detailed structural analysis of spent fuel pools in the case of an earthquake 
with consequential boiling in the pools will be carried out. At the Olkiluoto NPP, structural 
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analysis of the spent fuel pools has been studied and seismic walk-downs of the fire 
extinguishing water system have been performed.
The systems needed for residual heat removal from the reactor, containment and spent fuel 
pools require external power at both Finnish NPPs. At both sites, the ultimate heat sink 
is the sea. Depending on the design features of the plant, the time margins to withstand 
station blackout and loss of ultimate heat sink vary. A reliable supply of electrical power 
to the systems providing for basic safety functions at the Finnish NPPs is ensured by the 
Defence-in-Depth concept. As a result of multiple and diversified electrical power sources at 
different levels, the probability of loss of all electrical supply systems is considered very low 
at the Finnish NPPs. However, as a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident, further changes are expected to be implemented at the both NPPs 
(see Article 18). Examples of improvements under planning for the Loviisa NPP include 
installation of independent cooling towers for decay heat removal from the reactor core and 
from the spent fuel pools and diverse cooling of the spent fuel pools. Cooling towers were 
considered already before the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident due to the increased risks of oil 
transport on the Finnish Gulf. Safety improvement examples at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 
2 include ensuring cooling of the reactor core in case of total loss of AC systems, ensuring 
operation of the auxiliary feed water system pumps independently of availability of the sea 
water systems, and plans for diverse cooling of the spent fuel pools.
A comprehensive severe accident management (SAM) strategy has been developed and 
implemented at the operating Finnish NPPs during 1980’s and 1990’s after the accidents 
in TMI and Chernobyl (see Annexes 2 and 3). These strategies are based on ensuring 
the containment integrity which is required in the existing national regulations. STUK 
has reviewed these strategies and has made inspections in all stages of implementation. 
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major 
changes at the plants are considered necessary. However, the licensees are expected to 
consider ensuring the cooling of spent fuel pools in the SAM procedures (see Article 19). In 
addition, there are many actions related to the update of the emergency plans (see Article 
16). Both NPPs were required to clarify and update their emergency preparedness plans 
with respect to issues like the possibility of several reactor units’ simultaneous accident, 
evaluation of the suitability of emergency response personnel to their duties, management 
of access control and contamination control in the case when the normal arrangements 
are out of function and restoring the access routes and connections to the site in case of 
massive destruction of the infrastructure.
Fukushima related modifications at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs are described in more 
detail also in Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
Concerning the off-site emergency preparedness and response (see Article 16), there is a 
need to ensure accessibility to the site in case of extreme weather conditions, provide a 
sufficient amount of radiation protection equipment and radiation monitoring capabilities 
for rescue services and improve communication capabilities. The rescue planning is 
strengthened in a co-operation between the nuclear power utility, regional rescue services, 
regional police departments and STUK. In addition, a National Nuclear Power Plant 
Emergency Preparedness Forum is needed in order to have co-operation and combination 
between permanent groups and the establishment of the National Forum has been agreed. 
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the regional 
rescue service authorities, STUK and the NPP licensees will be participating in the Forum.
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In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the 
objectives of the Convention are complied with. Safety improvements have been annually 
implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since their commissioning. Legislation 
and regulatory guidance have been further developed taking into account nuclear safety 
research and advances in science and technology as well as the operating and construction 
experiences. Additional safety assessments and implementation plans for safety 
improvements have been made at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants based on the lessons 
learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Review Team) was carried out in October 2012 and STUK has developed its action plan 
for improvement on the basis of the IRRS mission results and the self-assessment. There 
exists no urgent need for additional improvements to upgrade the safety of the Finnish 
nuclear power plants in the context of the Convention.
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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 
January 1996, and it came into force in Finland 
on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish 
National Report for the Sixth Review Meeting in 
March/April 2014.
In Chapter 2 of this report, the measures relat-
ed to each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention 
are separately evaluated. The evaluation is based 
on the Finnish legislation and regulations as well 
as on the situation at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. The reference is made to the IAEA Safety 
Requirements and other safety standards as ap-
propriate. IAEA’s Information Circular 572, Rev. 4, 
28 January 2013, was used as a guideline for the 
context of the report.
In the report, latest safety reviews and plant 
modernisations are explained in detail including 
safety assessment methods and key results. Safety 
1 Introduction
performance of Finnish nuclear power plants is 
also presented by using representative indicators. 
The topics of the Second Extraordinary Meeting 
of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of 
Nuclear Safety are discussed under applicable 
Articles. Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, 
provision of regulatory guidance, safety assess-
ment, inspection and enforcement are also covered 
in detail. The results of the latest IRRS mission 
(IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service) 
carried out in Finland in October 2012 are de-
scribed under Article 8 and detailed actions related 
to recommendations and suggestions under appli-
cable Articles.
The sixth National Report is aimed to be a 
stand-alone document and does not require famil-
iarisation with the earlier reports. The fulfilment 
of the obligations of the Convention is described in 
general and the latest development since the Fifth 
Review Meeting is specifically described.
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2 Compliance with Articles 6 to 19 
– Article-by-article review
Article 6. Existing nuclear installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that the safety of 
nuclear installations existing at the time 
the Convention enters into force for that 
Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as pos-
sible. When necessary in the context of this 
Convention, the Contracting Party shall en-
sure that all reasonably practicable improve-
ments are made as a matter of urgency to 
upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. 
If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans 
should be implemented to shut down the nu-
clear installation as soon as practically possi-
ble. The timing of the shut-down may take into 
account the whole energy context and possible 
alternatives as well as the social, environmen-
tal and economic impact.
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants: 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant 
comprises of two VVER units that are operated 
by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the 
Olkiluoto plant comprises of two BWR units that 
are operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). 
TVO has also a Construction Licence for the new 
plant unit of nominal reactor thermal power 4300 
MW at the Olkiluoto site (Olkiluoto unit 3). At both 
sites there are fresh and spent fuel storage facili-
ties, and facilities for storage and treatment of low 
and medium level radioactive wastes. Other exist-
ing nuclear installations in Finland are the final 
disposal facilities for low and medium level ra-
dioactive waste at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plant 
sites. The disposal facility at Olkiluoto was taken 
into operation in 1992 and at Loviisa in 1998.
For taking care of the spent fuel final disposal, 
a joint company Posiva Oy has been established in 
1995 by Fortum and TVO. Research, development 
and planning work for spent fuel disposal is in pro-
gress and the disposal facility is envisaged to be op-
erational in about 2022. The Decision-in-Principle 
(DiP) on the spent fuel disposal facility in deep 
crystalline bedrock was made by the Government 
in 2000 and ratified by the Parliament in 2001. In 
the connection of approving the DiP in May 2002 
for the construction of the fifth power reactor in 
Finland, the Parliament also approved the DiP 
for expanding the capacity of the planned spent 
fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto to also include 
the spent fuel from this new reactor unit. The re-
pository will be constructed in the vicinity of the 
Olkiluoto NPP site. To confirm the suitability of the 
site, construction of an underground rock charac-
terisation facility was commenced in 2004. Posiva 
submitted a construction licence application for 
the spent nuclear fuel repository to the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy in the end of 2012. The 
detailed technical documentation of the application 
is planned to be reviewed by STUK during 2013-
2014 and based on the review STUK will give a 
safety assessment for the Ministry of Employment 
and Economy during 2014.
Three new nuclear power plant units have 
been under consideration in Finland (see more 
details of the licensing process under Articles 7 
and 17). Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
procedures were carried out in 2007–2009. In 
May 2010, the Government granted two Decision-
in-Principles for new reactor units, one to TVO 
(Olkiluoto site) and another to Fennovoima Oy (al-
ternative sites in Pyhäjoki and Simo). At the same 
time the Government rejected Fortum’s DiP appli-
cation to construct a new reactor unit to the Loviisa 
site. The Government also granted a Decision-in-
Principle applied by the spent fuel management 
company Posiva Oy for expanding the capacity of 
the planned spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto 
to also include spent fuel from Olkiluoto unit 4. 
The Parliament ratified all granted DiPs in July 
2010. The Decision-in-Principles set a schedule for 
STUK-B 164
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Article 6 – existing nucleAr instAllAtions
Fennovoima and TVO to conclude their licensing 
feasibility studies, bidding processes and prepara-
tions for the construction licence applications to 
the Government by mid 2015.
In its application to build a nuclear power plant 
Fennovoima did not present a plan for disposal of 
spent fuel. The DiP regarding Fennovoima’s ap-
plication includes a requirement that Fennovoima 
shall further develop its plan for spent fuel dispos-
al. The first option required that Fennovoima shall 
present to Parliament before end of June 2016 an 
agreement on co-operation with the present licen-
sees (TVO and Fortum) under the waste manage-
ment obligation regarding nuclear waste manage-
ment. According to the second option Fennovoima 
shall prepare within six years a programme for 
environmental impact assessment for its own facil-
ity taking care of the final disposal of spent fuel. 
In March 2012, the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy appointed a working group to steer 
nuclear power companies’ joint investigation of the 
alternatives available for final disposal of nuclear 
fuel. The working group’s final report assesses the 
environmental impacts of the various options (one 
or two final disposal facilities in Finland), safety, 
costs and a review of these with respect to the 
overall interests of society. In the working group’s 
opinion, both options can be safely implemented.
Finland observes the principles of the 
Convention, when applicable, also in other uses 
of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. 
in the use of a research reactor. In Finland, there 
is one TRIGA Mark II research reactor (250 kW), 
FiR 1, situated in Espoo. The research reactor was 
taken into operation in 1962, and it is operated 
by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. In 
2012, VTT decided to commence the activities re-
lated to the planning of the decommissioning of 
the research reactor. The preparation of the pro-
gramme for the environmental impact assessment 
procedure for the decommissioning of FiR  1 was 
started in May 2013.
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment 
and enhancement approach is presented in the 
nuclear legislation. Nuclear Energy Act states that 
the safety of nuclear energy use shall be maintained 
at as high a level as practically possible. For the 
further development of safety, measures shall be 
implemented that can be considered justified con-
sidering operating experience and safety research 
and advances in science and technology. The im-
plementation of safety improvements has been a 
continuing process at both Finnish nuclear power 
plants since the commissioning of the operating 
reactor units and there exists no urgent need to 
upgrade the safety of these plants in the context of 
the Convention.
Loviisa NPP units 1 and 2
The reactor units at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant were connected to the electrical grid in 
February 8, 1977 (Loviisa 1) and November 4, 1980 
(Loviisa 2). The nominal thermal power of both of 
the Loviisa units is 1500 MW (109% as compared 
to the original power of 1375 MW). The increase of 
the power level was implemented and licensed in 
1998.
The latest overall safety review of the Loviisa 
plant took place in 2005–2007 in connection of 
the relicensing of the operation of the plant. The 
Loviisa plant was reaching its original design age 
in 2007–2010, but the technical and economical 
lifetime of the plant is estimated to be at least 50 
years according to the current knowledge of the 
plant ageing. Based on the application, Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) carried out 
a comprehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 
when STUK provided the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (former Ministry of Trade and 
Industry) with its statement on the safety of the 
plant (see more details in Annex 2). The Finnish 
Government granted in July 2007 to Fortum new 
Operating Licences for unit 1 until the end of 2027 
Figure 1. Loviisa nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. 
Source: Fortum.
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and for unit 2 until the end of 2030. The length of 
the Operating Licences corresponds to the current 
goal for the plant’s lifetime, which is 50 years. Two 
periodic safety reviews (by the end of the year 2015 
and 2023) are to be carried out by the licensee as a 
licence condition.
Due to consistent plant improvements, the safe-
ty level of the plant has been increased as shown 
by the probabilistic risk assessment (see Article 
14). For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest ongo-
ing improvement is the complete renewal of the 
plant I&C system, where the safety classified parts 
of the project are intended to be completed in 2017.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent, additional safety improvements have been 
initiated at the Loviisa NPP. The issues under 
planning and implementation include among other 
things:
•	 Installation of independent cooling towers for 
decay heat removal from the reactor core and 
from the spent fuel pools. The cooling towers 
would provide an alternative ultimate heat sink 
in case of loss of sea water cooling and they 
were considered already before the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident due to the increased risks of 
oil transport on the Finnish Gulf. Installation of 
the towers is planned for 2014.
•	 Flood protection. The utility has estimated the 
effects of high sea level to the plant behav-
iour. The utility will submit a detailed plan on 
improved flood protection in 2014 (protection 
during annual maintenance shutdown already 
partly implemented).
•	 Design plans of diverse cooling water supply 
to the spent fuel pools have been submitted to 
STUK in 2013.
•	 Evaluation of the availability of cooling water 
and emergency diesel fuel in case of simulta-
neous accidents at multiple reactor units and 
other nuclear facilities at the same site.
Plant lifetime management includes credible pro-
cedures for the follow-up of the plant ageing. The 
conditions of components which are practically 
impossible to be replaced by new ones (pressure 
vessel, steam generators, etc.) are monitored most 
actively. One specific issue with Loviisa plant units 
is the risk of reactor pressure vessel brittle frac-
ture. Several modifications have been made at both 
units to reduce the risk. Fortum submitted dur-
ing the latest operating licence renewal process a 
comprehensive analysis based on which the brittle 
fracture risk can be managed until the end of the 
50 years plant lifetime. The permit renewal for the 
use of the reactor pressure vessels was carried out 
at the Loviisa unit 2 in 2010 and at the Loviisa 
unit 1 in 2012. STUK approved the applications 
to extend the operation of the pressure vessels at 
the both units to the end of the operating licence, 
i.e. until the end of 2027 for the Loviisa unit 1 and 
until the end of 2030 for the Loviisa unit 2.
The large plant modernisation projects car-
ried out at the Loviisa nuclear power plant and 
STUK’s safety reviews are described in more detail 
in Article 18 and in Annex 2. During recent years, 
only minor operational events have been taken 
place and no major safety issues have appeared 
(see also Article 19).
In addition to the regulatory oversight and safe-
ty assessment, there have been independent safety 
reviews conducted by international organisations 
such as IAEA and WANO (World Association of 
Nuclear Operators). IAEA OSART (Operational 
Safety Review Team) missions have been organ-
ised at the Loviisa power plant in November 1990 
and March 2007 with a latest follow-up review in 
July 2008. The WANO peer reviews have been car-
ried out at the Loviisa nuclear power plant at the 
beginning of 2001 and in March 2010. A follow-up 
for the last WANO peer review was carried out in 
April 2012.
In 2011, the net production of the Loviisa unit 1 
was 4030 GWh and the load factor was 94.7%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 
17 days. The net production of the Loviisa unit 
2 was 4040 GWh, the load factor 94.8% and the 
length of the refuelling and maintenance outage 
was 19 days. The annual collective radiation doses 
were 0.43 manSv and 0.29 manSv for Loviisa units 
1 and 2 respectively.
In 2012, the net production of the Loviisa unit 1 
was 3650 GWh, the load factor was 84.0% and the 
refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 54 days. 
The net production of the Loviisa unit 2 was 3960 
GWh, the load factor was 91.3%, and the refuelling 
and maintenance outage lasted 20 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2012 were 1.35 manSv for 
the Loviisa unit 1 and 0.33 manSv for the Loviisa 
unit 2.
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Figure 2. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. 
Source: TVO.
Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2
The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units were 
connected to the electrical network in September 
2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) and February 18, 1980 
(Olkiluoto 2). The nominal thermal power of both 
Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW, which was licensed in 
1998. The new power level is 115.7% as compared 
to the earlier nominal power 2160 MW licensed in 
1983. The original power level of both units was 
2000 MW. The Operating Licences of the units are 
valid until the end of 2018.
The latest periodic safety review (PSR) of 
the Olkiluoto plant took place in 2007–2009. 
Regulatory guide YVL 1.1 specifies the contents 
of the PSR. For a separate periodic safety review 
without operating licence renewal, STUK shall 
be provided with similar safety-related reports as 
in applying for the operating licence or operating 
licence renewal. STUK made a decision concerning 
the PSR in October 2009. The decision included 
also STUK’s safety assessment which provided a 
summary of the reviews, inspections and continu-
ous oversight carried out by STUK.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent, additional safety improvements have been 
initiated at the Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2. The 
issues under planning include among other things:
•	 Assessing possibilities to ensure cooling of the 
reactor core in case of total loss of AC supplies 
and systems. Evaluations of feasible solutions 
are under way.
•	 Ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water 
system pumps independently of availability of 
the sea water cooling systems. The modification 
is planned for 2014–2015.
•	 Design plans of diverse cooling water supply to 
the spent fuel pools will be completed in 2013.
•	 The utility is assessing plans for new mobile 
equipment (diesel generators, pumps).
•	 Evaluation of the availability of cooling water 
and emergency diesel fuel in case of accidents 
at multiple reactor units and other nuclear fa-
cilities at the same site.
The large plant modernisation projects carried out 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and STUK’s 
safety reviews are described in more detail in 
Annex 3. During recent years, only minor opera-
tional events have taken place and no major safety 
issues have appeared (see also Article 19).
In addition to the regulatory safety assess-
ment, there have been independent safety reviews 
conducted by international organisations. IAEA 
OSART mission has been organised at Olkiluoto 
in March 1986. The WANO peer reviews have been 
carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 
1999, in 2006 with a follow-up review in 2009, and 
in 2012.
In 2011, net production at the Olkiluoto unit 
1 was 7290 GWh and the load factor 94.8%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 1 lasted 9 days. The net production 
of the Olkiluoto unit 2 was 6910 GWh and the 
load factor was 90.9%. The annual refuelling and 
maintenance outage of the Olkiluoto unit 2 lasted 
29 days. The collective radiation doses in 2008 
were 0.21 manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 1 and 0.76 
manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 2.
In 2012, net production at the Olkiluoto unit 1 
was 6970 GWh and the load factor was 90.4%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 1 lasted 31 days. The net produc-
tion of the Olkiluoto unit 2 was 7480 GWh and the 
load factor was 96.9%. The annual refuelling and 
maintenance outage of the Olkiluoto unit 2 lasted 
9 days. The collective radiation doses in 2012 
were 0.53 manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 1 and 0.19 
manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 2.
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Olkiluoto NPP unit 3
Construction Licence application for the fifth nu-
clear power plant unit in Finland on the Olkiluoto 
site was submitted by TVO to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (predecessor of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy) in January 2004. 
The new unit, Olkiluoto 3 is a 1600 MWe European 
Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), the design of 
which is based on the French N4 and German 
Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn key delivery is pro-
vided by the Consortium Areva NP and Siemens. 
The technical requirements for Olkiluoto unit 
3 were specified by using the European Utility 
Requirements (EUR) document as a reference. 
TVO’s specifications complemented the EUR 
mainly in those points where Finnish require-
ments are more stringent. STUK gave its state-
ment in January 2005 on nuclear safety based on 
the review of the licensing documentation and the 
Government issued the Construction Licence in 
February 2005.
Construction work is going on and next li-
censing step is the Operating Licence. Operating 
Licence is needed prior to loading nuclear fuel 
into the reactor core. IAEA has agreed to carry out 
a pre-OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) 
mission to Olkiluoto NPP before the fuel loading. 
Licensing and construction of the Olkiluoto unit 3 
is described in more detail in Annex 4.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi ac-
cident, additional safety improvements have also 
been initiated for the Olkiluoto NPP unit 3. The 
licensee has assessed possibilities to implement 
external feed water connections to the steam gen-
erator secondary side, connections to external AC 
power supply and external make-up water injec-
tion into the reactor cooling system during refuel-
ling outages in order to have independent means 
to fulfil residual heat removal function in case 
plant’s normal systems are inoperable. In the fuel 
building, the possibility to use fire extinguishing 
water systems for coolong the spent fuel pools and 
boiling-out of the pool water have been evaluated. 
Additional mobile pumps to provide water injection 
into the fire fighting water system are to be ac-
quired before the start of operation of the Olkiluoto 
unit 3.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 6.
Figure 3. Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 in construction phase in April 2013. Source: TVO.
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Article 7. Legislative and 
regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish 
and maintain a legislative and regulatory 
framework to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework 
shall provide for:
i. the establishment of applicable nation-
al safety requirements and regulations;
ii. a system of licensing with regard to nu-
clear installations and the prohibition 
of the operation of a nuclear installa-
tion without a licence;
iii. a system of regulatory inspection and 
assessment of nuclear installations to 
ascertain compliance with applicable 
regulations and the terms of licences;
iv. the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of licences, 
including suspension, modification or 
revocation.
Legislative and regulatory framework
The current nuclear energy legislation in Finland 
(see Annex 1) is based on the Nuclear Energy Act 
originally from 1987. The Act has been amended 22 
times during the years it has been in force: most 
changes are minor and originate from changes to 
other Finnish legislation. In 2008, nuclear energy 
legislation was updated to correspond to current 
level of safety requirements and the new Finnish 
Constitution which came into force in 2000. 
Together with a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree 
originally from 1988, the scope of this legislation 
covers e.g.
•	 the construction and operation of nuclear fa-
cilities; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for 
producing nuclear energy, including research 
reactors, facilities for extensive disposal of nu-
clear wastes, and facilities used for extensive 
fabrication, production, use, handling or storage 
of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes
•	 the possession, fabrication, production, transfer, 
handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear wastes 
as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
The current radiation protection legislation is 
based on the Radiation Act and Decree, both of 
which are from 1991 and take into account the 
ICRP Publication 60 (1990 Recommendations of 
the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection). Section 2, General principles, and 
Chapter 9, Radiation work, of the Act are applied 
to the use of nuclear energy.
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2011 
to include provisions on mining and milling op-
erations aimed at producing uranium or thorium. 
In 2012, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
with some minor clarifications and to extend the 
use of inspection organisations. Some other minor 
amendments were also made during 2011–2012 in 
nuclear and radiation legislation to reflect changes 
of other legislation. Amendments in other national 
legislation have not caused essential changes to 
the regulatory control of nuclear facilities nor to 
the safety requirements set for them.
Finland is a Member State of the European 
Union. In 2011 some amendments were done in 
the Nuclear Energy Act due to the Nuclear Safety 
Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom). In 
2013, the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation 
Act are under an amendment process to imple-
ment the Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 
2011 establishing a Community framework for the 
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste.
In 2012, the Finnish regulatory framework for 
nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed in the 
IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) peer 
review process. According to the IRRS recommen-
dations, some amendments need to be considered 
for the legislation concerning mainly the independ-
ency of STUK. The amendments to the Nuclear 
Energy Act and the Radiation Act are being pre-
pared in 2013.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, the 
Government issued in 2008 the following regula-
tions:
•	 Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (733/2008)
•	 Government Decree on the Security in the Use 
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008)
•	 Government Decree on Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008)
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•	 Government Decree on the Safety of Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste (736/2008).
The Decrees 733/2008 and 735/2008 are applied 
to a nuclear power plant which is defined to be a 
nuclear facility equipped with a nuclear reactor for 
the purpose of electricity or heat production or a 
complex consisting of reactor units and other relat-
ed nuclear facilities located on the same plant site. 
The regulations are also applied to other nuclear 
facilities to the extent applicable. Decree 734/2008 
is applied to all use of Nuclear Energy, i.e., it covers 
all nuclear facilities and activities.
Decrees 733/2008 and 735/2008 will be amend-
ed in 2013 mainly due to tightening of safety re-
quirements after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident and new WENRA Safety objectives. A 
Government Decree on the safety of mining and 
milling operations aimed at producing uranium or 
thorium is being prepared in 2013.
As described above, nuclear legislation has been 
amended several times and therefore the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy has started an 
evaluation of the need of a comprehensive reform 
of the legislation.
At the same time with the international negotia-
tions to update the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
on Nuclear Liability also the Finnish Nuclear 
Liability Act was reviewed by a special govern-
mental committee already in 2002. The financial 
provisions to cover the possible damage and re-
sulting costs caused by a nuclear accident have 
been arranged according to the Paris and Brussels 
Conventions. A remarkable increase in the sum 
available for compensation of nuclear damages is 
expected in the future since international nego-
tiations about the revision of the Paris/Brussels 
agreements on nuclear liability were successfully 
completed in 2004. In addition to the revised agree-
ments, Finland has decided to enact unlimited li-
censee liability by law. This means, that insurance 
coverage will be required for a minimum amount 
of EUR 700 million and the liability of Finnish op-
erators shall be unlimited in cases where nuclear 
damage has occurred in Finland and also the third 
tier of the Brussels Supplementary Convention 
(providing cover up to EUR 1500 million) has been 
exhausted. The revised law will also have some 
other improvements, like extending the claiming 
period up to 30 years for victims of nuclear ac-
cidents (personal injuries). The law amendment 
(2005) has not taken effect yet. It will enter into 
force at a later date as determined by Government 
Decree. The entering into force of the amending 
act will take place as the 2004 Protocols amending 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions will enter into 
force.
As the ratification of the 2004 Protocols has 
been delayed, Finland made a temporary amend-
ment in the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, 
implementing the provision on unlimited liability 
and requirement of insurance coverage for a mini-
mum amount of EUR 700 million by the operator. 
The temporary law came into force in January 
2012 and will be repealed when the 2005 law 
amendment takes effect. In Finland, the finishing 
off the international ratification process of the con-
vention amendments without any undue delay is 
considered to be extremely important.
Provision of regulatory guidance
According to Section 7 r of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK shall specify detailed safety requirements 
concerning the implementation of safety level in 
accordance with the Act. These requirements are 
presented in regulatory guides which are called 
YVL Guides. STUK shall specify the safety re-
quirements it sets and publish them as part of the 
regulations issued by the STUK.
The safety requirements of STUK are binding 
on the licensee, while preserving the licensee’s 
right to propose an alternative procedure or solu-
tion to that provided for in the regulations. If the 
licensee can convincingly demonstrate that the 
proposed procedure or solution will implement 
safety level in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK may approve this procedure or solution.
The procedure to apply new guides to existing 
nuclear facilities is such that the publication of 
an YVL Guide does not, as such, alter any previ-
ous decisions made by STUK. After having heard 
those concerned, STUK makes a separate decision 
on how a new or revised YVL Guide applies to 
operating nuclear power plants, or to those under 
construction, and to licensee’s operational activi-
ties as well as to other nuclear facilities related 
to nuclear waste management and disposal and 
to the research reactor. To new nuclear facilities, 
however, the guides apply as such.
Nowadays the most important references con-
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sidered in rulemaking are the IAEA safety stand-
ards, especially the Requirements-documents, and 
WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association) Safety Reference Levels. Also the 
WENRA Safety Objectives for new reactors and 
the WENRA positions on some key technical issues 
are considered. Other sources of safety informa-
tion are worldwide co-operation with other coun-
tries using nuclear energy, e.g. OECD/NEA, MDEP 
(Multinational Design Evaluation Programme) 
and VVER Forum. The Finnish policy is to par-
ticipate actively in the international discussions 
on developing safety standards and adopt or adapt 
the new safety requirements into national regula-
tions. At the moment STUK has a set of about 70 
regulatory guides in force (see Annex 1). The regu-
latory guides have been continuously re-evaluated 
for updating.
After amending the nuclear energy legislation in 
2008, also the revision of the existing nuclear safety 
guide system (YVL Guides) has been commenced. 
The updating of regulatory guides on security ar-
rangements is also included in the ongoing activity. 
The main objectives of this effort on the revision of 
the guide system have been the following:
•	 to restructure the guide system to better reflect 
the various areas of safety; at the same time 
to limit the total number of guides and need 
for cross-referencing between the guides (see 
Figure 4)
B  Plant and system design 
B.1  Design of the safety systems of a nuclear facility 
B.2  Classification of systems, structures and 
equipment of a nuclear facility 
B.3  Safety assessment a NPP 
B.4  Nuclear fuel and reactor 
B.5  Reactor coolant circuit of a NPP 
B.6  Containment of a NPP 
B.7  Preparing for the internal and external 
threats to a nuclear facility 
B.8  Fire protection of a nuclear facility  
Structure of the new YVL guides
A  Safety management of a nuclear facility 
A.1  Regulatory control of the safe use of nuclear energy 
A.2  Siting of a nuclear facility 
A.3  Management systems of a nuclear facility 
A.4  Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility 
A.5  Construction of a NPP 
A.6  Operation and accident management of a NPP 
A.7  Risk management of a NPP 
A.8  Ageing management of a nuclear facility 
A.9  Reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility 
A.10  Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility 
A.11  Security arrangements of a nuclear facility
A.12 Control of information security on a nuclear facility
E  Structures and equipment of a nuclear facility
  
E.1  Inspection, testing and certifying organisations 
E.2  Manufacture and use of nuclear fuel 
E.3  Pressure vessels and pipings of a nuclear facility 
E.4  Verification of strength of pressure equipment of 
a nuclear facility 
E.5  In-service inspections of pressure equipment of 
a nuclear facility
D  Nuclear materials and waste 
D.1  Regulatory control of nuclear non-proliferation 
D.2  Transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste 
D.3  Handling and storage of nuclear fuel 
D.4  Handling of low- and intermediate-level waste and 
decommissioning of a nuclear facility 
D.5  Final disposal of nuclear waste 
D.6  Production of uranium and torium 
C  Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment 
C.1  Structural radiation safety and radiation monitoring 
of a nuclear facility 
C.2  Radiation protection and dose control of the personnel 
of a nuclear facility 
C.3  Control and measuring of radioactive releases 
to the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.4  Radiological control of the environment of a nuclear facility
C.5  Emergency preparedness arrangements of a NPP
E.6  Buildings and structures of a nuclear facility 
E.7  Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.8  Valve units of a nuclear facility 
E.9  Pump units of a nuclear facility 
E.10  Emergency power supply of a nuclear facility 
E.11  Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility
E.12 Testing organisations in nuclear facilities
Figure 4. The re-structured system of regulatory YVL Guides.
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•	 to compile requirements concerning related 
safety issues to the same guide making it easier 
to use by the licensees and other stakeholders; 
also they will be coupled to the stage of licens-
ing process
•	 to rewrite the separate requirements in such 
a way that each requirement will have its own 
number, be short and clearly stating who-what-
when shall be doing something; requirements 
are expressed in shall-format, descriptive text 
is provided only when necessary in the guide 
itself and additional information is provided in 
a separate justification memorandum (bases of 
the guide)
•	 when considering the requirements, special at-
tention is paid to the opportunities to limit un-
necessary prescriptiveness
•	 to update the contents of the regulatory guides, 
especially with the lessons learnt from the Olki-
luoto unit 3 project.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident it 
was decided to include lessons learned from the 
accident into the revised guides, which has de-
layed the completion of the new guides. The origi-
nal schedule was to have all of them ready by the 
end of 2011.The new revised schedule of the overall 
revision of YVL Guides is that all the new guides 
will be published during the autumn of 2013.
Considering the WENRA Safety Reference 
Levels published in 2007 and 2008, the Finnish 
policy is to include all of them in the revised 
regulatory guide system. This is confirmed already 
during the work through a systematic approach to 
earmark all the Reference Levels to certain guides.
To include the lessons from the TEPCO 
Fukushima accident in the new YVL Guides, a 
detailed plan was prepared in the beginning of 
2012. Available information from the accident and 
evaluation reports concerning the accident were 
considered in the preparation of the plan. Also the 
IAEA Action Plan and the draft WENRA report 
on Safety of new NPP designs were considered. 
The plan was revised in the end of 2012. In this 
revision the results of the European stress tests 
and the outcomes of the Extraordinary Meeting 
to the Convention on Nuclear Safety were con-
sidered. The most important changes that will be 
included in the new YVL Guides due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima accident deal with the design of NPPs 
and spent fuel storages, consideration of severe 
external hazards and with the requirements con-
cerning on-site emergency preparedness including 
multi-unit accidents.
System of licensing
The licensing process is defined in the legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facility 
is not allowed without a licence. The licences are 
been prepared by the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy and granted by the Government. The 
conditions for granting a licence are prescribed in 
the Nuclear Energy Act.
Before a Construction Licence for a nuclear 
power plant, nuclear waste disposal facility, or 
other significant nuclear facility can be applied, a 
Decision-in-Principle by the Government is needed. 
A condition for granting the Decision-in-Principle 
is that the operation of the facility in question is in 
line with the overall good of society. The municipal-
ity of the intended site of the nuclear facility has to 
be in favour of constructing the facility. There shall 
also be sufficient prerequisites for constructing 
the facility according to the Nuclear Energy Act: 
the use of nuclear energy shall be safe; it shall not 
cause injury to people, or damage to the environ-
ment or property.
The coming into force of the Decision-in-
Principle further requires that it will be con-
firmed by the simple majority of the Parliament. 
The Parliament can not make any changes to the 
Decision; it can only approve it or reject it as it is. 
The parties involved in the Decision-in-Principle 
process and their tasks are described in Figure 
5. In Decision-in-Principle phase STUK prepares 
a statement on safety and preliminary safety as-
sessment concerning the applicant, the proposed 
plant designs and plant sites. STUK asks also a 
statements e.g. from the Advisory Commission 
on Nuclear Safety and from the Ministry of the 
Interior concerning the emergency preparedness 
and physical protection arrangements.
For the Construction and Operating Licence 
application, the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy asks STUK’s statement on safety. 
Construction and Operating Licence documents to 
be submitted to STUK for approval in this phase 
are defined in Sections 35 and 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. STUK asks also statements e.g. 
from the Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety 
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Parliament:
Confirms Decision in Principle
Government:
Makes licensing decisions
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy:
Conducts preparations
Three step 
licensing:
• Decision in Principle
• Construction Licence
• Operating Licence
Public, other authorities, 
and expert organisations
STUK 
(regulatory body)
Municipality
of plant site
Expert 
organisations
Applicant
Suppliers
nuclear industry
Nuclear safety  
advisory commission
Safety documents
Regulatory 
review and 
oversight
Application
Advice
Statement on safety 
Agreement on site in
Decision in Principle 
(veto right)
Opinions, statements
Figure 5. Licensing of nuclear facilities in Finland.
and from the Ministry of the Interior. After re-
ceiving all statements for the Construction or 
Operating Licence, the Government will make its 
decision.
System of licensing was assessed in the IRRS 
mission conducted in Finland in October 2012. 
The IRRS team gave a recommendation that the 
Finnish Government should seek to modify the 
Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly and 
unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal authorities 
in the authorization process for safety. In particu-
lar, the changes should ensure that STUK has the 
legal authority to specify any licence conditions 
necessary for safety.
Decision-in-Principle procedure was been ap-
plied several times over the past 13 years. First 
time DiP procedure was applied for a nuclear 
power plant unit during the period November 2000 
– May 2002 when Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) 
applied a Decision-in-Principle for the fifth NPP 
unit in Finland and the Government approved it 
and the Parliament confirmed the approval. The 
DiP procedure was already earlier applied when 
the DiP application of Posiva Oy for spent fuel dis-
posal facility was confirmed by the Parliament in 
2001 and also in connection with confirmation in 
May 2002 by the Parliament of the Government’s 
Decision-in-Principle for expanding the capacity of 
spent fuel disposal facility to cover the spent fuel 
from the fifth reactor. The Decision-in-Principle 
procedure was also applied during the period 
April 2008 – July 2010 when three applications 
for new nuclear power plants (Fennovoima Oy, 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy and TVO), and two 
applications for expanding the planned capacity of 
the future spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto 
were first handled by the Government and subse-
quently approved by the Parliament (see Article 
14). The DiP application of Fortum regarding the 
proposed new Loviisa unit 3 and the correspond-
ing DiP application to expand the capacity of the 
spent fuel disposal facility were not approved by 
the Government.
In accordance with Section 108 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, the different phases of construction 
of a nuclear facility may be begun only after STUK 
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has, on the basis of the Construction Licence ap-
plication documents and other detailed plans and 
documents it requires, verified in respect of each 
phase that the safety-related factors and safety reg-
ulations have been given sufficient consideration.
Review of the detailed design of structures and 
equipment can be begun after STUK has found 
that the system-level design data of the system 
concerned are sufficient and acceptable. This as-
sessment may take place as part of the review of 
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report or sepa-
rate system-specific descriptions, which are subse-
quently added to the Final Safety Analysis Report.
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of 
the facility in detail. The purpose is to ensure that 
the safety and quality requirements, regulations 
for pressure equipment and approved plans are 
complied with and that the nuclear facility is con-
structed in other respects in accordance with the 
regulations. In particular, the oversight is aimed to 
verify that working methods ensuring high quality 
are employed for the construction.
Before loading fuel into the reactor, an 
Operating Licence is needed. The Operating 
Licences are granted for a limited period of time. 
This period has been at the beginning of Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto NPP operations five years and then 
about ten years. The periodic re-licensing has al-
lowed good opportunities for a comprehensive, 
periodic safety review. Current operating licences 
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto units are valid for 
about 20 years, but periodic safety reviews (PSRs) 
are required as a condition of continued operation 
in the licences.
System of regulatory inspection 
and assessment
The legislation provides the regulatory control sys-
tem for the use of nuclear energy. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for 
the regulatory oversight of the safety of the use 
of nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities 
of STUK are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Safety review and assessment as well as inspection 
activities are covered by the regulatory oversight.
Oversight during operation
STUK’s oversight during plant operation includes 
periodic inspection programme, continuous over-
sight performed by STUK’s resident inspectors, 
regular reporting and reporting of events and over-
sight performed at the plant site during operation 
and maintenance outages.
STUK’s periodic inspection programme is fo-
cused on the licensee’s main working processes and 
covers the most relevant areas of nuclear power 
plant safety. The objective of the inspection pro-
gramme is to assess the safety level at the plants 
as well as safety management. Possible problems 
at the plants and in procedures of the operating 
organisations are to be recognised.
Inspection programme has been modified dur-
ing the years. Latest changes were made in 2012, 
when inspection programme was updated and 
additional tools for organisational oversight was 
introduced into all inspections. Each year STUK 
defines the programme for the next year, including 
additional inspections as necessary. In addition to 
the periodic inspection programmes, STUK con-
ducts unannounced inspections if seen necessary.
STUK has put special emphasis on the manage-
ment of the entire inspection programme, includ-
ing the timely conduct, resource allocation and 
accurate reporting of results, but there are some 
issues which can be further improved. Periodic 
inspection programme was assessed in the IRRS 
mission conducted in Finland in October 2012. 
The IRRS mission team suggested that STUK can 
further enhance the effectiveness of its inspection 
activities by enhancing the focus of inspection 
on the most safety-significant areas, by defining 
more concrete criteria for reactive inspections and 
conducting higher number of unannounced inspec-
tions. STUK is updating the internal guidance of 
the periodic inspection programme by the end of 
year 2013 taking into account the IRRS recommen-
dations and suggestions. In addition, unannounced 
inspections are included in the yearly inspection 
programmes.
In the event review, the safety significance of 
the event is first evaluated based on the informa-
tion given by the operator and STUK’s resident 
inspectors. Later operating experience is reported 
to STUK as an event report, which STUK evalu-
ates and may require additional information or 
actions. STUK maintains internal database for 
events which disseminates operating experiences 
and provides easy access to operational event re-
ports. STUK may assign own investigation team 
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for events deemed to have special importance, es-
pecially when the operations at the nuclear power 
plant have not been performed as planned and 
expected. It is also possible to nominate an inves-
tigation team to investigate a number of events 
together in order to look for possible generic issues 
associated with the events. These inspections are 
usually conducted by a leadership of the STUK’s 
event investigation manager, and an investigation 
team includes normally 3–5 experts from STUK or 
from external organisations nominated on case-by-
case basis.
Numbers of operational events are followed 
through STUK’s plant performance indicator sys-
tem. Risk significance of operational events is fol-
lowed by PRA based indicators.
STUK’s oversight and safety assessment con-
cerning plant modifications is described in Article 
14.
Oversight during construction
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction 
of the facility in detail. Oversight consists of in-
spections within the frame of the Construction 
Inspection Programme and inspections on manu-
facturing and construction of systems, structures 
and components important to safety. In addition, 
STUK has four resident inspectors overseeing 
the construction, installations and commissioning 
work at the Olkiluoto site. Licensee reports regu-
larly about the progress of the construction.
To oversee the licensee’s performance in 
a construction project, STUK has established a 
Construction Inspection Programme. The purpose 
of the programme is to verify that the performance 
and organisation of the licensee ensure high-qual-
ity construction and implementation in accord-
ance with the approved designs while complying 
with the regulations and official decisions. The 
Construction Inspection Programme is divided into 
two main levels: the upper level assesses the licen-
see’s general operations to manage the construc-
tion, such as safety management and safety cul-
ture, organisation, corrective actions programme, 
the licensee’s expertise and use of expertise and 
project quality management. The next level, known 
as the operation level, assesses e.g. project quality 
assurance, training of the operating personnel, uti-
lisation of the PRA, radiation safety issues, and li-
censee’s review and assessment process for system, 
structure and component-specific design reviews 
and inspections in the various fields of technology. 
Furthermore, the emergency response arrange-
ments during construction, physical protection, fire 
protection and nuclear waste treatment are sub-
jects of the Construction Inspection Programme as 
far as the scope is considered necessary by STUK. 
In addition to the above-mentioned inspections, of 
which the licensee is informed in advance, STUK 
carries out inspections without prior notice at 
its discretion. Construction Inspection Programme 
was also assessed in the IRRS mission and the 
recommendations and suggestions given for the 
periodic inspection programme of the operating 
plants concern also the Construction Inspection 
Programme. STUK is updating the internal guid-
ance of the Construction Inspection Programme by 
the end of year 2013.
STUK performs inspections on manufacturing 
and construction of buildings, concrete and steel 
structures, and components as specified in YVL 
Guides. Inspections are determined in details when 
STUK reviews component or structure specific con-
struction plans. Inspections are defined either as 
hold or witness points. Licensee is responsible for 
inviting STUK to perform the inspection at a right 
time. Goal of the inspections is to verify that manu-
facturer, vendor and licensee have performed their 
duties as expected and that QC results of manufac-
turing and construction are acceptable. In addition, 
STUK performs inspections on installation and 
commissioning of systems, structures and compo-
nents. The safety class of systems, structures and 
components as well as the complexity of the SSCs 
are taken into account when determining the scope 
of inspections. On the licensee’s application, STUK 
may approve separate inspection organisations to 
carry out specified regulatory control duties.
Enforcement
The Nuclear Energy Act defines the enforcement 
system and rules for suspension, modification or 
revocation of a licence. The enforcement system in-
cludes provisions for executive assistance if needed 
and for sanctions in case the law is violated. The 
enforcement tools and procedures of the regulator 
are considered to fully meet the needs.
In practice, the enforcement tools include: oral 
notice or written request for action by the inspec-
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Figure 6. Co-operation and interfaces between STUK and Ministries and other organisations.
tor, and written notice or order for actions by 
STUK. Actions can include shutting down the 
plant operation immediately or decrease of reac-
tor power and for unlimited time. Legally stronger 
instruments would be 1) setting a conditional im-
position of a fine, 2) threatening with interruption 
or limiting the operation and, 3) threatening that 
STUK enforces the neglected action to be made at 
the licensee’s expense.
The repertoire of these tools together with some 
practical examples for implementing them has 
been presented in an internal policy document as 
part of STUK’s Quality System.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 7.
Article 8. Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or 
designate a regulatory body entrusted with 
the implementation of the legislative and 
regulatory framework referred to in Article 
7, and provided with adequate authority, 
competence and financial and human re-
sources to fulfil its assigned responsibili-
ties.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure an effective sepa-
ration between the functions of the regula-
tory body and those of any other body or or-
ganization concerned with the promotion 
or utilization of nuclear energy.
STUK in the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the over-
all authority in the field of nuclear energy is the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The 
Ministry prepares matters concerning nuclear 
energy to the Government for decision-making. 
Among other duties, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy is responsible for the formulation 
of a national energy policy.
The mission of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) is ‘to protect people, so-
ciety, environment, and future generations from 
harmful effects of radiation’. STUK is an inde-
pendent governmental organisation for the regu-
latory control of radiation and nuclear safety as 
well as nuclear security and nuclear materials. 
STUK is administratively under the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Interfaces to ministries 
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and governmental organisations are described in 
Figure 6. It is emphasised that the regulatory con-
trol of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy 
is independently carried out by STUK. No Ministry 
can take for its decision-making a matter that has 
been defined by law to be on the responsibility 
of STUK. STUK has no responsibilities or duties 
which would be in conflict with regulatory control.
The current Act on STUK was given in 1983 
and the Decree in 1997. According to the Decree, 
STUK has the following duties:
•	 regulatory oversight of safety of the use of nu-
clear energy, emergency preparedness, security 
and nuclear materials
•	 regulatory control of the use of radiation and 
other radiation practices
•	 monitoring of the radiation situation in Fin-
land, and maintaining of preparedness for ab-
normal radiation situations
•	 maintaining national metrological standards in 
its field of activity
•	 research and development work for enhancing 
radiation and nuclear safety
•	 informing on radiation and nuclear safety is-
sues, and participating in training activities in 
the field
•	 producing expert services in the field of its ac-
tivity
•	 making proposals for developing the legislation 
in the field, and issuing general guides concern-
ing radiation and nuclear safety
•	 participating in international co-operation in 
the field, and taking care of international con-
trol, contact or reporting activities as enacted 
or defined.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regula-
tory oversight. The responsibilities and rights of 
STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of nu-
clear energy, are provided in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. They cover the safety review and assessment 
of licence applications, and the regulatory over-
sight of the construction, operation and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility. The regulatory over-
sight of nuclear power plants is described in detail 
in the Guide YVL 1.1. STUK has e.g. legal rights to 
require modifications to nuclear power plants, to 
limit the power of plants and to require shutdown 
of a plant when necessary for safety reasons, as 
described in Article 7.
STUK does not grant any construction or op-
erating licences for nuclear facilities. However, in 
practice no such licence would be issued without 
STUK’s statement where the fulfilment of the 
safety regulations is confirmed as described in 
Article 7.
STUK’s Advisory Committee was established in 
March 2008. Advisory Committee helps STUK to 
develop its functions as a regulatory, research and 
expert organisation in such a way that the activi-
ties are in balance with the society’s expectations 
and the needs of the citizens. Advisory Committee 
can also make assessments of the STUK’s actions 
and give recommendations to STUK.
An Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety 
has been established in 1988 by a Decree. This 
Commission gives advice to STUK on important 
safety issues and regulations. The Commission 
also gives its statements on licence applications. 
The Commission has now two international com-
mittees, one for reactor safety and one for waste 
safety issues. In addition, an Advisory Committee 
on Radiation Safety has been established for advis-
ing the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs. The 
members of the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Safety and the Advisory Committee on Radiation 
Safety are nominated by the Government.
To assist STUK’s work in nuclear security, an 
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was es-
tablished in 2009. The members of the committee 
come from the various Finnish authorities, and the 
nuclear licensees also have their representatives. 
The duties of the committee include the assess-
ment of the threats in the nuclear field as well as 
consultation to STUK in important security issues. 
The committee also aims to follow and promote 
both the international and internal co-operation in 
the field of nuclear security.
STUK is responsible for informing the public 
and media on radiation and nuclear safety. STUK 
aims to communicate proactively, openly, timely 
and understandably. A prerequisite for successful 
communication is that STUK is known among me-
dia and general public and the information given 
by STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication 
is based on best available information. STUK’s web 
site is an important tool in communication. It is 
important that the web pages are professionally 
edited and updated regularly. The information on 
web pages must be easy to find and understand-
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able. Internal communication provides the person-
nel information about STUK’s activities and sup-
ports its capability in participating in the external 
communication.
STUK’s role and responsibilities have been as-
sessed by a peer review. Full-scope IRRT mission 
(IAEA’s International Regulatory Review Team) 
was carried out in 2000 and a follow-up mission in 
2003. IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service) was carried out in October 2012.
In the latest IRRS mission, 18 international 
experts and 5 IAEA staff members reviewed regu-
latory activities in Finland on the basis of IAEA 
Safety Standards, International practices and ex-
periences and lessons learned from the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The scope of the 
mission was nuclear facilities, except the research 
reactor FiR-1 (preparations for environmental im-
pact assessment for decommissioning of this reac-
tor were commenced earlier in 2012), radiation 
sources and transport. In its preparations to this 
mission, STUK carried out a comprehensive self-
assessment and developed a preliminary action 
plan for improvement.
As a result of the IRRS mission, the review 
team recognised several strengths and good prac-
tices such as effective safety assessment of new 
nuclear power plants, STUK’s organisation and 
conduction of emergency exercises and active con-
tribution of STUK to the global improvement of 
radiation and nuclear safety. They identified also 
areas for improvement, such as a need to strength-
en the legislative framework by embedding in 
law the separation of STUK from entities having 
responsibilities or interests that could unduly in-
fluence its decisions, enhancing the effectiveness 
of STUK inspection activities and implementing of 
an independent monitoring programme for the en-
vironment of NPPs. STUK has developed its action 
plan for improvement on the basis of the IRRS mis-
sion results and the self-assessment. These actions 
have been included in STUK’s strategy, operating 
programmes and annual plans. Follow-up mission 
is preliminarily planned for 2015.
IAEA’s International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was carried out 
in Finland in 2009 and the follow-up in 2012.
Finance and resources of STUK
The organisational structure and the responsibili-
ties within STUK are described in the Management 
System of STUK. Also processes for regulatory 
oversight and other activities of STUK are present-
ed in the Management System. The organisation of 
STUK is described in the Figure 7.
STUK receives about 33% of its financial re-
sources through the government budget. However, 
the costs of regulatory oversight are charged in 
full to the licensees. The model of financing the 
regulatory work is called net-budgeting model and 
it has been applied since 2000. In this model the 
licensees pay the regulatory oversight fees directly 
to STUK. In 2012, the costs of the regulatory over-
sight of nuclear safety were 17 million €.
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its re-
sponsibilities. The net-budgeting model makes it 
possible to increase for example personnel resourc-
es based on needs in a flexible way.
At the end of 2012, number of staff in the de-
partment of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was 115. 
The number of staff has increased by 9 since the 
time of the fifth review meeting. The expertise of 
STUK covers all the essential areas needed in the 
oversight of the use of nuclear energy. As needed 
STUK orders independent analyses, review and 
assessment from technical support organisations 
to complement its own review and assessment 
work. The main technical support organisation 
of STUK is the VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland, but also Lappeenranta University of 
Technology (LUT) and Aalto University (former 
Helsinki University of Technology) are important. 
Also international technical support organisations 
and experts have been used, especially to sup-
port review and inspection activities related to 
Olkiluoto unit 3.
New personnel have been recruited since 2003 
mainly for the safety review and assessment and 
inspection activities related to the Olkiluoto unit 
3. The number of personnel in the department 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation over the period of 
2001–2012 is shown in Figure 8. The resources 
used for the oversight of existing nuclear power 
plants (Loviisa units 1 and 2 and Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2), Olkiluoto unit 3 which is under con-
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struction and new plant projects (Loviisa unit  3, 
Olkiluoto unit 4 and Fennovoima’s unit 1) are 
shown in Figure 9. Annual volume of the oversight 
of the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction was about 30 
man-year in 2012. Starting from year 2003, inspec-
tion organisations have been performing construc-
tion inspections in lower safety classes.
STUK has also increased the number of per-
sonnel in the areas of security of nuclear facilities 
as well as in activities related to nuclear waste 
management and disposal. In 2009, a separate unit 
for security with three experts was founded in the 
department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and in 
the end of 2012, 4 experts worked in this unit.
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Figure 7. Organisation of STUK. The total number of staff at the end of 2012 was 358.
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Ensuring competence
The management of STUK highlights the need for 
competent workforce. STUK has adopted a compe-
tence management system and nuclear safety and 
regulatory competencies are also emphasised in 
STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy is 
reflected into the annual training programmes, on 
the job training and new recruitments. The national 
nuclear safety and waste management research pro-
grammes have an important role in the competence 
building of all essential organisations involved in 
nuclear energy. These research programmes have 
two roles: for the first ensuring the availability of 
experts and for the second ensuring the on-line 
transfer of the research results to the organisations 
participating to the steering of the programmes and 
fostering the expertise. STUK has an important role 
in the steering of these programmes.
Most of the professional staff of STUK con-
ducting safety assessments and inspections has a 
degree of university level. The average experience 
of the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear field. 
The competence analysis is carried out on regular 
basis and the results are used as the basis for the 
training programmes and the new recruitments. 
The training programme includes internal courses 
as well as courses organised by external organisa-
tions. On an average 5 % of the annual working 
hours has been used to enhance the competence.
An induction programme is set up at STUK 
for all new recruited inspectors. In addition to 
administrative issues, the induction programme 
includes familiarisation with legislation, regula-
tory guidance and regulatory oversight practices. 
Programme is tailored to each new inspector and 
followed by the manager.
STUK has participated in the preparation and 
execution of a basic professional training course 
on nuclear safety with other Finnish organisations 
in the field. The first 6-week course commenced in 
September 2003 and the 11th basic professional 
training course will commence in autumn 2013. 
At the moment, over 600 newcomers and junior 
experts, of whom more than 70 have been from 
STUK, have participated in these courses. The 
content and structure of the course has been en-
hanced according to the feedback received from the 
participants.
In Finland, VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland is the largest research organisation in the 
field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 200 experts 
are working in the field of nuclear energy, about 
half of them full-time. The total volume of the nu-
clear energy research in Finland in the year 2012 
was over 75 million € (estimate of the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy). This figure 
includes research related to use of nuclear energy 
made in all the stakeholder organisations. Two 
thirds of the research is focused on the final dispos-
al of the spent fuel. The largest individual organi-
zations are VTT, LUT (Lappeenranta University of 
Technology), GTK (Geological Survey of Finland), 
and Aalto University (former Helsinki University 
of Technology, HUT).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 
to ensure funding for a long-term nuclear safe-
ty and nuclear waste management research in 
Finland. Funds are collected annually from the 
licence holders to a special fund. Regarding nuclear 
safety research the amount of money is propor-
tional to the actual thermal power of the licensed 
power plants or the thermal power presented in 
the Decision-in-Principle. For the nuclear waste 
research, the annual funding payments are propor-
tional to the current fund holdings for the future 
waste management activities.
The research projects are selected so that they 
support and develop the competences in nuclear 
safety and to create preparedness for the regula-
tor to be able to respond on emerging and urgent 
safety issues. The topics of the recent nuclear 
safety research programme (SAFIR2014) are or-
ganisation and human factors, automation and 
control room, fuel and reactor physics, thermal 
hydraulics, severe accidents, structural safety of 
reactor circuit, construction safety, probabilistic 
safety analysis and development of research in-
frastructure. The amount of money collected from 
the licensees in year 2012 was about 5.6 million € 
for nuclear safety research. The research projects 
have also additional funding from other sources. 
The total volume of the programme in 2012 was 
10 million €. As a result of the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident, a reassessment was made how 
the accident should be taken into account, and 
the research programme was supplemented with 
research topics related to natural hazards and 
multiple failure events, the adequacy and scope 
of nuclear power plant design basis, mitigating 
the impact of accidents (e.g. high concentration of 
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boron in the reactor circuit, hydrogen formation 
and transport, range of fission products released in 
core melt), and the overall life cycle of nuclear fuel 
including spent fuel pools.
The objective of KYT2014 (Finnish Research 
programme on Nuclear Waste Management) is to 
ensure the sufficient and comprehensive availabil-
ity of the nuclear technological expertise and other 
capabilities required by the authorities when com-
paring different nuclear waste management ways 
and implementation methods. KYT2014 is divided 
into three main categories:
•	 new and alternative technologies in nuclear 
waste management
•	 safety research in nuclear waste management 
and
•	 social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management,
and the main emphasis is on safety related re-
search. The programme is conducted during 2011–
2014 and the total annual funding is 2.8 M€, of 
which State Nuclear Waste Management Fund 
(VYR) covers 1.7 M€.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 8.
Article 9. Responsibility of 
the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that 
prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation rests with the holder of the rel-
evant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder 
meets its responsibility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with 
the licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. According to Section 9 of the Act, it shall 
be the licensee’s obligation to assure safe use of 
nuclear energy. Furthermore, it shall be the licen-
see’s obligation to assure such physical protection 
and emergency planning and other arrangements, 
necessary to ensure limitation of nuclear damage, 
which do not rest with the authorities.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body 
to verify that the licensees fulfil the regulations. 
This verification is carried out through continuous 
oversight, safety review and assessment as well 
as inspection programmes established by STUK. 
In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s 
commitment to the strong safety culture. The ob-
vious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these 
responsibilities are strict adherence of regula-
tions, prompt, timely and open actions towards 
the regulator in unusual situations, active role 
in developing the safety based on improvements 
of technology and science as well as effective ex-
ploitation of experience feedback. In addition to 
inspections and safety assessment, the follow-up 
of licensee’s efforts in achieving results is based on 
safety indicators. This system includes indicators 
e.g. for plant availability, incidents, probabilistic 
risk assessment results, safety system operability, 
radiation doses to personnel as well as releases to 
the environment and resulting radiation exposures 
to the general public.
Based on the Chapter 7 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, to ensure that the financial liability for the 
future management and disposal of nuclear wastes 
and for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
is covered, the nuclear power companies are every 
third year obliged to present estimates for future 
costs of these operations and take care that the 
required amount of money is set aside to the State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund. In order to 
provide for the insolvency of the nuclear utilities, 
they shall provide securities to the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy for the part of finan-
cial liability which is not yet covered by the Fund. 
At the end of the year 2012, the funded money (2 
160 million euros) covered most part of the whole 
liability (2 238 million euros). Under the Nuclear 
Energy Act, nuclear companies should supplement 
the fund by payment of 83 million euros in early 
April 2013 (see also Article 11).
The arrangements for the Olkiluoto unit 3 will 
follow the same lines after the start of the opera-
tion. The licensee with a waste management obli-
gation shall submit the waste management scheme 
and the calculations of waste management costs, 
which are based on the scheme, to the Ministry 
for approval for the first time early enough before 
beginning the operations producing nuclear waste, 
and at the latest in connection with the operat-
ing licence application. The waste management 
scheme shall cover all phases of waste manage-
ment including the decommissioning of the nuclear 
facilities and the final disposal of all arising nucle-
ar wastes. The scheme must be sufficiently detailed 
to allow the calculations for the assessed liability.
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The financial provisions to cover the possible 
damages to third parties caused by a nuclear ac-
cident have been arranged in Finland according 
to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to 
the revision of the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
in 2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited li-
censee’s liability by law (see Article 7). The revised 
law will also have some other modifications, such 
as extending the claiming period up to 30 years 
for victims of nuclear accidents. As the interna-
tional ratification of the 2004 Protocols has been 
delayed, Finland made a temporary amendment in 
the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, imple-
menting the provision on unlimited liability and 
requirement of insurance coverage for a minimum 
amount of EUR 700 million. The temporary law 
came into force in January 2012 and will be re-
pealed when the 2005 law amendment takes effect 
after the international ratification of the Paris and 
Brussels Conventions.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 9.
Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that all organizations 
engaged in activities directly related to nucle-
ar installations shall establish policies that 
give due priority to nuclear safety.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
safety culture and safety management
The importance of a good safety culture is em-
phasised in the Nuclear Energy Act and in the 
Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants (733/2008, Sections 21, 28 and 29), which 
state that when designing, constructing, operat-
ing and decommissioning a nuclear power plant, a 
good safety culture must be maintained by making 
sure that the decisions and activities of the entire 
organisation reflect commitment to safety. Licensee 
has to ensure that these requirements are applied 
in all organisations that participate in safety sig-
nificant activities. An open working atmosphere 
must be promoted to encourage identification, re-
porting and elimination of factors endangering 
safety, and the personnel must be given opportuni-
ty to contribute to the continuous enhancement of 
safety. According to the Nuclear Energy Act, a re-
sponsible director has to be appointed for the con-
struction and operation of a nuclear power plant. 
The appointment is subject to approval by STUK. 
The responsible director has a duty to ensure the 
safe use of nuclear energy and to see that the ar-
rangements for physical protection and emergency 
preparedness and the safeguards control are com-
plied with. The responsible director must have real 
possibilities to take effectively care of this duty.
STUK’s Guide YVL 1.4 sets general require-
ments for management systems. An updated guide 
YVL  A.3 concerning the management systems is 
under development and will be implemented dur-
ing 2013-2014. The new YVL A.3 is also based on 
IAEA GS-R-3, and it includes even more detailed 
requirements for promoting good safety culture 
than the current guide YVL 1.4. The management 
system must support the characteristics of the or-
ganisational culture that promote good safety cul-
ture, and the management must express its com-
mitment to safety. Safety culture expertise must be 
available for developing the safety culture. The de-
velopment of the safety culture must be target ori-
ented and systematic. The procedures used must 
strengthen a vigilant, questioning and initiative 
attitude at all levels of the organisation. The man-
agement system must also contain procedures for 
identification and continuous promotion of safety 
culture. The licensee has to also establish a process 
to measure, assess and improve its’ safety culture.
STUK is also developing a new YVL guide 
concerning nuclear facility construction and modi-
fications, i.e., YVL A.5. Also in this guide there are 
requirements concerning safety culture and risk 
management. During construction and modifica-
tions the licensee must ensure that the contribut-
ing parties are able to perform according to safety 
requirements and there must be training on safety 
culture issues for the personnel taking part in the 
activities. The licensee must have procedures for 
evaluating and developing the safety culture of the 
contributing parties. Guide YVL A.5 is planned to 
be published in 2013 and implemented at the exist-
ing nuclear power plants or plants under construc-
tion in 2013-2014. The new guide is applied as such 
to new nuclear facilities.
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident has high-
lighted the importance of safety culture and its 
continuous assessment and improvement. The 
Diet report in 2012 concluded that “fundamen-
tal causes of the accident are to be found in the 
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ingrained conventions of Japanese culture; our 
reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question au-
thority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; 
our groupism; and our insularity”. These ingrained 
conventions were seen as factors preventing nec-
essary stakeholders (Licensee, Regulatory Body 
and Government) to take needed actions to ensure 
safety and therefore also contradicting with good 
safety culture. The influence of ingrained conven-
tions in national culture is considered in Finland 
to be one of the key messages in the Diet report. 
To better understand the ingrained conventions in 
the Finnish culture and their possible positive and/
or negative impacts on safety culture, STUK has 
made a decision to conduct a research in the near 
future.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa NPP
Fortum Nuclear Competence Center consists of 
Loviisa NPP, Technical Support and the Nuclear 
Safety Oversight (NSO). NSO oversees the Fortum 
Nuclear operations and Loviisa NPP, is independ-
ent from operations and reports to the licensee 
management. Loviisa NPP has made organisation-
al changes that aim at also promoting the safety 
culture development. There is a unit especially 
dedicated for operational experience and safety 
culture. In addition, the Loviisa NPP has an inde-
pendent advisory body for safety issues, i.e., a nu-
clear safety committee with external expert mem-
bers. Fortum has established documented quality 
and safety policies for the Loviisa NPP.
Fortum has continued having international 
evaluations of safety management and procedures 
at the Loviisa NPP in order to improve its own 
operations. IAEA carried out an OSART safety 
review in Loviisa in March 2007, with a follow-up 
review in July 2008. WANO peer review was per-
formed in March 2010, with a follow-up review in 
April 2012. In the latest WANO follow-up review, 
WANO stated that most development actions were 
completed where as a couple of them are still in 
progress, although they have been appropriately 
started.
Loviisa NPP has conducted a safety culture self 
evaluation according to a renewed procedure dur-
ing 2012. Based on the results from the evaluation 
Loviisa NPP has formed an action plan.
Fortum has continued the special training pro-
gramme for the Loviisa NPP contractors, with 
which the licensee aims to ensure the right at-
titudes and safety culture among the contractors 
working at the NPP. In the training, Fortum com-
municates the safety-first-principle and nuclear 
and radiation safety issues for contractor person-
nel working at the site. The contractor training 
is valid only for a determined time and has to be 
repeated when expired. All contractors and suppli-
ers are regularly evaluated by Fortum to ensure 
that they can fulfil the regulatory and safety re-
quirements. Fortum has developed procedures for 
ensuring appropriate competence for the auditors 
conducting contractor evaluations and audits.
Olkiluoto NPP
The Olkiluoto NPP has worked several years with 
safety culture evaluation and development. The 
operator TVO has founded a special safety cul-
ture team that is independent from operations and 
construction. This team meets regularly about 10 
times a year and the mission is to form a compre-
hensive view of the safety culture situation in the 
whole TVO and report and give suggestions to the 
top management of the organisation. The NPP has 
had a safety culture specialist available who has 
facilitated the safety culture self evaluations and 
also implementations of different safety culture 
promoting methods. An example is the Human 
Performance Improvement program including peer 
checking, two way communication etc.
TVO has also an independent cross functional 
safety group that consists of specialists among 
NPP’s own staff and also external expert members 
that are called in for special topics.
TVO has assessed the safety culture of the 
Olkiluoto NPP through several methods. The safe-
ty culture issues have been regularly discussed in 
the safety group meetings. The self-assessment is 
repeated approximately every third year. Personnel 
surveys and the peer review method of the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) have 
also been utilised actively. TVO has also docu-
mented quality and safety policies for the Olkiluoto 
NPP and so called ‘Management Expectations’ fly-
ers, where the managers communicate very clearly 
their expectations for safe working and safety at-
titudes.
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TVO has continued using and developing the 
safety culture promotion and assessment methods 
concerning the Olkiluoto unit 3 project and the 
contributing parties. Assessment method consists 
of a questionnaire, interviews and analysis of 
safety observations, authority inspections and non-
conformance records. The Safety Culture report is 
prepared twice a year. Safety culture promotion 
methods include safety culture pilots, info tv and 
materials, regular safety culture meetings with the 
supplier and so on. A strong safety culture is also 
essential during the commissioning phase, which 
has been taken into account in cooperation with 
the commissioning personnel.
TVO administrates and follows up the compe-
tence of contractors that work at the plant regu-
larly or for longer terms. These contractors have 
to complete the same basic training as NPP’s own 
personnel as appropriate. Basic nuclear and radia-
tion safety training is prerequisite for all persons 
working at the site. Priority to safety is addressed 
in the training. TVO regularly audits and evalu-
ates contractors and suppliers to ensure that they 
can fulfil the regulatory and safety requirements.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has continued to regularly inspect the man-
agement systems of both licensees (Fortum and 
TVO) to ensure that they are fulfilling the require-
ments of the legislations and the Guide YVL 1.4. 
Based on the inspections, there is still need for 
development actions to fulfil the requirements es-
pecially concerning the process based management 
and supply chain management. The safety culture 
is also included as a topic in the STUK’s periodic 
inspection programme. During 2010–2013 the in-
spections have dealt with especially safety culture 
evaluation methods and management commitment 
for safety culture and the responsibility for the 
management to define and communicate the re-
quirement for a good safety culture. There is a spe-
cial top level inspection in the periodic inspection 
programme, “Management and Safety Culture”, 
that includes an assessment of safety culture is-
sues, management and leadership. Additionally, 
safety culture issues are included in quality as-
surance audits and event analyses. Safety culture 
related findings from different inspections are 
discussed in regular meetings in STUK and be-
tween the senior management of the nuclear power 
plants and the regulatory body.
In the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011, STUK 
conducted an event investigation concerning the 
Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator 
procurement. The investigation underlined the 
importance of strict supply chain management 
especially stressing the safety requirements and 
the communication of these during the whole pro-
curement and delivery process and to all involved 
parties. The importance of the management’s lead 
in enhancing safety culture and priority to safety 
was also recognised and unility’s attitude was also 
crucial in communication with all stake-holders.
STUK has developed a special inspection tool 
for gathering information about issues related to 
Human and Organisational Factors (HOF) within 
periodic inspection programme for operating NPPs. 
The tool was implemented during 2012. Based on 
the findings according to four predefined areas, 
i.e. personnel planning, communication, handling 
of non-conformances and process management, 
STUK can obtain an overall picture of the li-
censee’s situation concerning these HOF topics. 
STUK developed also in 2012 a special database 
for collecting HOF related findings made during 
the oversight of the Olkiluoto NPP unit 3. The 
IRRS mission team suggested that STUK should 
consider the development and implementation of a 
more systematic method for collection and assess-
ment of indications of the licensee’s safety culture. 
STUK will continue developing the collection and 
analysis of all HOF related findings by expanding 
the database for both operating NPPs and NPPs 
under construction.
STUK co-operates with VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland on safety culture related inspec-
tions and VTT is conducting a re-assessment on 
safety culture at the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction 
site. Safety culture related seminars have also 
been arranged together with both VTT and the 
licensees, and vendors.
Means used by regulatory body 
in its own activities
Safety is emphasised in the Quality Manuals of 
STUK as well as in the framework contract be-
tween STUK and its technical support organisa-
tion VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. 
STUK’s Quality Policy includes STUK’s values 
that give the highest priority to keeping the ra-
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diation exposure of people as low as reasonably 
achievable and preventing radiation and nuclear 
accidents. STUK has taken an active role in this 
area and both developed its own culture and taken 
the initiative in the assessment of cultures of the 
licensee organisations. The IRRS mission was car-
ried out in fall 2012 and the reviewers suggested 
that STUK could emphasise safety culture also in 
its quality manual in a more detailed way as well 
as to assure the safety consciousness of the staff. 
To meet this suggestion, STUK decided to update 
its management system and to include self-assess-
ment of safety culture into annual self-assessment 
programme.
Both the periodic inspection programme and 
the construction inspection programme are es-
tablished according to STUK’s strategic decisions 
about safety critical areas at NPPs. These ar-
eas are covered at least every third year at the 
operating nuclear power plants. STUK conducts 
self-assessments and personnel questionnaires to 
follow up the internal opinions regarding the pri-
ority devoted to different topics of nuclear safety. 
STUK arranges regularly training for the inspec-
tors and an introduction programme is set up for 
all new recruited inspectors. STUK has added 
resources to and reorganised the organisation that 
handles NPP security issues. Similarly STUK has 
strengthened its personal resources for the review 
of the construction licence application submitted 
by Posiva Oy at the end of 2012 for the spent fuel 
encapsulation and disposal facility in Olkiluoto.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 10.
Article 11. Financial and 
human resources
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that adequate 
financial resources are available to sup-
port the safety of each nuclear installation 
throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that sufficient 
numbers of qualified staff with appropri-
ate education, training and retraining are 
available for all safety-related activities in 
or for each nuclear installation, through-
out its life.
Financial resources
Nuclear Energy Act defines as a condition for 
granting a Construction or Operating Licence that 
the applicant has sufficient financial resources, 
necessary expertise and, in particular, that the op-
erating organisation and the competence of the 
operating staff are appropriate. According to the 
Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee shall also have 
adequate financial resources to take care of the 
safety of the plant. In addition, Nuclear Energy Act 
provides detailed regulations for the financial ar-
rangements for taking care of nuclear waste man-
agement. The Act on Third Party Liability provides 
regulations on financial arrangements for nuclear 
accidents, taking into account that Finland is a 
party to the Paris and Brussels conventions.
The financial preconditions are primarily as-
sessed by authorities other than STUK (mainly 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy). 
The financial position and business environment 
of the licensee also affect the safety of plants, and 
STUK therefore follows licensees’ plans to improve 
safety of nuclear power plants, as well as organi-
sational reforms, safety research conducted by 
licensees, the number of employees and the compe-
tence of personnel. The annual reports of Fortum 
Corporation and Teollisuuden Voima Oyj provide 
financial information on the utilities. Both utilities 
have annually invested typically about 40–50 M€ 
for maintaining the plant and improving safety. 
For example, TVO has recently made a decision to 
renew all emergency diesel generators where the 
overall investment is more than 100 M€.
A financing system for the costs of future waste 
management and decommissioning exists to en-
sure that the producers of nuclear waste bear their 
full financial liability on the coverage of those costs 
and that the costs can be covered even in case of 
insolvency of the waste generator. The pertinent 
licence-holders submit every three years for regu-
latory review the technical plans and cost calcula-
tions on which the liability estimates are based. 
After confirmation of the financial liabilities, the 
licensees pay fees to a State controlled Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund and provide securities 
for the liability not yet covered by the funded 
money. At the end of 2012, the funded money 
(2  160  million euros) covered most part of whole 
liability (2 238 million euros). Under the Nuclear 
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Energy Act, nuclear companies should supplement 
the fund by payment of 83 million euros in early 
April 2013.
Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensur-
ing that all the employees are qualified and author-
ised to their jobs. The regulatory requirements for 
human resources are stated in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Sections 7 and 20), the Government Decree on 
the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008) and 
STUK’s Guides YVL 1.6 and YVL 1.7. The Nuclear 
Energy Act Section 7 was modified during 2012 
with a demand to appoint also deputies for the 
responsible persons for emergency preparedness, 
security and safeguards. According to Section 30 
of the Government Decree 733/2008, significant 
functions with respect to safety within nuclear 
power plants must be designated, and training pro-
grammes must be prepared for development and 
maintenance of professional qualifications of the 
persons working in these positions. Adequate com-
mand of the functions in question must also be 
verified. The Guide YVL 1.6 sets requirements for 
NPP operator competence, and the Guide YVL 1.7 
for training and qualifications of personnel work-
ing in functions that are important for plant safety. 
The YVL Guides concerning human resources are 
currently being updated and will be replaced by 
the guide YVL A.4 during 2013. This new YVL 
guide has more specific requirements for safety 
critical positions, e.g. for responsible director and 
persons responsible for safeguards, emergency pre-
paredness and security. The guide also has specific 
requirements on management and leadership com-
petencies.
Human resource planning at the Loviisa NPP 
is based on a ten-year plan, which is subject to an-
nual management review and updating. Loviisa 
NPP has taken into use a project management 
procedure which includes a resource management 
approach that will support the NPP in evaluating 
and following up the resources needed for accom-
plishing the projects.
The training activities and procedures at the 
Loviisa NPP are constantly developing. Much re-
sponsibility is given to the line manager and the 
individual defining of qualification and training 
needs. The training unit can support the line or-
ganisation with their expertise, but the responsi-
bility for developing the specialist competence lies 
on the line organisation. The training unit’s main 
responsibility is to develop the human resource 
management procedures and organise the general 
training sessions. The training organisation has 
been strengthened with experts in behavioural 
sciences. Fortum has a procedure for setting up in-
dividual development plans for all newcomers and 
for persons changing positions. Fortum has defined 
the qualification needs for the different positions 
based on job descriptions, but the challenge is to 
break down the descriptions to real competencies 
and development needs. Loviisa NPP has to devel-
op more its strategic competence management to 
be able to ensure the resources needed for a longer 
term. STUK has by inspections identified a need 
for human resource development in, for example, 
quality assurance. Loviisa NPP has during 2012 
recruited some full time project managers and 
increased the quality management training to im-
prove the situation. Fortum has a full scope simu-
lator at the Loviisa NPP to ensure the training of 
operators. Fortum takes actively part in developing 
and executing the national nuclear safety training 
(YK) course to ensure competence for the nuclear 
field now but also in the coming years.
TVO has updated the personnel plan regu-
larly according to the phases of Olkiluoto NPP 
unit 3 construction phase and also considering 
the planning of the fourth reactor Olkiluoto unit 
4, for which TVO got the Government Decision in 
Principle in 2010. TVO has also started a trainee 
program for developing young recruits for a career 
at TVO. TVO has also during 2012 actively started 
to seek solutions for planning resources efficiently 
between projects and day to day operations. The 
ageing power plants and the more demanding 
safety requirements need more and more improve-
ment projects with critical time schedules. An effi-
cient plant modification and project procedure is of 
high importance for safe and successful operations. 
TVO has revised their training program and proce-
dures taking into account the commissioning of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 and the increasing need for sys-
tematic and strategic competence management due 
to the growing organisation (OL3, OL4). TVO uses 
an IT-system that supports the managers e.g. in 
defining and following up individual development 
plans. TVO has defined training requirements for 
each position or job that automatically will be in-
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cluded in the new recruited person’s development 
plan. In 2010 TVO had a WANO Technical Support 
Mission that gave TVO good bench-marking input 
for the development actions.
Personnel and human resources related issues 
are included in STUK’s periodic and construc-
tion inspection programmes at the nuclear pow-
er plants. A top level inspection of the periodic 
inspection programme, “Human Resources and 
Competence”, includes assessment of human re-
source management, competence development and 
training programmes. It also covers the licensee’s 
procedures for managing human resources and 
competence of suppliers, sub-suppliers and other 
partners participating in functions affecting safety. 
During the years 2010–2013 STUK has paid atten-
tion especially to personnel planning and ensuring 
resources in development and modification pro-
jects. STUK also participates in examinations of 
shift personnel, where the operators working in the 
control rooms show that they are conversant with 
all salient matters related to plant operation and 
safety. STUK further approves the appointment 
of certain key personnel, such as the responsible 
director and his/her deputies.
Ensuring an adequate national supply of ex-
perts in nuclear science and technology and high 
quality research infrastructure is recognised as 
a continuous challenge in Finland because of the 
retirement of large age groups, ongoing Olkiluoto 
unit 3 construction project and the new reactors, 
that got the government Decision in Principle in 
May 2010. In addition to the measures to maintain 
and develop the capabilities and amount of profes-
sional staff of STUK and the utilities, the similar 
requirements for maintaining and developing the 
human resources in the nuclear energy sector ap-
ply to VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
which acts as the main technical support organisa-
tion to STUK. In the same way one has to devote 
appropriate measures to develop the educational 
resources in technical universities and other high-
level universities in Finland.
The main organisations in the nuclear energy 
area develop and organise the basic professional 
training course on nuclear safety, which is a yearly 
held approximately 5-week training programme 
for students and staff members of the partici-
pating organisations (STUK, the licensees, VTT, 
Aalto University and Lappeenranta University 
of Technology, Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy).
During 2010–2012 a committee set up by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy worked 
on a report aiming at giving recommendations 
and steps to be taken until the 2020’s for ensuring 
competence and resources needed for the nuclear 
sector. STUK was an active part in this commit-
tee. One of the recommendations of the committee 
was: The future needs and focus areas of Finnish 
nuclear energy sector research must be accurately 
defined and a long-term strategy drawn up for 
further development of research activities. This 
calls for a separate joint project among research 
organisations and other stakeholders in the field. 
The report can be found on http://www.TEM.fi/
files/33099/TEMjul_14_2012_web.pdf.
At the end of January 2013 the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy set up a working 
group to prepare a research and development 
strategy. The objectives of the working group in-
clude the following tasks: (1) definition of main de-
velopment lines for the Finnish research activities 
in the area of nuclear energy (vision until 2030, 
road maps, nuclear energy research in general, 
nuclear safety research, research on advanced nu-
clear reactor concepts, research on nuclear fusion 
technology), (2) identification of priority areas for 
nuclear energy research taking into account fu-
ture research needs and the required knowledge 
base, (3) definition of the needs for the develop-
ment of research infrastructure covering the needs 
of different actors in the nuclear energy sector, 
(4)  optimization of the management of national 
research programmes as well as the provision of 
funding to the research programmes and (5) enable 
more significant than presently participation of 
Finland in the international research activities in 
the nuclear energy sector. The working group will 
be chaired by a representative of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. The Ministry will 
also provide secretariat to the working group. The 
nominated members of the working group include 
experts from STUK, VTT, Finnish Academy, Aalto 
University, Technical University of Lappeenranta, 
University of Helsinki, Fortum, TVO and Posiva.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 11.
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Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that the capabilities 
and limitations of human performance are 
taken into account throughout the life of a 
nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements 
regarding human factors
Human reliability in the plant operations is large-
ly based on good plant design and proper pro-
cedures and training. According to Section 6 of 
the Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (733/2008), special attention must be 
paid to the avoidance, detection and correction of 
any human error during design, construction, op-
eration and maintenance. The possibility of human 
errors shall be taken into account in the design of 
a nuclear power plant and in the planning of its 
operation and maintenance, so that human errors 
and deviations from normal plant operations due 
to human error do not endanger plant safety. The 
impacts of human error shall be reduced by us-
ing various safety principles, including defence-in-
depth, redundancy, diversity and separation.
According to Section 19 of the Government 
Decree 733/2008, the control rooms of a nuclear 
power plant must contain equipment that provides 
information on the operational state of the nuclear 
reactor and any deviations from normal operation. 
Furthermore, the nuclear power plant shall con-
tain automatic systems that actuate safety func-
tions whenever required and control and supervise 
their functioning during operational occurrences 
and accidents. These automatic systems shall be 
capable of maintaining the plant in a controlled 
state long enough to provide the operators with 
sufficient time to consider and implement the cor-
rect actions. The nuclear power plant shall have an 
emergency control room independent of the control 
room, and the necessary local control systems for 
shutting down and cooling the nuclear reactor, and 
for removing residual heat from the nuclear reac-
tor and spent fuel stored at the plant.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Measures at the Loviisa plant to ensure adequate 
human performance have been focused on develop-
ment of operating procedures. Large part of plant’s 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have been 
modified into flowchart format. These EOPs in-
clude symptom based identification which guides 
operators to event based procedures. Complex ac-
cident sequences and core melt accidents lead to 
symptom based operation. Human redundancy is 
provided by independent on-duty safety engineer. 
These emergency operating procedures have gone 
through a comprehensive set of verification and 
validation activities which include background 
analysis of the plant behaviour. Loviisa plant 
is equipped with a full scope training simulator 
which is used for operator training, including ac-
cident situations.
Fortum evaluates human reliability as part of 
the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). For ana-
lysing hidden defects influencing the course of a 
possible transient or accident, Fortum has evalu-
ated regularly different types of duties performed 
at the plant. In the analysis such operational and 
maintenance mistakes have been evaluated which 
may act as an initiating event of a transient or an 
accident. Different plant states and duties related 
to them have been evaluated in detail.
Control actions needed during an accident have 
been divided in the PRA evaluation into two parts: 
a diagnosis and actions taken to prevent the ac-
cident. Possibilities for mistakes have been studied 
with the help of a simulator. Plant procedures for 
emergency situations have been developed and will 
be further developed, taking also into account the 
results of PRA. For preventing human errors it is 
important, that the operating events are carefully 
evaluated and, if necessary, procedures of the nu-
clear power plant are developed to prevent similar 
mistakes. Fortum has developed the utilisation of 
operating experiences and conducts the root cause 
analyses out of most significant events.
The protection systems of the plant initiate the 
safety systems automatically when needed so that 
the operators will have enough time to consider 
actions according to operating and emergency pro-
cedures. Due to the inherent characteristics of the 
Loviisa plant, the operators will have more time for 
consideration in a transient situation than usually 
at other nuclear power plants. The Loviisa units 
1 and 2 have their own independent main control 
rooms where the needed process information is 
available and control actions can be performed. 
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Alarm signals from the interim spent fuel stor-
age are also available in the Loviisa unit 2 main 
control room. Process information is presented 
in the main control room with indicating meters, 
indicator lights and recorders as well as with the 
monitors of the process computer system. There 
are two redundant alarm systems in the main 
control room. These systems have been realised by 
using two different techniques, conventional and 
computer-based techniques. Indicator light fields 
are on the operator’s consoles, and two monitors 
have been reserved for computer alarms. In addi-
tion, data on events and conditions as well as the 
exceeding of warning and alarm limits are record-
ed by the alarm printers. The process computer 
gives process information in an illustrative format 
for the use of the operators.
In addition to the main control room, the shut-
down of the reactor as well as the control and 
monitoring actions necessary for safety can be per-
formed by means of a so-called emergency control 
room table, located in the main control room of the 
other unit. For severe accidents there is a separate 
dedicated control room shared by both units.
The I&C systems are currently being renewed 
at the Loviisa plant. Human performance is taken 
into account in the modification. This automation 
renewal project has a dedicated control room de-
sign team, which is in charge of the human factors 
engineering (HFE).
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Basis for safe operation is laid already in design 
phase. A so-called 30-minute rule has been the de-
sign basis for the protection system at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2. Important protection measures and 
safety systems start up automatically so, that no 
actions of operating personnel are needed dur-
ing the first thirty minutes after the beginning of 
the operational transient or postulated accident. 
Proper emergency and transient situation proce-
dures as well as training for those situations re-
duce the possibility of human errors further.
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have their own in-
dependent control rooms, where the necessary 
process information is available, and from where 
all necessary control measures can be conducted. 
The alarms covering the interim spent fuel storage 
are available in the control room of the Olkiluoto 
unit 1. The technical solutions of the main con-
trol rooms are based on the proven control room 
technology. During the renewal of turbine automa-
tion system several new computerised operator 
workstations and a large screen display system 
were installed into the main control room. Process 
information is presented by the indicating measur-
ing equipment installed in the steering desks and 
panels as well as with several computer display 
units. Conventional and computer aided alarm 
systems are used to facilitate the management of 
main processes and other sub and auxiliary pro-
cesses. The alarms are indicated primarily by the 
alarm lamp panels. The parallel alarms received 
through the computer are seen on the monitors. 
In addition, the event and state data as well as 
deviations from warning/alarm limits are printed 
on the alarm printers. A safety parameter display 
system (SPDS), which improves the performance 
capability of the operating personnel in controlling 
transient and accident situations, is in use at the 
Olkiluoto plant units. Main control room can now 
be described as a hybrid control room. All the main 
control room related modifications are tested at the 
training simulator, and operators are trained for 
managing the modified systems prior to the modifi-
cations are installed.
Both Olkiluoto plant units have an emergency 
control post, from where the reactor can be tripped 
and where the main parameters of the reactor such 
as neutron flux, pressure, temperature and water 
level can be monitored. Cooling the reactor down to 
a cold state and removal of decay heat can be car-
ried out after the shutdown by using local control 
posts. The requirement of another, independent 
emergency control room emerged after the revision 
of the STUK’s Guide YVL 5.5 “Instrumentation 
systems and components at nuclear facilities” in 
2002. TVO is evaluating possibilities to improve 
and centralise the emergency controls to better 
comply the present requirements. Modifications 
are currently under detailed design.
There are methods for preventing human errors 
during operation. Main areas to be considered are 
operation, maintenance and modification projects. 
Human reliability can be enhanced in every day 
activities with certain methods. These methods 
include pre-job-briefing, de-briefing, peer checking, 
independent verification and clear communication. 
TVO has trained and introduced these methods 
in feasible activities. Proper work planning and 
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Permit-to-Work-system in addition to up-to-date 
procedures are key methods in maintenance relat-
ed activities to ensure safety during maintenance. 
Checking and approval requirements are also con-
sidered when requalifying systems back into oper-
ation. This work is part of a company wide project 
called “Human Performance 2012” which incor-
porates also other measures to improve human 
performance. The aim is to support managers and 
the personnel in managing human performance to 
avoid as many human mistakes as possible.
Human Factor issues are taken into account 
in all events. Lessons learned from the events are 
taken into account in the corrective action plans 
and lessons learned are used in internal training 
and organisational development. TVO has utilised 
operating experience and results of root cause 
analyses in the development of human aspects in 
the operating procedures. Errors related to the 
maintenance actions have also been examined 
and measures have been developed to avoid corre-
sponding errors. Fatigue has been identified as an 
important factor to be managed.
TVO has conducted a probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) where the consequences of human 
errors have been studied. Latent maintenance and 
testing errors have been studied in connection with 
the system analyses related to the PRA. In addi-
tion to the human factor experts, experienced staff 
members from the operating and maintenance 
personnel have participated in assessing the pos-
sibility of errors. The identified error possibilities 
have been classified into groups according to their 
importance and the most important ones have 
been modelled in the PRA study to clarify the 
risks related to errors. The reliability of operator 
actions conducted during accident conditions was 
assessed as a part of the PRA analysis. The diag-
nostic errors that may be made in connection with 
accidents have also been assessed. Based on the 
results of the analyses concerning the human er-
rors, a few additions and modifications have been 
made on the emergency and operating procedures 
of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Emergency operat-
ing procedures have been recently re-evaluated 
in order to identify any previously unnoticed er-
rors. Some clarifications have been made into 
procedures based on these talk/walk-throughs and 
simulator tests.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3, human factors engi-
neering has been part of the design phase. Concept 
of operation is taken from existing units and ref-
erence plants. Main control room has operational 
I&C system with operating terminals and large 
screen displays. This interface can be used in all 
plant conditions. Additional information can be 
integrated into this system, e.g. alarm systems and 
operating procedures. Safety related I&C system 
has own traditional operating panels which are 
diverse control method for operational I&C. These 
safety panels include also hardwired controls 
which are additional back-up for all I&C systems. 
Olkiluoto unit 3 has also remote shutdown sta-
tion. Feasibilty of human factors engineering will 
be demonstrated in validation studies. Integrated 
validation will be done at a full scope simulator 
before plant commissioning.
Regulatory oversight
Human factors have to be taken into account in 
the design and analysed in the failure analyses of 
plant safety systems and in probabilistic risk as-
sessments. Such analyses have been completed for 
both Finnish nuclear power plants. In addition to 
this high level licensing documentation, individu-
al system design needs to be reviewed by STUK. 
Main emphasis is on the control room design ap-
provals. Design documentation needs to reflect 
proper human factors design and design shall be 
coordinated with quality plans, change processes 
and verification/validation plans. Finally licensee 
shall demonstrate the safety with integrated sys-
tem validation and analyse the results. Human er-
ror discrepancies need to be addressed if there are 
major findings, before commissioning of the control 
room systems can proceed.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 12.
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Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that quality assurance 
programmes are established and implemented 
with a view to providing confidence that spec-
ified requirements for all activities important 
to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the 
life of a nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
management systems
According to Section 29 of the Government Decree 
on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008), 
the organisations participating in the design, con-
struction, operation, and decommissioning of a nu-
clear power plant are required to employ a man-
agement system. The quality management system 
must cover all functions influencing plant safety, 
and the licensees are further required to ensure 
that all their suppliers, sub-suppliers and other 
partners participating in functions that affect nu-
clear and radiation safety adhere to the quality 
management system. Along with the management 
system, the Decree sets requirements for the docu-
mentation of the lines of management and moni-
toring of the operations.
STUK’s Guide YVL 1.4 sets general require-
ments for management systems. An updated Guide 
YVL  A.3 concerning the management system is 
under development and will be published in 2013. 
Guide YVL A.3 adheres to IAEA Safety Standard 
GS-R-3 on management systems. Requirements for 
the quality assurance programme during operation 
are presented in the Guide YVL 1.9 and require-
ments for quality management of system design 
in the Guide YVL 2.0. The quality management 
requirements related to specific technical areas are 
presented in the corresponding technical guides. 
STUK is also developing a new YVL guide concern-
ing nuclear facility construction and modifications, 
i.e., YVL A.5. In this new guide, there are require-
ments for example on supplier management. The 
management systems of the licensees and appli-
cants are subject to approval by STUK. According 
to the Guide YVL 1.4, any safety-significant revi-
sions to the management system must be submit-
ted for approval to STUK, but minor revisions are 
only submitted for information prior to their use.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Fortum’s Policy Commitment to Quality in the 
Nuclear Power Operations was revised and con-
firmed by the management of Fortum in 2010. The 
development of Loviisa NPP’s quality management 
system is based on the principle of continuous im-
provement in accordance with the observations 
and remarks made in quality audits and quality 
assessments. The environmental management sys-
tem of the plant was certified in 2002 according to 
the ISO 14001:1996 standard. During the prepa-
ration phase an environmental policy and a new 
chapter on environmental system were introduced 
in the Quality Manual.
Fortum has developed their management sys-
tem, according to the Guide YVL 1.4 requirements. 
The quality management system of Fortum Power 
& Heat Oy for the Loviisa NPP complies with the 
requirements of the Guide YVL 1.4 in most re-
spects, but some deviations still remain of which 
the most significant is the lack of process based 
management approach. Fortum applied in 2012 for 
a deviation from the requirements of the process 
management but STUK made an assessment that 
Loviisa NPP has already made progress on the 
path towards a process based management sys-
tem and that this development shall be continued. 
Another area where deviations exist is the sup-
plier management. Fortum conducted an independ-
ent evaluation of the purchasing activities at the 
Loviisa NPP in the end of 2012 and this evaluation 
will result in a development program for year 2013 
with licensee top management strong commitment. 
Loviisa NPP has clearly defined the responsibili-
ties for developing the management system and 
reformed the management procedures for review-
ing the management system. Loviisa NPP has 
had special training sessions for defined personnel 
on the topic management system and the Guide 
YVL 1.4. Loviisa has reformed also the quality as-
surance (QA) personnel qualification demands and 
procedures for evaluating and developing the QA-
competence.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
TVO’s quality management system is described 
in the Quality Management Manual. It takes into 
account the requirements from YVL 1.4, IAEA 
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GS-R-3 and ISO 9001:2000. TVO is actively de-
veloping the management system towards a pro-
cess based management system due to the grow-
ing organisation and the need for systematic and 
efficient operations throughout the organisation. 
The Management System guides all TVO’s opera-
tions and provides each staff member with proce-
dures for the safe, economical, high-quality and 
environmentally friendly generation of electricity. 
TVO’s company-level policies are nuclear safety 
and quality policy, social responsibility policy, pro-
duction policy and corporate security policy. The 
functions and responsibilities of TVO’s organisa-
tions and personnel are described in detail in the 
TVO’s Administrative Rules, in the Organisational 
Manual and in the manuals and instructions of 
individual organisational units. For the Olkiluoto 
unit 3 construction phase, STUK has approved 
“The Quality Manual for Olkiluoto 3 Project”. The 
review of document as well as review of the QM 
systems of plant vendor and major suppliers is car-
ried out by STUK. STUK has also asked external 
QM experts’ opinions on the QM systems.
The quality management system of TVO for 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 mainly complies with 
the requirements of the Guide YVL 1.4. The most 
significant development need concerns the process 
management and process descriptions. TVO also 
needs to develop the purchasing processes and the 
quality assurance competence in procurement. The 
lessons learned from the Olkiluoto unit 3 emer-
gency diesel generator event investigation were to 
be applied to Olkiluoto units 1, 2 and 3 (see Article 
10). According to STUK’s review, the management 
system of Olkiluoto unit 3 complies with the Guide 
YVL 1.4.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has followed up the implementation of the 
YVL 1.4 requirements in the management sys-
tems of the licensees during the periodic inspection 
program. The top level inspection of the STUK’s 
periodic inspection programme, “Functioning of 
the Management System”, includes assessment 
of functioning, development and assessment of 
the management system as well as assessment 
of the organisation for quality management. The 
“Management and Safety Culture” inspection (see 
Article 10) also contains items concerning man-
agement systems. During 2010–2013 the manage-
ment system inspections have especially dealt with 
the process management, quality assurance com-
petence in procurement and supply management. 
The management systems of the main suppliers 
are also reviewed and assessed and their imple-
mentation is verified through inspections and au-
dits mainly by the licensee where STUK is taking 
part as an observer.
Concerning the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction 
project, STUK has performed quality management 
and quality assurance inspections as a part of the 
construction inspection programme. In addition, 
STUK has participated as an observer in the licen-
see’s and vendor’s quality audits at the subcontrac-
tors. STUK’s inspections have been focussed on 
the forthcoming integration of the management 
system of Olkiluoto unit 3 to TVO’s management 
system during commissioning phase.
During 2012 STUK had an external consultant 
evaluating the licensees’ procurement and supply 
management procedures and instructions to get an 
independent specialist opinion about the maturity 
of the procedures.
Management system of the regulatory body
STUK has an own Quality Manual that includes 
quality policy, description of the quality system, 
organisation and management, main and support-
ing working processes and personnel policy. The 
results of internal audits, self-assessments and in-
ternational evaluations are used as inputs for the 
enhancement projects of the Quality Management 
System at STUK. In addition to STUK’s Quality 
Manual, all main functions of STUK have their 
own more detailed Quality Manuals.
STUK’s management system will be further 
developed during the next years according to the 
suggestions of the IRRS mission. For example, 
STUK will review and revise the existing Quality 
Manuals and guidance documents for consistency 
and improve overall descriptions of the processes 
including sub-processes and their interdepend-
ency. STUK will also develop further a systematic 
long-term programme for self-assessments, inter-
nal and external audits and evaluations on the 
effectiveness of the processes. In addition, STUK 
will develop more detailed procedures for the use 
of graded approach in the authorisation of systems, 
structures and components and in the planning 
and conducting inspections.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 13.
STUK-B 164
41
Article 14. Assessment and 
verification of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. comprehensive and systematic safety as-
sessments are carried out before the con-
struction and commissioning of a nuclear 
installation and throughout its life. Such 
assessments shall be well documented, sub-
sequently updated in the light of operating 
experience and significant new safety in-
formation, and reviewed under the author-
ity of the regulatory body;
ii. verification by analysis, surveillance, test-
ing and inspection is carried out to ensure 
that the physical state and the operation 
of a nuclear installation continue to be 
in accordance with its design, applicable 
national safety requirements, and opera-
tional limits and conditions.
Regulatory approach to safety assessment
The prerequisite of the Construction and Operating 
Licences is that the licence applicant has made its 
own safety assessment. The fulfilment of the safety 
requirements is demonstrated in the Construction 
and Operating Licence documentation. STUK 
makes an independent safety assessment concern-
ing the application and this assessment is required 
in the Nuclear Energy Act. Conditions for granting 
a Licence are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
For example, there is a requirement that the use of 
nuclear energy must be safe. In Section 20 of the 
Act it is further stated that the operation of the 
nuclear facility shall not be started until STUK 
has ascertained that the nuclear facility meets the 
prescribed safety requirements.
The Nuclear Energy Decree requires that when 
applying for a construction licence, the applicant 
must submit to STUK the following documents: 
a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, a design 
phase Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a proposal 
for a safety classification document, a description 
of Quality Management during the construction of 
the nuclear facility, preliminary plans for the ar-
rangements for security and emergency prepared-
ness, and a plan for arranging the safeguards con-
trol. For the operating licence, the applicant must 
submit to STUK: the Final Safety Analysis Report, 
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment, the safety clas-
sification document, the quality management pro-
gramme for the operation of the nuclear facility, 
Operational Limits and Conditions, a programme 
for periodic inspections, security and emergency 
plans, a description on administrative rules for 
safeguards, a programme for radiation monitoring 
in the environment of the nuclear facility, a de-
scription of how safety requirements are met, and 
a programme for the management of ageing. In ad-
dition, the Decree gives STUK a possibility to ask 
other documents considered necessary for safety 
demonstration.
Design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary (PSAR) and Final (FSAR) Safety 
Analysis Reports. The reports are submitted 
to STUK for approval with the applications for 
Construction and Operating Licences. PSAR/FSAR 
forms the basis to STUK’s safety assessment which 
is required before granting the Construction/
Operation Licence (see Article 7). According to the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR has to be continu-
ously updated, and changes to FSAR have to be 
submitted to STUK for approval. Requirements 
for the plant modification process are presented 
in the Guide YVL 2.0, “Systems design for nuclear 
power plants”. The main principle in plant modifi-
cation process is that conceptual design plans and 
system-specific pre-inspection documents of Safety 
Class 1, 2 and 3 systems must be submitted to 
STUK for approval. STUK reviews and approves 
the modification prior to its implementation at the 
plant. In connection with a system modification, 
the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be amended 
accordingly without delay.
The general design bases for nuclear fuel have 
been defined in the Guides YVL 1.0 and YVL 6.2. 
The design objective is that the probability of fuel 
failure is low during normal operational condi-
tions and anticipated operational transients, and 
that during a postulated accident the rate of fuel 
failures remains low and the fuel remains in a cool-
able state. Detailed requirements for the design, 
quality management and control, handling, storage 
and transport of fuel are specified in the Guides 
YVL 6.2, YVL 6.3, YVL 6.4, YVL 6.5, YVL 6.7 and 
YVL 6.8.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the oper-
ating licence is granted for a fixed term. However, 
legislation has not prescribed the length of the 
term. The term is proposed by the licensee in the 
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application, and must be justified on the basis of 
the ageing and planned future operation of the nu-
clear facility. Particular attention is paid to licen-
see’s processes and activities and planned safety 
improvements to ensure safety for the estimated 
duration of operation. The procedure for operating 
licence renewal is in general the same as in ap-
plying for an operating licence for a new nuclear 
facility. Specific requirements on the documents to 
be submitted to STUK for the renewal of the oper-
ating licence are described in the Guide YVL 1.1 
“Regulatory control of safety at nuclear facilities”. 
Renewal of the operating licence always involves 
a periodic safety review of the facility. If a licence 
is granted for a significantly longer term than ten 
years, STUK requires the licensee to carry out a 
periodic safety review within about ten years of 
receiving the operating licence or of conducting the 
previous periodic safety review. For a separate pe-
riodic safety review, STUK must be provided with 
similar safety-related reports as in applying for 
renewal of the operating licence. Renewal of the op-
erating licence of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
took place in 2005–2007 and the periodic safety 
review of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 2007–2009 
(see Article 6).
The Government Decree on the Safety of 
Nuclear Power plants (733/2008) requires that nu-
clear power plant safety and the technical solutions 
of its safety systems shall be substantiated by us-
ing experimental and calculation methods. These 
include among others analyses of operational oc-
currences and accidents, strength analyses, failure 
mode and effect analyses, and probabilistic risk 
assessments. Analyses shall be maintained and 
revised if necessary, taking into account operating 
experience, the results of experimental research, 
plant modifications and the advancement of calcu-
lation methods. The calculation methods employed 
for demonstrating compliance with safety regula-
tions shall be reliable and well qualified for the 
purpose. They shall be applied so that the resulting 
system design bases meet the acceptance criteria 
with high certainty. Any uncertainty in the results 
shall be assessed and considered when defining 
safety margins. STUK’s review of these analyses 
includes independent safety analyses.
Detailed requirements concerning transient 
and accident analyses, including sensitivity analy-
ses, are presented in the Guide YVL 2.2, “Transient 
and Accident Analyses for Justification of Technical 
Solutions at Nuclear Power Plants”. Requirements 
for probabilistic risk assessments are given in 
the Guide YVL 2.8, “Probabilistic safety analysis 
in safety management of nuclear power plants”. 
Acceptance criteria for the analyses are present-
ed in Guides YVL 6.2 “Design bases and gen-
eral design criteria for nuclear fuel” and YVL 7.1, 
“Limitation of public exposure in the environment 
of and limitation of radioactive releases from a nu-
clear power plant”.
Deterministic safety assessment
Detailed requirements concerning transient and 
accident analyses, including sensitivity analyses, 
are presented in the Guide YVL 2.2, “Transient 
and Accident Analyses for Justification of Technical 
Solutions at Nuclear Power Plants”.
Fortum submitted with the licence renewal 
documentation in 2005–2007 the revised Final 
Safety Analysis Report, including the transient 
and accident analyses of the Loviisa units 1 and 
2. Fortum has revised the analyses taking into 
account plant modifications implemented at both 
units as well as new regulatory requirements. The 
analyses presented in the Safety Analysis Report 
cover anticipated operational transients, category 
1 and 2 accidents, and severe accidents. The analy-
ses cover all operating states and include accident 
analyses for the storages of spent fuel and reactor 
waste. Fortum has supplemented the deterministic 
safety analyses in 2008 by analyses of design ex-
tension conditions.
STUK assessed the submitted analyses for the 
Loviisa NPP and methods applied in the analyses. 
STUK contracted VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland to carry out independent analyses to 
verify the results given in the licence renewal 
documentation and to conduct sensitivity analyses. 
STUK concluded that the plant behaviour in dif-
ferent transient and accident situations has been 
analysed comprehensively and that the methods 
used in the analyses are properly validated to de-
scribe the operation of the Loviisa plant.
Accident and transient analyses of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2, as well as the analysis methods, have 
been updated and developed throughout the opera-
tion of the plant. TVO revised completely the acci-
dent and transient analyses in conjunction with the 
application for the renewal of its operating licence 
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in 1995–1998. The analyses were at that time car-
ried out for nuclear fuel that is no longer being used 
at the NPP units. For the periodic safety review in 
2007–2009, TVO updated the accident analyses us-
ing the SVEA-96 Optima 2 as a reference fuel. The 
plant modifications carried out after the renewal of 
the operating licence in 1998 were also taken into 
account in the update. Since renewal of the operat-
ing licence, Guides YVL 2.2 and YVL 6.2 have been 
revised and a requirement regarding analyses of 
design extension conditions was introduced. When 
updating its analyses for periodic safety review, 
TVO has taken into account the new regulation.
The calculation methods used for analysing 
the plant normal operating conditions, transients 
and postulated accidents were developed by the 
supplier of the Olkiluoto plant units. The methods 
have been qualified to an extent corresponding to 
a good level from the international perspective. 
STUK reviewed the updated analyses and the 
calculation methods used. The conclusion was that 
the analyses of transients and accidents of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 were conducted as referred 
to in Section 3 of Government Decree 733/2008. 
However, STUK required updating of the loss of 
coolant analyses assuming a level of system avail-
ability specified in the Guide YVL 2.2. TVO submit-
ted the required updates in 2010.
The preliminary analyses of Olkiluoto unit 3 
were presented to STUK in PSAR and the Topical 
Reports appended to PSAR with the application for 
the construction licence. STUK contracted techni-
cal support organisations to carry out independent 
analyses to verify the results. STUK approved the 
PSAR of Olkiluoto unit 3 in January 2005 just 
before the construction licence was granted by the 
Government. TVO has submitted updated analyses 
for the Final Safety Analysis Report in 2008–2012. 
The analyses will be reviewed as a part of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 operating licence application.
Probabilistic risk assessment
Regulatory requirements on PRA
In the Nuclear Energy Decree, probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) has been included since 1988 
in the list of documents to be submitted to STUK 
for the review of the operating licence application. 
Since 2008 the preliminary design phase PRA has 
been in the list of documents to be submitted to 
STUK for the review of the construction licence ap-
plication according to the Nuclear Energy Decree, 
but a limited preliminary PRA has been required 
in Regulatory YVL Guides since 1996. PRA for 
construction licence application is based on pre-
liminary design information and generic reliability 
data for components. PRA for operating licence ap-
plication is based on essentially final design infor-
mation and vendor specific component reliability 
data, where available, and system modelling is also 
more detailed.
According to the Government Decree on Nuclear 
Safety, PRA shall be maintained and revised if 
necessary, taking into account operating experi-
ence, the results of experimental research, plant 
modifications and the advancement of calculation 
methods. The detailed requirements on the use of 
PRA are set forth in the Regulatory Guide YVL 2.8. 
Detailed requirements on risk-informed applica-
tions are included in several other YVL Guides.
STUK required in 1984 that the Finnish utili-
ties Fortum (former Imatran Voima Oy) and TVO 
shall make extensive probabilistic risk assess-
ments for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants. The objective of the study was to determine 
the plant-specific risk topographies of the essential 
accident sequences. Another important objective 
was to enhance the plant personnel’s understand-
ing of the plant and its behaviour in different 
situations. Therefore STUK also required that the 
PRAs are performed mainly by the utility person-
nel and external consultants are used only for 
special topics.
In 1987 STUK published the Regulatory Guide 
YVL 2.8 on PRA. The Guide was updated in 
1996 and 2003. Currently the Guide requires a 
full-scope (including internal events, fires, floods, 
seismic events, harsh weather and other external 
events) PRA for power operation and low-power 
and shut-down states. PRA shall cover the analy-
sis of the probability of core damage (Level 1) and 
large release of radioactive substances (Level 2). 
PRA shall be updated continuously to reflect plant 
and procedure modifications and changes in reli-
ability data (Living PRA).
Guide YVL 2.8 includes the following probabil-
istic safety goals:
•	 Core damage frequency less than 1∙10-5/year
•	 Large radioactive release (> 100 TBq Cs-137) 
frequency less than 5∙10-7/year.
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These safety goals apply as such to new plant 
units. For operating units, instead of the numeri-
cal safety goals, the SAHARA (safety as high as 
reasonably achievable) principle and the principle 
of continuous improvement are applied.
Guide YVL 2.8 also includes requirements on 
several risk informed applications, such as analy-
sis of plant modifications, risk-informed in-service 
inspections and testing, development of emergency 
operating procedures and training programmes 
and review of safety classification and Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
For a new plant unit, a preliminary PRA cover-
ing Levels 1 and 2 shall be submitted to STUK for 
the review of the construction licence application 
(design phase PRA) and the updated and comple-
mented PRA (Levels 1 and 2) shall be submitted 
for the review of the operating licence application.
PRA’s computer models shall be made available 
to STUK. STUK uses PRA routinely to support its 
decision making, for example, in review of plant 
modifications and applications for exemption from 
Operational Limits and Conditions and in analysis 
of operating events.
The Guide YVL 2.8 is being updated in STUK’s 
ongoing renewal of Regulatory Guides. In the new 
guide YVL A.7, requirements on the use of PRA in 
the decommissioning phase have been added and 
the list of applications and documents to be sub-
mitted to STUK have been specified.
Main developments in risk informed 
regulation and safety management 
during the reporting period
During the reporting period the role of risk in-
formed regulation and safety management has 
been further strengthened by STUK and the licen-
sees. The following activities can be given as exam-
ples of the increased role of risk informed methods:
•	 Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection pro-
grammes for the operating units were imple-
mented by TVO in 2012.
•	 TVO and Fortum have applied PRA in support 
of the review of safety classification of the oper-
ating units.
•	 The finalisation of the PRA for Olkiluoto unit 
3 under construction is still ongoing. Risk in-
formed applications have been used in the 
design of the unit and the risk informed ap-
plications for the operating phase are under 
development in accordance with the Guide YVL 
2.8. PRA is also used in the planning of commis-
sioning testing programmes.
•	 Risk informed methods have been used to sup-
port ageing management, for example, trend 
analysis of failure data. In connection with the 
life extension of Loviisa unit 1 reactor pressure 
vessel, the probabilistic analysis of pressurised 
thermal shock was used to evaluate the safety 
significance of radiation induced embrittlement 
of weld seams.
•	 Risk informed approach has been used also for 
inspections of Loviisa reactor vessel internals. 
Preliminary results show that risk reduction 
could be gained by doubling the inspection 
interval, which would decrease the risk due to 
heavy load drop significantly.
The use of PRA in several well-established appli-
cations has been continued and the methods have 
been further refined.
In addition to the risk informed applications 
based on regulatory requirements, the licensees 
use PRA in applications supporting their operat-
ing activities, for example availability analysis and 
risk centred maintenance.
Further development of the PRA computer code 
system developed at STUK has been continued in 
a joint project with VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland. The software is used in the review of 
the PRAs submitted by the licensees and in sup-
port of risk informed decision making at STUK.
Probabilistic risk assessment 
of the Loviisa NPP
Fortum provided STUK with Level 1 PRA in 1989. 
Since 1990 Fortum has extended PRA by analys-
ing risks related to fires, floods, earthquakes, se-
vere weather conditions and outages, as well as by 
conducting Level 2 PRA. Plant modifications have 
been carried out continuously at the Loviisa NPP, 
including safety system improvements, fire safety 
improvements, implementation of Severe Accident 
Management systems and a major modernisation 
programme in mid 1990’s (see Annex 2). By means 
of these modifications risks have been decreased 
and the risk topography of the plant has been 
balanced. Technical solutions of the modifications 
have also been often justified with PRA.
The development of the core damage frequency 
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since 2000 is shown in Figure 10. At the end of year 
2012 the calculated estimate for the total probabil-
ity of reactor core damage was about 3.0∙10–5 per 
reactor year. The relative contribution to the an-
nual core damage frequency from different groups 
of initiating events are shown in Figure 11. The 
Loviisa plant has full scope PRA covering Levels 
1 and 2. The latest completion included fire risk 
analysis for shutdown states in 2011.
Fortum has also provided STUK with the Level 
2 PRA, in which the integrity of the containment 
and the release of radioactive materials from the 
plant to the environment are evaluated. In the lat-
est update in 2012, it was estimated that the total 
probability of a large release to the environment 
is about 1.4∙10–5 per year. The estimate includes a 
detailed study for internal events, fires, floods and 
severe weather conditions at power states and at 
outages, whereas some specific events (seismic, 
shutdown fires, heavy load drop, loss of DC power, 
etc.) are based on rough estimates on the accident 
progession. In 2012, mainly the following modi-
fications have decreased core damage frequency 
and large release frequency: renewal of auxil-
iary service water system (VF62), modifications in 
power distribution for some containment systems, 
renewal of Pressuriser Overpressure Protection 
Valve (PORV), renewal of pressuriser spray system 
and new procedures for sump recirculation in shut-
down states.
The results of STUK’s review show that Fortum 
has applied in its analyses commonly accepted 
methods in modelling transient and accident situ-
ations of the plant and in collecting and analysing 
reliability data. The reviews also show that the 
assessments provide an adequate basis for risk 
informed decision making.
PRA has been used by the licensee in the risk-
informed applications required by the Guide YVL 
2.8, for example in evaluation of plant modifica-
tions, review of safety classification, development 
of Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection programme. 
The risk informed review of the Operational Limits 
and Conditions, including optimisation of testing 
intervals, and optimisation of Operational Limits 
and Conditions (allowable outage times) is under 
way. The Loviisa NPP has also introduced a Risk-
Informed In-Service Inspection programme for pip-
ing. The number of inspections was increased but 
the focus shifted from high safety classes to lower 
safety classes. This shift is due to the fact that 
some lower safety class pipings have relatively 
large risk significance as they belong to vital sup-
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Figure 10. Development of the estimate of annual core 
damage frequency of the Loviisa NPP in 2000–2012. 
The increase in the core damage frequency in 2003 
was due to extension of the PRA scope with non-seis-
mic external events during shutdown states. The pre-
liminary conservative analyses showed relatively high 
risk due to exceptionally high outside air temperature 
and oil spills in the Gulf of Finland in cold shutdown 
states. Later the risk estimate was decreased due to 
plant modifications and more realistic analyses.
Internal PO
Internal SD
Flood PO
Fire PO
Fire SD
Weather PO
Weather SD
10 %
36%
2%
25%
3%
10%
14%
Loviisa 
relative risk profile 2012, total CDF 3,05E-5
Figure 11. Relative contribution of different initiating 
event types to the annual core damage frequency 
in 2012 for Loviisa NPP. The most significant internal 
initiating events at full power (power operation, PO) 
are the small interfacing system  LOCAs and the loss 
of instrumentation room ventilation. At shutdown (SD) 
the most significant internal initiating events are drop 
of heavy loads and reactivity accident due to boron 
dilution. Note: “Flood” includes only internal flooding 
from process systems and external flooding is includ-
ed in “Weather”.
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port systems, or leaks in lower class pipelines may 
lead to consequential damage to safety systems. 
The radiation doses to inspection personnel will 
decrease as a result of the new inspection pro-
gramme.
Probabilistic risk assessment of 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2
TVO submitted to STUK the first version of Level 
1 PRA in 1989. Since then, the PRA has been 
updated several times and the scope has been ex-
tended. TVO has now practically full-scope PRA 
covering levels 1 and 2 for full power operation and 
for low power and shutdown states.
Annual core damage frequency since 2000 is 
shown in Figure 12. Plant modifications have been 
carried out continuously at the Olkiluoto plant, 
including backfitting with severe accident manage-
ment systems and power uprate and modernisa-
tion in the 1990’s (see Annex 2).
At the end of 2012 the overall core damage fre-
quency of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 is approximately 
1.3∙10–5 per reactor year, including all operating 
states and all groups of initiating events. The 
relative contributions to annual core damage fre-
quency from different groups of initiating events 
are shown in Figure 13.
In 1996, TVO submitted to STUK the Level 2 
PRA. The analysis has been updated a few times 
since then. According to the living PRA model 
in 2010 the frequency of the large release to the 
environment (>100 TBq Cs-137) was 3.5∙10–6 per 
reactor year, which was approximately one tenth of 
the core damage frequency. The large release fre-
quency has decreased in the updates mainly due to 
the decrease of the core damage frequency, but the 
severity of the release has decreased significantly 
mainly due to modifications in procedures.
TVO has used PRA in the risk-informed appli-
cations required by the Guide YVL 2.8, for exam-
ple in evaluation of plant modifications, review of 
safety classification, development of Risk-Informed 
In-Service Inspection programme, optimisation of 
testing intervals, and optimisation of Operational 
Limits and Conditions (allowable outage times).
Probabilistic risk assessment 
of Olkiluoto unit 3
The vendor of Olkiluoto unit 3 conducted a design 
phase PRA, which TVO submitted in 2004 to STUK 
for the review of the construction licence applica-
tion as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. The 
design phase PRA includes analysis of internal 
initiating events, internal hazards and external 
hazards for power operation and refuelling out-
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Figure 12. Development of the estimate of annual 
core damage frequency for Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 
2000–2012. The decrease in seismic risk in 2009 is due 
to plant modifications allowing improved handling of 
spurious activation of isolations due to relay chatter. 
The risk estimate increase in 2009 is due to a more 
detailed analysis of the capacity of decay heat removal 
by diverse systems. The risk estimate increase in 2011 
is due to the change of the method used to deter-
mine fire ignition frequencies and update of external 
hazards study that contains a new man-made hazard 
“marine oil-spill”.
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Figure 13. Relative contribution of different initiating 
event types to the annual core damage frequency in 
2012 for Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. The most significant 
internal initiating events at full power are the loss of 
off-site power and loss of feedwater. Note: “Flood” 
includes only internal flooding from process systems 
and external flooding is included in “Weather”.
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age. STUK approved the Olkiluoto 3 PRA for the 
construction licence in January 2005. The PRA of 
Olkiluoto 3 has been continuously updated by the 
plant vendor during the construction phase and 
STUK has closely followed the completion of the 
PRA.
Olkiluoto unit 3 preliminary PRA covers seismic 
events and other external events (harsh weather, 
organic material in seawater etc.). According to the 
preliminary results, Olkiluoto unit 3 fulfils with a 
wide margin the probabilistic safety goals set forth 
in the Guide YVL 2.8. The contribution of seismic 
events is less than 1 per cent of the total CDF and 
the contribution of other off-site external events 
is less than 10 per cent of the total CDF. The most 
important external events are strong wind with 
snowfall and the loss of the ultimate heat sink due 
to oil spill, organic material in seawater or frazil 
ice.
Preliminary results of level 2 PRA show that 
large release frequency of Olkiluoto unit 3 is very 
small. In addition, the distance of the magnitude 
and frequency of releases from the unacceptable 
region are clearly large, and only 2 per cent of the 
releases are in the vicinity of the limit for large 
release. Thus, future refinement of the analyses is 
not expected to change the magnitudes of releases.
PRA has been used by TVO and plant vendor 
in the risk-informed applications required by the 
Guide YVL 2.8, for example in evaluation of sys-
tem design, review of safety classification, devel-
opment of Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection 
programme, optimisation of testing intervals, op-
timisation of Operational Limits and Conditions 
(allowable outage times), and planning of plant 
commissioning tests.
Assessment of safety as a result of 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant on the 11th of March in 2011, 
safety assessments in Finland were initiated af-
ter STUK received a letter from the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy on 15 March 2011. 
The Ministry asked STUK to carry out a study 
on how the Finnish NPPs have prepared against 
loss of electric power supply and extreme natu-
ral phenomena in order to ensure nuclear safety. 
STUK asked the licensees to carry out assessments 
and submitted the study report to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy on 16 May 2011. 
Although immediate actions to ensure safety of 
public and environment were not considered neces-
sary, STUK required the licensees to carry out ad-
ditional assessments and present action plans for 
safety improvements. Assessments were conducted 
and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 
15 December 2011. STUK has reviewed the results 
of national assessments, and made licensee specific 
decisions on 19 July 2012 on the suggested safety 
improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests 
and submitted the national report to European 
Commission at the end of 2011. An EU level peer 
review on the report was completed by April 2012. 
The recommendations of the EU peer review have 
been taken into account in the regulatory deci-
sions and will be considered in the development of 
national regulations. A National Action Plan was 
prepared addressing the measures initiated on 
a national level and at the nuclear power plants 
as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi ac-
cident. The National Action Plan was sent to the 
European Nuclear Regulators Group (ENSREG) 
and peer reviewed in April 2013. In addition, 
Finland participated in the second Extraordinary 
Meeting of the Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) 
in August 2012 and prepared a report introduc-
ing all Fukushima related actions. All STUK’s 
related decisions, the national report to European 
Commission, the report to the Extraordinary CNS, 
and the Finnish National Action Plan have been 
published on STUK’s website.
Based on the results of assessments conducted 
in Finland to date, it is concluded that no such 
hazards or deficiencies have been found that would 
require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. 
However, areas where safety can be further en-
hanced have been identified and there are plans on 
how to address these areas. The experiences from 
the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are also 
taken into consideration in the ongoing renewal 
of the legislation and Finnish Regulatory Guides 
(YVL Guides) and in the nuclear safety research 
programme SAFIR 2014 (see Articles 7 and 8). 
Safety improvements under planning and imple-
mentation at the Finnish NPPs due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are described more 
detailed under Articles 16, 17, 18 and 19, and in 
Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
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Information collected in connection with exter-
nal events PRAs has been used in the national and 
EU stress tests after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi NPP accident, although mainly deterministic 
approach has been used. Seismic events and other 
off-site external events have been included in the 
PRAs in the 1990’s and the analyses have been up-
dated regularly. The input data and plant response 
analyses used in the external events PRAs have 
been reviewed after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi NPP accident in connection with the stress 
tests and no essential shortcomings have been 
found. Further updates of the analyses and hazard 
estimates will be continued.
Verification of safety
Verification programmes
Government Decree 733/2008 includes several re-
quirements which concern the verification of the 
physical state of a nuclear power plant. For in-
stance, in all activities affecting the plant opera-
tion and the availability of components, a system-
atic approach shall be applied for ensuring the 
operators’ continuous awareness of the state of the 
plant and its components. The reliable operation of 
systems and components shall be ensured by ade-
quate maintenance as well as by regular in-service 
inspections and periodical tests. General require-
ments on verification programmes and procedures 
are provided in the YVL Guides (e.g. Guide YVL 
1.8, YVL 1.9, YVL 3.0, YVL 3.8).
Main programmes used for verification of the 
state of a nuclear power plant are
•	 periodic testing according to the Operational 
Limits and Conditions
•	 maintenance programme
•	 in-service inspection programme
•	 periodic inspections of pressure equipment and 
piping
•	 surveillance programme of reactor pressure 
vessel material
•	 programmes for evaluating the ageing of com-
ponents and materials.
Activities for verifying the physical state of a pow-
er plant are carried out in connection with nor-
mal daily routines and with scheduled inspections, 
testing, preventive maintenance etc. Activities are 
performed by the licensee and in the case of certain 
inspections by contractors approved separately. 
Detailed programmes and procedures are estab-
lished and approved by the licensee. They are also 
reviewed and, when needed, approved by STUK. 
The results of tests and inspections are document-
ed in a systematic way and used through a feed-
back process to further develop the programmes. 
The Operational Limits and Conditions are ap-
proved by STUK. In general, the role of STUK is 
to verify that the licensees follow the obligations 
imposed on them and carry out all activities sched-
uled in verification programmes.
Comprehensive evaluations related to the state 
and operation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
were carried out in the periodic safety reviews 
by Fortum in 2005–2007 and TVO in 2007–2009. 
These activities were controlled by STUK.
Inspection qualification
According to international experience and the 
Guide YVL 3.8, STUK has recognised the qualifica-
tion of non-destructive testing systems and proce-
dures as an issue of high importance. This issue re-
quires high priority at both nuclear power plants. 
The implementation of qualified NDT systems has 
been started in 1990’s.
General requirements on inspection qualifica-
tion are provided in the Guide YVL 3.8. The 
document “European methodology for qualifica-
tion” drawn up by the European Network for 
Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) shall be used 
as the minimum requirement level for qualifica-
tion of inspection systems to be used in in-service 
inspection, and it shall be complemented by the 
ENIQ Recommended Practices. In the content of 
licensees’ guidelines published by the qualification 
body, the requirements presented in the Guide YVL 
3.8, in the European Methodology for Qualification 
(EUR 17299) and in its recommendations have 
been taken into account.
The licensees Fortum and TVO have estab-
lished the Steering Committee for Qualification 
and nominate its members on annual basis. The 
Steering Committee for Qualification is guiding 
and supervising the practical qualification work 
with the help of a separate Technical Support 
Group nominated and supervised by the Steering 
Committee.
Based on a contract with the licensees, Inspecta 
Certification is nominated as the qualification 
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body for qualification management, implementa-
tion, control and assessment as well as the issuing 
of qualification certificates in Finland. The Finnish 
qualification body is a qualification body of type 1, 
which is an independent third party organisation 
as defined by ENIQ Recommended Practice 7. 
When needed Inspecta Certification uses also ex-
perts outside of its own organisation for individual 
qualifications.
Most of the qualifications have already been 
performed and approved by STUK.
STUK ordered in 2009 an assessment of the 
current qualification activities in Finland from an 
independent expert organisation. The purpose was 
to assess whether Finnish inspection qualification 
practice leads to reliable and effective in-service in-
spection of safety critical components. Review was 
performed in two parts: 1) review of the inspec-
tion qualification system as specified in the Guide 
YVL 3.8 and the national qualification guideline 
documents issued by the qualification body and 
2) review of the inspection qualification practices. 
As a conclusion of the assessment it was reported 
that the qualification system meets the Finnish re-
quirements, is effective and provides confidence in 
the inspections of safety critical components.
In-service inspections
The condition of the pressure-retaining compo-
nents of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs is en-
sured with regular in-service inspections. The com-
ponents of the primary circuit are inspected by 
means of non-destructive examination methods. 
These regularly repeated examinations are carried 
out during outages according to the Guide YVL 3.8. 
The results of the in-service inspections are com-
pared with the results of the previous inspections 
and of the pre-service inspections which have been 
carried out before the commissioning.
The in-service inspection plans are submit-
ted to STUK for approval before each individual 
in-service inspection. Programmes and related in-
spection procedures are changed when necessary, 
taking into account the development of require-
ments and standards in the field, the advancement 
of examination techniques and inspection experi-
ences as well as operating experiences in Finland 
and abroad.
Guide YVL 3.8 and the latest revisions of the 
ASME Code, Section XI are applied as approval 
bases for the in-service inspection programmes 
and procedures. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix 
R and ENIQ European Framework Document for 
Risk-informed In-service Inspection are used as 
approval bases for the risk-informed in-service in-
spection programmes.
The reliability of the non-destructive exami-
nation methods for the primary circuit piping 
and components has been essentially improved 
after the commissioning of the both Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs. Guide YVL 3.8 calls for the qual-
ification of the entire NDT-system; equipment, 
software, procedures and personnel. Most of the 
inspection systems are already qualified at the 
both plants. STUK follows the development and 
implementation of the plans.
A risk-informed inspection programme has been 
introduced and approved by STUK at the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 for the inservice inspections of safety-
critical pipelines. The deployment of risk-informed 
inspection methods for targeting inspections has 
been developed in Finland by STUK, Fortum, 
Fortum, TVO and VTT. The objective of risk-in-
formed in-service inspection programmes is to al-
locate inspection resources to the targets that are 
most critical from the point of view of risk. Using 
this approach, it is possible to ensure that the cur-
rent inspection objects are well-justified, identify 
new objects and omit certain less safety-critical 
objects from the existing inspection programme. 
According to experts’ view, the programme is the 
most extensive risk-informed in-service inspection 
programme so far implemented in Europe.
The length of the inspection period of the 
regular inspections (e.g. ASME Code, Section XI) is 
normally ten years. Inspection programmes have 
been complemented with additional inspections 
as regards the reactor pressure vessel and the pri-
mary circuit piping, and the length of the inspec-
tion period of the reactor pressure vessel has been 
reduced to eight years. The length of the inspection 
period of the objects susceptible to thermal fatigue 
is typically three years.
At the Olkiluoto plant, attempts have been 
made to focus the inspections on areas where faults 
are most likely to emerge. These include, for exam-
ple, items susceptible to fatigue due to tempera-
ture variations or items susceptible to stress corro-
sion cracking. The selection of inspection items is 
under continuous development. For this purpose, a 
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risk-informed in-service inspection procedure has 
been developed for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 and 
it has been approved by STUK. Inspections and 
inspection schedules will be optimised on the basis 
of risk-informed methods when the next inspection 
interval programmes are drawn up.
The frequency of the non-destructive examina-
tions performed at regular intervals is usually ten 
years at the Olkiluoto NPP. The inspection fre-
quency for items susceptible to thermal fatigue is 
three years, and the inspection frequency for items 
susceptible to stress corrosion cracking is three to 
five years.
In addition to the inspections mentioned above, 
physical inspections concerning the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are carried out 
as regular pressure equipment inspections accord-
ing to the Finnish pressure equipment legislation. 
Such inspections are a full inspection, an internal 
inspection and an operational inspection. These 
inspections include non-destructive examinations 
as well as pressure and tightness tests. The inspec-
tions of piping have been defined in the system-
specific monitoring programmes. These periodic 
inspections are dealt with in the Guides YVL 3.0, 
YVL 3.3, YVL 5.3, and YVL 5.7. The periodic in-
spection programmes of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs fulfil the requirements of YVL Guides, as 
regards the number and techniques of inspections.
Ageing management
According to the Government Decree (733/2008), 
the design and construction of a nuclear power 
plant shall include provision for the ageing of sys-
tems, structures and components (SSCs) important 
to safety. Their condition shall be monitored to 
ensure operability and conformity in design-basis 
conditions. The needed replacements, repairs and 
modifications, shall be carried out in a systematic 
manner.
The regulatory oversight of ageing in operating 
plants focuses on operating licence renewals and 
Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs) where the conform-
ance to the relevant Government Decrees and YVL 
Guides, including experiences with ageing and 
its management, is investigated. STUK’s findings 
from other regulatory control practices, particu-
larly the periodic inspection programme, are used 
as verification. The periodic inspections are done 
on plant site according to annual planning and 
tackle both the technical aspects of each discipline 
and the process of ageing management. STUK also 
receives annual reports from each nuclear power 
plant unit on ageing management activities within 
each technical discipline.
An expert group dedicated to ageing manage-
ment has been established within STUK to over-
see how the licensees perform their duties in the 
ageing management of SSCs. The group, which 
consists of mechanical, electrical, I&C, civil and 
human resource experts and resident inspectors, 
looks into such events and observations at the 
Finnish nuclear plants that may be related to 
inadequate ageing management. If shortcomings 
are found, for example in condition monitoring or 
maintenance, the group calls the licensee for fur-
ther clarications or corrective actions. The group 
also follows up findings from other countries and 
evaluates their possible linkage to the ageing 
management of the Finnish nuclear plants. In the 
overall renewal of the STUK’s regulatory guides, a 
dedicated regulatory guide is developed for ageing 
management, i.e. YVL A.8.
Ageing management at the Loviisa NPP
Radiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) and the related surveillance and miti-
gation actions dominated the ageing management 
in Loviisa NPP since the early years of operation. 
This was more relevant to Loviisa unit 1 whose 
girth weld at the level of the reactor core has a 
higher content of impurities. In 1996, the brittle 
weld joint of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel 
was heat-treated to improve the ductility proper-
ties of the welding material. In this connection the 
reactor pressure vessel was subject to thorough 
non-destructive tests. Embrittlement rate has 
been re-assessed based on the new surveillance 
programme representing the critical weld. STUK 
has granted the operating licences of the RPVs for 
the Loviisa units 1 and 2 until 2027 and 2030, re-
spectively. For both units, deterministic and proba-
bilistic safety analyses will be updated in the PSRs 
(by end of 2015 and 2023) in order to justify contin-
ued servive of the RPVs. In addition, new findings 
from domestic and international inspection and 
research programmes may require updating of the 
RPV analysis results.
In the mid-1990’s, Fortum implemented their 
systematic plant-wide ageing management pro-
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gramme. The SSCs are assigned to categories A 
through D based on their technical and economical 
replaceability. SSC failures in category A would 
limit plant lifetime and thus deserve a part-assem-
bly-wise break-down of ageing related remedies. 
Category A comprises the main primary compo-
nents. Data indicative of plant status and trends 
are collected with operation, maintenance and in-
spection IT systems, R&D activities and via experi-
ence exchange. The consequent ratings of operabil-
ity, remaining service life and necessary actions for 
each SSC are stored on the plant database.
In 2006 the operating utility Fortum submitted 
to the Government an application to continue the 
operation of Loviisa units 1 and 2 until the end of 
2027 and 2030, respectively, meaning a 20-year ex-
tension to the original design lifetime. Among the 
ageing-related justification were the main fatigue 
analyses, updated to cover the whole 50 years’ 
life span with consideration of the environmen-
tal effects. Documents on In-Service Inspection 
Summary Programme, Ageing Management 
Programme Principles and Implementation, and 
SSC Status and Service Life Extensibility were 
also submitted. For electrical and I&C components 
it was noted that massive projects are underway to 
replace cables in containment due to its detected 
considerable ambient temperature rise, and for 
plant-wide replacing of obsolete protection and 
plant I&C systems and components. In its review, 
STUK made a general point that the state-of-the-
art permitted a quantitative life-time evaluation 
only in case of ageing by fatigue. However, other 
potential mechanisms have been identified and 
resources are in place to monitor, inspect, mitigate 
and repair as needed. The operating organisation 
has also strong technical support which has con-
vincingly resolved forthcoming ageing issues in the 
past, and the history records are well preserved. 
The Government granted the applied operating li-
cences on condition that two PSRs are undertaken 
during the licence period.
Ageing management at the Olkiluoto NPP
The ageing management activities at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 arose from wide-spread indications of 
inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) 
in reactor auxiliary system piping. Early replace-
ment of entire piping systems, achievable with 
modest doses to maintenance staff, considerably 
mitigated IGSCC and led the way to the utility’s 
strategy of seeing to the critical SSCs so that a 
remaining plant life-time of 40 years (design life-
time) could be always demonstrated.
Since 1991, the AGE Group, with assistance of 
several technical discipline related expert groups, 
has taken care of these activities by gathering 
information of possibly needed future actions from 
several sources and by preparing and updating a 
table of recommended major modifications, replace-
ments, repairs and overhauls. The modernisation 
and power uprating of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 
2 by 16% in 1994–1996 evolved from these recom-
mendations and was completely carried out by the 
utility’s technical support organisation residing on 
plant site. The associated significant renewal cam-
paigns of obsolete electrical and instrumentation 
systems and components largely contributed to 
current 20-year operating licence periods terminat-
ing in 2018. Efforts to enhance the reliability and 
good performance of the plant components, and to 
ensure the spare part and support service availa-
bility have continued until recent years. The major 
foreseeable modifications until decommissioning 
have been identified.
Systematic maintenance planning is an integral 
part of ageing management at the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2. Nominated owners of equipment groups, 
characterised by a common type or location, ana-
lyse the entire maintenance programme and its 
experiences, and assist in selection of the most ef-
fective maintenance works. Annual findings from 
each equipment group are stored into a relational 
data base on the plant computer.
STUK reviewed TVO’s clarification on the ac-
tual condition and ageing implications of the main 
SSCs in connection to the Periodic Safety Review 
(PSR) carried out in 2007–2009. Supporting as-
sessment has been done in several periodical in-
spections on plant site. The main components were 
generally found to be in good condition, but the 
appearance of IGSCC in Nickel-based alloys could 
not be excluded and it possibly explains an indica-
tion reported from the safe-end weld of the main 
feedwater nozzle, made from Alloy 182. The indica-
tion has, however, remained unchanged as evalu-
ated by NDT-inspections during annual outages. 
The PSR also referred to a completed pilot project 
for updating fatigue analyses of selected systems 
to incorporate the environmental effect as re-
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quired in the implementation process of the Guide 
YVL 3.5. Based on recommendations from expert 
consultancy of VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland, more refined modelling is employed now 
that the utility is renewing all fatigue analyses to 
justify a prospective re-licensing of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 for an operating life of 60 years.
At the Olkiluoto unit 3, the ageing management 
is taken into account at the design phase. The most 
severe operating conditions and long-term influ-
ences, under which an individual component is 
expected to serve as a part of a process system, are 
used to determine the design basis requirements 
for that component. With known design basis re-
quirements and defined life times of SSCs, their 
materials, fabrication and other ageing manage-
ment related issues are specified accordingly. This 
includes precautions against foreseeable degrada-
tion mechanisms with state-of-the art technology, 
and provision for inspections, overhauls, testing 
and replacements as needed while respecting the 
ALARA principle. The anticipated life-span of the 
main technologies and independence from single 
technologies are particularly considered in I&C 
system and somponent design. The design and fab-
rication of SSCs are verified with qualified analy-
ses, inspections and testing, overseen by STUK, in 
order to demonstrate fulfillment of quality and per-
formance requirements set by the design specifica-
tions. During Olkiluoto unit 3 operation, the ageing 
of SSCs and retaining the design margins will be 
managed by dedicated programmes and monitor-
ing tools, and by in-service inspections to whose 
planning risk-informed methods are applied.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 14.
Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that in all operational 
states the radiation exposure to the workers 
and the public caused by a nuclear installa-
tion shall be kept as low as reasonably achiev-
able and that no individual shall be exposed 
to radiation doses which exceed prescribed 
national dose limits.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
radiation protection
The main regulations governing radiation pro-
tection of Nuclear Power Plant operation are 
the Radiation Act (592/1991), Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991), Government Decree for Nuclear 
Safety of NPPs (733/2008) and YVL Guides, Part 
7 (12 guides). Radiation Decree stipulates that the 
effective dose caused to a worker shall not exceed 
an average of 20 millisieverts (mSv) per year in 
any five years period, nor 50 mSv in any single 
year. The limit for the annual dose of an individual 
in the population, arising from the normal opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant, is 0.1 mSv. Based 
on this, STUK shall upon application confirm the 
release limits for radioactive materials during the 
normal operation of a nuclear power plant. ALARA 
requirement is issued in the Radiation Act and 
more in detail implementation requirements are 
given in the YVL Guides both for NPP workers and 
release abatement. During 2010–2012 no changes 
in the Guides as regards radiation protection were 
made. New regulatory guides are drafted as part of 
the overall revision of the regulatory guides.
Radiation doses of NPP workers
An ALARA programme, updated in 2009, exists for 
workers at the Loviisa NPP. It includes as main ob-
jectives the continuous improvement in the collec-
tive dose indicator trend: decreasing of a four years 
average, now being at 0.6 manSv/reactor unit/year. 
Important measures are e.g. minimisation of an-
timony 122 and 124 content on primary circuit 
surfaces and optimised use of additional shielding 
in the primary coolant circuit area during outages. 
One of the reactor coolant pump seals was replaced 
with an antimony-free material during outage in 
2012. It has been estimated that the original seals 
of the coolant pumps are the main reason for ac-
tivation products of antimony 122 and 124 in the 
primary circuit. The rest of the seals will be re-
placed with antimony-free seals during the next 
years if results from the new seal are acceptable. 
ALARA programme includes also the goal that no 
employee at the plant should receive a radiation 
dose exceeding 15 mSv per year. As a plant modifi-
cation, rearrangement of controlled area activities 
for decontamination and operational waste man-
agement was made in 2010.
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TVO’s ALARA programme for the Olkiluoto 
NPP contains a compilation of major objectives 
and procedures regarding the radiation protection, 
reduction of the doses of employees and target 
values for main radioactive effluents. The ALARA 
programme was updated in 2010 and it is included 
in TVO’s radiation protection manual, which is reg-
ularly updated. The ALARA programme includes 
the goals that collective dose should not exceed 
1 manSv for two reactor units in a normal year 
(1.5 manSv when major additional maintenance is 
needed) and that no employee at the plant should 
receive a radiation dose exceeding 10 mSv per year. 
In the programme, there are also target limit val-
ues for main radioactive effluents like noble gases, 
iodine isotopes, water-borne releases and tritium, 
too. The goal is that annual effluents are less than 
the target values which are based on real amounts 
of annual releases from the Olkiluoto NPP. In ad-
dition, TVO has a specific ALARA group where 
the topics of the ALARA programme has been dis-
cussed regularly 3–4 times per year.
TVO has continued the replacement of cobalt-
containing components in the primary circuit with 
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Figure 14. Collective annual occupational doses at the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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Figure 15. Collective annual occupational doses at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
Table 1. Annual radiation doses of workers at the 
Loviisa NPP in 2010–2012.
Year
Collective 
dose 
[manSv]
Maximum 
personal dose  
[mSv]
Average 
dose*) 
[mSv]
2010 1.57 15.8 2.27
2011 0.71 7.9 1.39
2012 1.68 14.3 2.35
*) Calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/
month.
Table 2. Annual radiation doses of workers at the Olki-
luoto NPP in 2010–2012.
Year
Collective 
dose 
[manSv]
Maximum 
personal dose  
[mSv]
Average 
dose*) 
[mSv]
2010 0.90 9.1 0.72
2011 0.96 9.3 0.76
2012 0.72 9.0 0.90
*) Calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/
month.
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new ones with low cobalt content. Cobalt-containing 
components have been reduced from the original 
value of each plant unit, by more than 40 %. The 
reduction in moisture of primary steam with the 
equipment upgrades (new steam dryers) during 
2005–2007 at the Olkiluoto NPP has continued the 
substantial reduction of radiation dose rates at the 
turbine plant during 2010–2012. The risk-informed 
procedure was deployed to in-service material in-
spections in piping and welding for the first time 
in outages 2012 at the Olkiluoto NPP. This has also 
contributed towards reducing the amount of work 
carried out in most radioactive areas, thus reducing 
the radiation exposure of the employees.
The radiation dose statistics of the workers are 
presented for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 14 
and 15. The individual radiation doses have re-
mained well under the set annual and five years 
dose limits. The maximum combined dose of a 
Finnish worker at the NPPs for a single year dur-
ing 2010–2012 was 15.8 mSv. For a 5 years period 
2008–2012, the maximum dose was 53.8 mSv and 
was received by a person working at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant.
In international comparison (e.g. the ISOE ra-
diation dose database of the NEA, the Nuclear 
Energy Association of the OECD countries), the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been among the best 
boiling water reactors when comparing both in-
dividual and collective radiation doses. The long-
term planning of annual maintenance operations 
has made it possible to keep their duration short, 
which usually reduces the amount of work car-
ried out and hence also the exposure to radiation. 
Loviisa NPP has succeeded in decreasing the col-
lective dose of the personnel and is well in com-
parison with different type of PWRs.
Radioactive effluents
STUK confirms upon the licensee’s application 
the release limits for radioactive materials dur-
ing the normal operation of a nuclear power plant. 
Operational Limits and Conditions have more 
stringent requirements applicable for the radioac-
tive substances of primary coolant (fuel integrity), 
thus practically preventing releases. Fuel rods at 
the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants 
have had very low failure rates. Both nuclear pow-
er plants have efficiently implemented measures to 
reduce the releases of radioactive substances into 
the environment.
The radioactive effluents from the plants in 
2010–2012 are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Radio-
active releases into the environment from the 
Finnish nuclear power plants have been well below 
authorised limits (for important nuclides and path-
ways, of the order of 0.01% to 0.1% of set values 
based on the requirements). Calculated radiation 
exposures to the individual of the critical group liv-
ing in the environment of the nuclear power plants 
are shown in Figure 16.
STUK received reports from Fortum (the lat-
est report in 2011) and TVO (the latest report in 
Table 3. Radioactive effluents from the Loviisa NPP. The proportion of the releases as compared  
to the limit values is given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2010 5.88E+12 (0.03 %) 4.84E+07 (0.02 %) 1.18E+08 1.77E+08 (0.02 %)
2011 6.29E+12 (0.03 %) 8.58E+05 (0.0004 %) 1.10E+08 1.88E+08 (0.02 %)
2012 5.56E+12 (0.04 % *) 2.25E+05 (0.0001 %) 1.03E+08 3.06E+08 (0.03 %)
*) Release limit for noble gases was changed in 2012.
Table 4. Radioactive effluents from the Olkiluoto NPP. The proportion of the releases as compared  
to the limit values is given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2010 5.81E+11 (0.003 %) 9.40E+07 (0.08 %) 1.17E+07 2.39E+08 (0.08 %)
2011 1.24E+12 (0.007 %) 1.74E+06 (0.002 %) 1.50E+07 1.38E+08 (0.05 %)
2012 1.21E+12 (0.01 % *) 1.70E+07 (0.02 % *) 1.63E+07 2.04E+08 (0.07 %)
*) Release limits for noble gases and iodine were changed in 2012.
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2010) on the implementation of the Guide YVL 7.1 
concerning the potential solutions (Best Available 
Techniques, BAT) for further reduction of the radi-
oactive discharges from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs. Fortum has developed caesium removal 
technology from liquid releases which is in success-
ful operation. The utility reviewed VVER reactor R 
& D issues and evaluated their own developments 
underway. They recognized some techniques worth 
of further research and development. TVO and the 
Olkiluoto power plant had previously carried out 
improvements on water treatment and purifica-
tion of discharge waters, and no new solutions 
were presented now. TVO had also an independent 
assessment, comparing the emissions and operat-
ing experience in the Olkiluoto plant units and in 
equivalent Swedish BWRs. The results indicate 
that the standard of radiation protection is also 
in this respect at least of the same level as in the 
reference plant units surveyed. STUK concluded 
that the both utilities apply the BAT principle to 
abatement of radioactive discharges of their power 
plants.
Environmental radiation monitoring
STUK has approved the operating programme for 
environmental radiation monitoring in the sur-
roundings of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs for 
2012–2016. The changes in the programme com-
pared with the previous one were related to, inter 
alia, the use of reference samples, changes in gar-
dening and agricultural product samples, collect-
ing frequencies of samples, measurements of the 
water treatment plant sludge and the interpreta-
tion of measurement results on carbon-14 nuclides.
Environmental Radiation Monitoring Depart-
ment of STUK has acted as an outside contracted 
laboratory for the licensee. The outside contracted 
laboratory collects and analyses about 300 samples 
(air, fallout, sediment, indicator organisms, milk, 
etc.) per year from the environment of both Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto NPPs. Very small quantities of radio-
active substances of local origin were detected in 
2010–2012 on some samples from the environment 
of both nuclear power plants. Concentrations of the 
radioactive substances were very low, and effects 
on the public are insignificant.
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Figure 16. Calculated annual radiation exposures to the members of critical groups in the environment of 
the Finnish nuclear power plants. Doses have been clearly under the limit 100 μSv.
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The IRRS review team identified that STUK 
should withdraw from the current practice of 
conducting the environmental monitoring pro-
grammes in the vicinity of the nuclear facilities 
based on commercial contracts with the licensees. 
Furthermore, STUK should implement an inde-
pendent monitoring programme for the environ-
ment, to verify the results of the off-site environ-
mental monitoring programmes required from the 
licensees. Based on the IRRS recommendation, 
there is a plan to change the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act in the near future.
Regulatory oversight
On the basis of documents submitted by the licen-
sees, STUK approved in 2012 the use of the dosim-
etry service of the Loviisa nuclear power plant and 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant until 2016. As 
appropriate, the approval also covers the agree-
ment between the licensee and the outsourced ser-
vices provided by the company Doseco Oy, respon-
sible for routine dosimetry at the Olkiluoto NPP. 
STUK has audited the dose monitoring service at 
Doseco Oy.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occu-
pational radiation doses of Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants have underwent STUK’s annual tests with 
acceptable results. These tests comprise irradiat-
ing a random sample of dosimeters at STUK’s radi-
ation standard laboratory and determination of the 
doses at the power plant (blind test). Although the 
test results were acceptable, it was found that the 
test results of the Loviisa NPP for surface doses 
were systematically conservative. Closer investi-
gation revealed that the surface doses reported to 
the dose register in 2011 were relatively higher in 
relation to deep doses when compared to previous 
years. As a corrective action, technical and admin-
istrative changes were made to the radiation dose 
determination algorithms at the Loviisa NPP in 
2012.
STUK carries out annual radiation protection 
inspections on-site according to the periodic in-
spection programme, e.g. covering the resources, 
expertise and operation of the radiation protec-
tion organisation, dosimetry, radiation measure-
ments in the plant, radioactivity measurements 
of effluents, and monitoring of radiation in the 
environment. STUK carries out on-site inspections 
related to radiation protection also during annual 
maintenances. The inspections at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs have shown e.g. that the plants 
have introduced technical and IT administration 
improvements in the field of radiation protection, 
which made it possible to enhace the control of oc-
cupational radiation doses and contamination.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 15.
Article 16. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that there are on-
site and off-site emergency plans that are 
routinely tested for nuclear installations 
and cover the activities to be carried out 
in the event of an emergency. For any new 
nuclear installation, such plans shall be 
prepared and tested before it commences 
operation above a low power level agreed 
by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that, insofar as 
they are likely to be affected by a radio-
logical emergency, its own population and 
the competent authorities of the States in 
the vicinity of the nuclear installation are 
provided with appropriate information for 
emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have a 
nuclear installation on their territory, in-
sofar as they are likely to be affected in the 
event of a radiological emergency at a nu-
clear installation in the vicinity, shall take 
the appropriate steps for the preparation 
and testing of emergency plans for their 
territory that cover the activities to be car-
ried out in the event of such an emergency.
Emergency preparedness on-site of NPPs
Regulations concerning emergency preparedness 
and response arrangements at the NPPs are given 
in the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Energy 
Decree and the Government Decree on Emergency 
Response Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008). Detailed requirements and STUK’s 
oversight procedures are given in the Guide YVL 
7.4.
The Government Decree on Emergency Res-
ponse Arrangements at Nuclear Power plants is 
under renewal and the new Decree is expected to 
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become effective in 2013. Parallel to that the Guide 
YVL 7.4 is revised according to the Decree tak-
ing also into account the lessons learned from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. In the new 
Decree, there is a requirement to take into account 
the possibility of several reactor units’ simultane-
ous accident in the emergency planning. In STUK’s 
decisions made on the basis of the national as-
sessments and European Stress Tests for nuclear 
power plants, both TVO and Fortum were required 
to clarify and update their emergency plans and 
procedures with respect to issues like qualification 
of the staff in the emergency organisation, man-
agement of access control and contamination con-
trol in the case when the normal arrangements are 
out of function and restoring the access routes and 
connections to the site in case of massive destruc-
tion of the infrastructure. Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPP as well as STUK’s emergency centre are now 
equipped with satellite telephones. The work for 
developing and improving the emergency prepar-
edness arrangements will continue.
Fortum and TVO have analysed accident 
and safety-impairing events at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs. These analyses are documented in 
the safety analysis reports of the plants and have 
been used as the basis for planning the Finnish 
nuclear power plant emergency response arrange-
ments.
Emergencies are classified and described briefly 
in the plant’s emergency plan. The notifications 
and alarms to plant personnel and authorities 
required by different classes of emergencies, as 
well as the scope of operations of the emergency re-
sponse organisation pertaining to the type of emer-
gency, are described in the emergency procedures.
A person responsible for emergency response 
arrangements has been appointed both for the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due 
to the updated Nuclear Energy Act the nominated 
deputies for the persons responsible for emergency 
response arrangements have been appointed by 
the licensees and approved by STUK. The emer-
gency response organisation has been described 
in the emergency plan and procedures, updated 
with regard to personnel changes once a year. The 
more limited staffing of the emergency response 
organisation required for emergency standby state 
(alert) is defined in the shift supervisor guides for 
the emergency response.
The facilities of the emergency response organi-
sation at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants include a system for displaying data directly 
from the process computer. Several hundred pa-
rameters are transmitted also to the STUK’s emer-
gency response centre. The automatic data transfer 
and display system from the Olkiluoto NPP to 
STUK was upgraded in 2011 and from the Loviisa 
NPP to STUK in 2012.
Emergency response training and exercises are 
annually arranged for the emergency response 
organisation of the nuclear power plants. The 
emergency response training has included class-
room and group-specific practical training as well 
as special training, such as first aid, fire and ra-
diation protection training. In addition to severe 
accidents, emergencies covered by the emergency 
response exercises also included conditions classi-
fied as emergency standby. The content and scope 
of the training as well as feedback obtained from 
the training are assessed in the inspections of the 
STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
STUK verifies the preparedness of the organisa-
tions operating nuclear power plants in yearly on-
site inspections. Emergency preparedness at the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants meet the key 
regulatory requirements. At the Loviisa NPP, the 
objects of the inspection included the preparedness 
organisation’s personnel resources, facilities and 
equipment, training and alert arrangements, revi-
sion of the structure and content of emergency pre-
paredness instructions, radiation measurements 
in the surroundings and meteorological measure-
ments on-site. Emergency preparedness exercises 
and mustering exercises were conducted annually. 
Also an unannounced exercise was organised start-
ing outside the normal working hours.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, the objects of the inspec-
tion included preparedness organisation personnel 
resources, training, exercises, facilities and equip-
ment, alarm arrangements, radiation measure-
ments in the surroundings, meteorological meas-
urements on-site, emergency preparedness of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 construction site and the work for 
revising the emergency preparedness instructions. 
An all-site mustering exercise was held in 2012 at 
the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction site.
Both the Loviisa and Olkiluoto monitoring net-
works have up to 15 real time environmental dose 
rate measuring stations, five and four of them close 
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to the plant area and the others in a half circle at 
5 km distance from the plant. Three additional 
measurement stations will be installed in the vi-
cinity of Olkiluoto unit 3 before the plant unit is in 
operation. At the Loviisa NPP, a new monitoring 
network including 28 stations is on trial run and 
will replace the older system in 2013. The design 
basis of the new measuring stations is at least 3 
months autonomic operation in emergency situa-
tions with long-term batteries. At the Loviisa NPP, 
the licensee will renew the weather monitoring 
system including also the on-site weather mast 
and including a new measurement point in the 
marine environment.
Off-site preparedness arrangements
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans re-
quired by the rescue legislation (379/2011) are pre-
pared by regional authorities. The requirements 
for off-site plans and activities in a radiation emer-
gency are provided in the Decree of the Ministry 
of Interior (406/2011). STUK is an expert body to 
support the Ministry of Interior in the emergency 
response in the case of nuclear and radiological ac-
cidents.
STUK publishes VAL Guides for emergency re-
sponse. Guide VAL 1 (2012) “Protective Measures 
in Early Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological 
Emergency” and VAL 2 (2012) “Protective Measures 
in Intermediate Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological 
Emergency” provide detailed guidance. In the case 
of an accident the local authorities are alerted by 
the operating organisation of the plant.
The Ministry of Interior has released a new 
guide “Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies: Roles 
and Responsibilities of All Actors” (MI publication 
38/2012), which contains the detailed information 
of the arrangements in the Finnish society in the 
case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in the case of a nuclear or ra-
diological emergency. STUK has an expert on duty 
on 24/7 basis. The message on an exceptional event 
(alarm) can be received from the operating organi-
sations of the facilities, or automatically from the 
radiation monitoring network that is dense in the 
whole country (approx 250 measuring stations, see 
Figure 17), or from foreign authorities.
The off-site plans include provisions to inform 
the population in the case of an accident. Written 
instructions on radiological emergencies, emergen-
cy planning and response arrangements have been 
provided to the population living within the 20 km 
Emergency Planning Zone. These instructions are 
regularly updated and distributed.
The regulations and guides are tested in off-site 
emergency exercises conducted every third year. 
Full scale off-site emergency and rescue exercise 
OLKI11 was carried out in 2011 based on the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant accident scenario. 
Over 50 different organisations participated in this 
exercise which combined for the first time a sce-
nario initiated by illegal activities and a technical 
emergency situation at the plant.
In 2013, the national full command post exer-
cise LOVIISA13 was held. About 60 different gov-
ernmental, regional and private organisations in 
Finland took part in the exercise.
As a result of the studies made after the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major 
Figure 17. The measuring stations of the 
radiation monitoring network.
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changes have been identified in off-site emergency 
preparedness so far. However, there is a need to 
ensure accessibility to the site in case of extreme 
natural hazards, provide a sufficient amount of ra-
diation protection equipment and radiation moni-
toring capabilities for rescue services and improve 
communication capabilities. In addition, there is 
a need to ensure that the resources of rescue au-
thorities can be reasonably coordinated between 
radiological and other emergencies, should they 
happen simultaneously.
The rescue planning is strengthened in a co-op-
eration between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue services, regional police departments and 
STUK. Permanent coordination groups have been 
established for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs 
in order to ensure coordinated and consistent 
emergency plans, to improve and develop emer-
gency planning and arrangements and to share 
lessons from the exercises, regulations and other 
information. Also extensive training is arranged 
by these groups. In addition, a National Nuclear 
Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Forum is 
under consideration in order to have co-operation 
and combination between permanent groups. The 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health, the regional rescue service 
authorities, STUK and the NPP licensees will be 
participating in the Forum.
In autumn 2012, an international Integrated 
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission held 
at STUK covered also emergency arrangements. 
As the outcome, the IRRS mission suggested 
that STUK should, in cooperation with relevant 
Government authorities, consider improving na-
tional arrangements for timely provision of as-
sistance requested by other countries (including 
through RANET) and for effectively integrating 
assistance received by Finland into the national 
response system. As a good practise the IRRS team 
mentioned that STUK has excellent tools, facilities 
and organisational arrangements to perform the 
necessary evaluation of the emergency in a timely 
manner and to provide appropriate recommenda-
tions for protective measures. The organisation 
and conduct of the emergency exercises and the 
coordination with other stakeholders was also con-
sidered exemplary.
Information to the neighbouring countries
Finland is a party to the Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency, done in 
Vienna in 1986. Being a member of the European 
Union, the Council Decision (87/600/EURATOM) 
on Community arrangements for the early ex-
change of information in the event of a radiologi-
cal emergency applies in Finland, too. In addition, 
Finland has respective bilateral agreements with 
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
Ukraine. Accordingly, arrangements have been 
agreed to directly inform the competent authorities 
of these countries in the case of an accident.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency 
exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant site, STUK has taken part in international 
emergency exercises. STUK has also participated 
as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged 
by the Swedish and Russian nuclear power plant 
operators and authorities. Neighbouring countries 
have been actively invited to take part in the 
Finnish exercises. In 2013, Finland hosted a joint 
international exercise in which Nordic and Baltic 
countries and the IAEA took part in. Participants 
were from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and also Russian 
key emergency centres followed the exercise. The 
international exercise was combined with the full 
exercise at the Loviisa nuclear power plant. In the 
exercise e.g. real time communication and coordi-
nation of actions among participants were tested.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 16.
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Article 17. Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that appropriate proce-
dures are established and implemented:
i. for evaluating all relevant site-related fac-
tors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear 
installation for its projected lifetime;
ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact of a 
proposed nuclear installation on individu-
als, society and the environment;
iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant 
factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) 
and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety 
acceptability of the nuclear installation; 
for consulting Contracting Parties in the 
vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, 
insofar as they are likely to be affected by 
that installation and, upon request provid-
ing the necessary information to such Con-
tracting Parties, in order to enable them to 
evaluate and make their own assessment of 
the likely safety impact on their own terri-
tory of the nuclear installation.
Regulatory approach to siting
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power 
plant are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
the Nuclear Energy Decree. The application for a 
Decision-in-Principle has to include e.g.:
•	 a description of settlement and other activities 
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and its vicinity
•	 a description of the suitability of the planned 
location for its purpose, taking account of the 
impact of local conditions on safety, security 
and emergency response arrangements, and the 
impacts of the nuclear facility on its immediate 
surroundings
•	 an assessment report in accordance with the 
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (468/1994) as well as a description of 
the design criteria which the applicant will ob-
serve in order to avoid environmental damage 
and to restrict the burden to the environment.
More detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) are provided in the 
Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (713/2006). The Finnish EIA legislation 
complies with the EU Directive 2001/42/EU on the 
EIA procedure.
In the design of a nuclear power plant, site-
related external events have to be taken into ac-
count. Government Decree 733/2008 provides as 
follows: “The safety impact of local conditions, as 
well as the security and emergency preparedness 
arrangements, shall be considered when selecting 
the site of a nuclear power plant. The site shall be 
such that the impediments and threats posed by 
the facility to its environment remain extremely 
minor and heat removal from the plant to the en-
vironment can be reliably implemented.” STUK 
issued in 2001 the Guide YVL 1.10 “Safety criteria 
for siting a nuclear power plant”, which describes 
generally all requirements concerning the site 
and surroundings of a nuclear power plant, gives 
requirements on safety factors affecting site selec-
tion and covers regulatory control. Requirements 
on seismic design are set forth in the Guide YVL 
2.6. Deterministic analyses are made to assess the 
impact of various natural phenomena and other 
external events. The probabilistic risk assessment 
required for the safety review of Construction and 
Operating Licence applications provides informa-
tion on risks caused by external events.
The general principle in the siting of nuclear 
power plants is to have facilities in a sparsely 
populated area and remote from large population 
centres. In the vicinity of the plant, no activities 
are allowed that could pose an external threat to 
the plant. Site characterisation is performed based 
on geological, seismic, hydrological and meteoro-
logical factors as well as on transport routes and 
risks, industrial activities, agriculture, nature and 
population. Extreme meteorological conditions and 
consequences (e.g. frazil ice formation) have to be 
taken into consideration in the site evaluation and 
plant design.
In connection with the decisions for construc-
tion of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants in the 
1970s, siting requirements related to population 
density and land use planning were quite easily 
and practically achievable in a sparsely populated 
country like Finland. The precautionary action 
zones have only a few tens of permanent inhabit-
ants. Similar attention was not given to the recrea-
tional houses and the transient summertime popu-
lation in the coastal area (mainland and islands) 
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where the conditions might be demanding for ef-
ficient emergency preparedness and rescue action. 
The number of recreational houses on the seaside 
within 5 km the existing plants is about 400–500.
Finland is a party to the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, done in Espoo in 1991. 
The Convention is applied for Finnish nuclear 
facility projects by providing a full participation 
to all neighbouring countries which announce the 
willingness to participate in the environmental im-
pact assessment procedure in question. In Finland, 
the EIA is conducted at an early stage of a NPP 
project, prior to the selection of the plant design, 
based on the power range of the plant and on gen-
eral information on the available designs. This is 
before the Decision-in-Principle is taken, as the 
outcome of the EIA procedure is part of the materi-
al needed for the Decision-in-Principle application.
Regulatory Guide YVL 1.10 on NPP siting cri-
teria is being revised. The new Guide YVL A.2 will 
include a description of all relevant legal processes, 
including those based on non-nuclear legislation. 
Efficient cooperation between the utility and re-
sponsible authorities is emphasised, e.g., for:
•	 maintaining the land use planning in the plant 
environment during the plant operational life 
time in line with the safety goal of avoiding 
dense population
•	 taking necessary actions to guarantee efficient 
road connections to the plant area also in case 
of a severe accident and all extreme weather 
conditions.
Quality, competence and comprehensiveness of the 
site survey and site confirmation are required and 
the results shall be assessed by STUK in differ-
ent licensing stages. The basic goals for population 
safety will not be changed in the revised guide.
The EIA and other site-related studies are con-
ducted by the licence applicant or licensee depend-
ing on the context. The safety related reports are 
reviewed by STUK. The Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy arranges the national public 
hearings and the Ministry of the Environment ar-
ranges the international hearings.
The bilateral agreements mentioned under 
Article 16 include provisions to exchange informa-
tion on the design and operation of nuclear facili-
ties. In the European Union a specific statement is 
also prepared for each new nuclear power plant 
unit in a member state before authorisation of 
the operation (Euratom Treaty, Article 37). This is 
based on a General Data report submitted by the 
member state and on its examination in a plenary 
meeting of Group of Experts. For Olkiluoto unit 3 
this process was conducted in 2010. Based on the 
legislation on land use planning, statements from 
neighbouring countries must be requested for the 
land use plans of a nuclear power plant. Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia were informed of initiating the 
regional planning process for Fennovoima’s two 
candidate sites in Northern Finland and the oppor-
tunity to participate.
The detailed requirements on the determina-
tion of site-specific design bases for external events 
are collected and expanded in the new Guide YVL 
B.7.
Re-evaluation of site related factors
The operating licence for a nuclear facility is grant-
ed for a fixed term. Periodic Safety Review (PSR) 
shall be conducted either in connection with the 
license renewal or as a separate review with inter-
vals of about ten years at most.
For the licence renewal of the Loviisa units in 
2005–2007 and the Periodic Safety Review of the 
Olkiluoto units in 2007–2009, comprehensive re-
assessments of safety, including the environmen-
tal safety of the nuclear facility and the effects of 
external events on the safety of the facility, were 
conducted by the licensees and reviewed by STUK. 
The assessments covered meteorology, hydrology, 
geology, seismology, population and use of land 
and sea area. During the operation of a nuclear 
facility, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), 
including its site-specific parts, has to be periodi-
cally reviewed and updated as needed. A detailed 
re-evaluation of the site related factors was also 
carried out in 2007–2009 for the Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa sites in connection with the Environmental 
Impact Assessment and Decision-in-Principle pro-
cedures for new NPP units. The next PSR for the 
Loviisa NPP has been started by the licensee and 
it shall be submitted to STUK by the end of 2015. 
The next PSR for the Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 
will be conducted in connection with the renewal of 
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the operating licences expiring at the end of 2018. 
Olkiluoto site related factors will be re-evaluated 
also in connection with the operating licence proce-
dure for the Olkiluoto unit 3.
The capacity of the NPP units to withstand ex-
ternal hazards is evaluated in deterministic safety 
analyses and in probabilistic risk assessments 
(PRA). PRAs of the Finnish units cover natural 
and man-made external hazards such as high 
seawater level, high wind including tornadoes, 
lightning, high- and low air temperature, high sea-
water temperature, frazil ice formation in cooling 
water intakes, algae and other organic material in 
seawater, oil spills from oil tanker ship accidents 
and earthquakes. During the past twenty years 
the results of external events PRAs have initiated 
several safety improvements in the plants.
Research on the site related natural hazards 
is conducted continuously in the Finnish National 
Nuclear Safety Research Program SAFIR (http://
safir2014.vtt.fi/links.htm). STUK has a major role 
in steering the research and the results support 
STUK in the review of the reports submitted by 
the licensees. The research covers seismic haz-
ard and extreme meteorological phenomena and 
seawater level variations, including the effects of 
climate variability and change.
In addition to the normal PSRs, an extraordi-
nary review of site related issues was carried out 
after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
in connection with the so called European stress 
tests. National studies were initiated immediately 
after the accident and the EU stress tests were 
started in June 2011.
The stress tests did not reveal any new site-
related external hazards or vulnerabilities of the 
plants to external events. No need for immediate 
action was recognized, but some additional studies 
of external hazards and feasibility studies for plant 
modifications to improve robustness against exter-
nal events were found justified.
The following examples of safety improvements 
and additional analyses of external events at the 
Loviisa NPP can be mentioned: enhanced protec-
tion against high seawater level during annual 
maintenance shutdown (partly implemented) and 
power operation (hazard evaluation and feasibility 
studies on-going), installing cooling towers replac-
ing the service water system in case of blockage 
of seawater intake (under detailed planning), and 
detailed structural analysis of spent fuel pools in 
the case of an earthquake with consequential boil-
ing in the pools.
At the Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2, the plans 
include system modifications to ensure the opera-
tion of the auxiliary feed water system in case of 
the loss of the ultimate heat sink (seawater sys-
tems) and structural analysis of the spent fuel 
pools. Seismic walk-downs of the fire extinguishing 
water system have been carried out and some im-
provements will be implemented. The emergency 
diesel generators will be replaced within the next 
few years. The new emergency diesel generators 
will be provided with alternative air and seawater 
cooling, while the existing diesels have only sea-
water cooling. In addition, studies are carried out 
on systems to ensure residual heat removal in the 
case of total loss of AC power and/or loss of the ul-
timate heat sink due to external or internal events. 
The effects of extreme seawater levels on the acces-
sibility of the site will be studied as well.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 17.
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Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the design and construction of a nuclear 
installation provides for several reliable 
levels and methods of protection (defence 
in depth) against the release of radioac-
tive materials, with a view to preventing 
the occurrence of accidents and to mitigat-
ing their radiological consequences should 
they occur;
ii. the technologies incorporated in the de-
sign and construction of a nuclear instal-
lation are proven by experience or quali-
fied by testing or analysis;
iii. the design of a nuclear installation al-
lows for reliable, stable and easily manage-
able operation, with specific consideration 
of human factors and the man-machine 
interface.
Implementation of defence in depth
Regulatory requirements regarding nuclear 
power plant design and construction
According to the Government Decree 733/2008, 
several levels of protection have to be provided in 
the design of a nuclear power plant. The design of 
the nuclear facility and the technology used is as-
sessed by STUK when reviewing the applications 
for a Decision-in-Principle, Construction Licence 
and Operating Licence. Design is reassessed 
against the advancement of science and technol-
ogy, when the Operating Licence is renewed and in 
the periodic safety reviews.
In the design, construction and operation, prov-
en or otherwise carefully examined high qual-
ity technology shall be employed to prevent op-
erational transients and accidents and to mitigate 
their consequences. A nuclear power plant shall 
encompass systems by means of which operational 
transients and accidents can be quickly and reli-
ably detected and the aggravation of any event 
prevented. Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. The design of a nucle-
ar power plant shall be such that accidents leading 
to extensive releases of radioactive materials must 
be highly unlikely.
Dispersion of radioactive materials from the 
fuel of the nuclear reactor to the environment shall 
be prevented by means of successive barriers which 
are the fuel and its cladding, the cooling circuit of 
the nuclear reactor and the containment building. 
Provisions for ensuring the integrity of the fuel, 
primary circuit and containment are included.
In ensuring safety functions, inherent safety 
features attainable by design shall be made use of 
in the first place. If inherent safety features cannot 
be made use of, priority shall be given to systems 
and components which do not require an external 
power supply or which, as a consequence of a loss 
of power supply, will settle in a state preferable 
from the safety point of view (passive and fail-safe 
functions).
In order to prevent accidents and mitigate the 
consequences thereof, a nuclear power plant shall 
be provided with systems for shutting down the 
reactor and maintaining it in a subcritical state, 
for removing decay heat generated in the reactor, 
and for retaining radioactive materials within the 
plant. Principles ensuring the implementation of 
these safety functions even in the event of a mal-
function must be applied in designing the systems 
in question. Such principles are redundancy, sepa-
ration and diversity. The safety functions neces-
sary for transferring the plant to, and maintaining 
a controlled state must be accomplished, even if 
any individual system component needed to fulfil 
the safety function (including the necessary sup-
porting or auxiliary functions) is inoperable and 
if any other component needed for the function is 
simultaneously out of use due to required repair 
or maintenance. Common-cause failures in safety 
systems shall only have minor impacts on plant 
safety. A nuclear power plant shall have reliable 
on-site and off-site electrical power supply systems. 
The execution of safety functions shall be possible 
by using either of the two electrical power supply 
systems. Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident, the Finnish requirements are being sup-
plemented by requiring that the plant shall be pro-
vided with systems and procedures by which decay 
heat removal from the reactor and from the spent 
fuel pools can be ensured for 72 hours independ-
ent of the electricity or water supply from off-site 
sources in events caused by rare external events 
or disturbances in the plant internal electricity 
distribution.
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The plant shall also be provided with systems, 
structures and components for controlling and 
monitoring severe accidents. These shall be inde-
pendent of the systems designed for operational 
conditions and postulated accidents. Systems nec-
essary for ensuring the integrity of the contain-
ment building in a severe accident shall be safety-
classified and capable of performing their safety 
functions, even in the case of a single failure of an 
active component.
Special attention shall be paid to the avoid-
ance, detection and correction of any human er-
rors during design, construction, operation and 
maintenance. The possibility of human errors shall 
be taken into account in the design of the nuclear 
power plant and in the planning of its operation 
and maintenance, so that human errors and devia-
tions from normal plant operations due to human 
errors do not endanger plant safety. The impacts 
of human error shall be reduced by using various 
safety design methods, including defence-in-depth, 
redundancy, diversity and separation.
Detailed requirements are given in Guides YVL 
1.0, YVL 2.0, YVL 2.4, YVL 2.7, YVL 3.0, YVL 4.3, 
YVL 5.2, YVL 5.5, and YVL 6.2.
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the first 
time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in-Principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued 
when the Construction Licence application is re-
viewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems 
and equipment is carried out through their de-
sign approval process. The design of Loviisa plant 
units was reassessed by STUK in 2005–2007 and 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2007–2009 in the periodic 
safety review process. Design of the Olkiluoto unit 
3 has been assessed for the construction licence 
(2005) and during the construction phase. It will be 
reassessed when reviewing the plant’s operating 
licence.
Application of defence in depth 
concept at the Finnish NPPs
During the time period 2010–2012, no significant 
faults or signs of wear were detected in the integ-
rity of equipment and structures critical to plant 
safety. The condition of the multiple barriers con-
taining releases of radioactive substances has re-
mained good both at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs.
In connection with the Loviisa plant’s licence 
renewal, Fortum prepared a plan on actions aimed 
at further enhancing the safety of the plant units 
in the future. The most important ongoing plant 
modification project related to the Defence-in-
Depth concept at the Loviisa plant is the upgrade 
of the I&C systems of the plant units. The project 
started in 2004 with the construction of a new I&C 
building. Safety classified parts of the project are 
intended to be completed in 2017.
Fortum and TVO have also reviewed all of the 
analyses of transient and accident situations at 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 
connection with the operating licence renewal and 
periodic safety review. Deterministic safety assess-
ment is described in more detail under Article 14.
Severe accidents were not taken into account in 
the original design of the operating Finnish nucle-
ar power plants. However, since the commissioning 
of the plants, major improvements have been im-
plemented to mitigate the consequences of severe 
accidents. Mitigations systems of the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs are described in detail in Annexes 
2 and 3.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3, application of the 
Defence-in-Depth principle was presented in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). The 
design follows the principles laid down in the 
Government Decree 733/2008. Compared with the 
existing reactors, the possibilities for mitigation 
of the consequences of the severe accidents are 
taken into account already in the early design 
phase. This is achieved by implementing features 
to ensure containment integrity. Design provisions 
include e.g. core catcher for corium spreading and 
cooling, hydrogen recombination, and containment 
heat removal. In addition, aircraft crash protection 
design requirements for both a military aircraft 
and a large passenger aircraft are taken into ac-
count.
Several plant modifications improving safety 
have been carried out at the Loviisa NPP during 
the last few years. Plates preventing vortices were 
installed in the intake pipes of the Loviisa plant 
emergency makeup water tanks during the 2009 
annual outage. The objective of the modification is 
to obstruct air suction into the reactor emergency 
injection system pumps when the tank water level 
drops. The Loviisa plant improved suction strain-
ers of the low pressure emergency cooling system 
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and the containment spraying system by means of 
installing higher density mesh elements in them. 
The modification serves to ensure fuel cooling in 
accident conditions by means of preventing materi-
als coming loose from, for example, heat insulation 
from being carried to the reactor core via the emer-
gency cooling system. According to analyses, block-
ages in the core caused by large amounts of fibres 
could lead to overheating of the reactor core. The 
modifications were carried out at the Loviisa unit 2 
in 2010 and at the Loviisa unit 1 in 2011.
Based on the safety analyses, it was considered 
necessary to make modifications in the operation 
of the Loviisa emergency water tanks of the low 
pressure emergency cooling system (accumula-
tors). The modification serves to to ensure that 
heat transfer from the reactor can be reliably pro-
vided by preventing the nitrogen in the water tank 
from getting into the reactor. In order to ensure 
the tightness of the primary circuit, the sealing 
grooves of two inner sealing groove zones of the 
Loviisa units 1 and 2 reactor pressure vessel flange 
face were repaired. The tightness of the reactor 
pressure vessel and its lid is based on double seal 
grooves in which a nickel sealing wire is inserted. 
The first defects which required local repair were 
detected in these sealing grooves in periodic in-
spections at the Loviisa unit 2 in 2005. Similar de-
fects were also detected in subsequent inspections 
at the Loviisa unit 1. The repairs were done during 
the annual outage 2010 at the unit 1 and 2012 at 
the unit 2.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent, safety improvements have been initiated at 
the Loviisa NPP. Improvements under planning 
and implementation for the Loviisa plant include 
among other things:
•	 Installation of independent cooling towers for 
decay heat removal from the reactor core and 
from the spent fuel pools. The cooling towers 
would provide an alternative ultimate heat sink 
in case of loss of sea water cooling. Installation 
of the towers is planned for 2014.
•	 Flood protection. The utility has estimated the 
effects of high sea level to the plant behav-
ior. The utility will submit a detailed plan of 
improved flood protection in 2014 (protection 
during annual maintenance shutdown already 
partly implemented).
•	 Design plans of diverse cooling water supply 
to the spent fuel pools have been submitted to 
STUK in 2013.
•	 Evaluation of the availability of cooling water 
and emergency diesel fuel in case of accidents 
at multiple units.
Fukushima related modifications at the Loviisa 
NPP are described in more detail in Annex 2.
Several plant modifications improving safety 
have also been carried out at the Olkiluoto NPP 
units 1 and 2 during the last few years. The main 
steam line isolation valves inside the containment 
were replaced at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 dur-
ing annual maintenances in 2010 and 2011. The 
function of the valves is to isolate the reactor pres-
sure vessel and prevent the loss of reactor coolant 
and releases of radioactive substances outside the 
containment. The valves also function as a backup 
for the isolation valves outside the containment. 
One reason for the valve replacement was the ten-
dency of the old valves to close as the steam flow 
increases. In a situation where one valve closes, the 
steam flow through the other valves increases and 
this can make them close, too. The near simultane-
ous closing of all the steam line isolation valves 
causes a greater pressure rise and load on the 
reactor pressure vessel than the closing of a single 
valve only.
TVO has replaced in 2010 all rubber collar pipe 
penetrations below elevation +10 in the rooms 
containing emergency cooling system pumps with 
type-approved fire and pressure penetrations. All 
in all, the modification involved over 60 penetra-
tions. STUK had earlier made a remark about the 
condition of the penetrations. TVO examined all 
the similar original penetrations at the plant by 
means of testing and assessing their compliance 
with fire, ventilation and water-tightness require-
ments, and analysed the risks to plant safety. 
Based on the risk analysis results, the impact of 
the conditions of the penetrations was about 3% of 
the PSA model annual core damage frequency.
TVO has made a decision to replace all cur-
rent emergency diesel generators (EDGs) of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 with their auxiliary sys-
tems to correspond with the changed need for 
power, taking also into account any increases in 
the need for power due to possible future plant 
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modifications as well as the lessons learnt from 
the Fukushima accident in relation to securing the 
power supply.
Safety improvements due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident under planning for 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 include among other 
things:
•	 Assessing possibilities for ensuring cooling of 
the reactor core in case of total loss of AC sup-
plies and systems. Evaluations of feasible solu-
tions are under way.
•	 Ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water 
system pumps independently of availability of 
the sea water systems. The modification is 
planned for 2014-2015.
•	 Design plans of diverse cooling water supply to 
the spent fuel pools will be completed in 2013.
•	 The utility is assessing plans for new mobile 
equipment (aggregates, pumps).
•	 Evaluation of the availability of cooling water 
and emergency diesel fuel in case of accidents 
at multiple units.
Fukushima related modifications at the Olkiluoto 
NPP units 1 and 2 are described in more detail in 
Annex 3.
In 2011, STUK has accepted increase of the 
maximum bundle average burnup up to 57 MWd/
kgU for the TVEL 2nd generation fuel used at the 
Loviisa plant. STUK has also accepted increase 
of the maximum bundle average burnup up to 50 
MWd/kgU for the fuel types used at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2: GEI4, GNF2, ATRIUM 10XM, SVEA-
96 OPTIMA and SVEA-96 OPTlMA2. New type of 
fuel bundles (so-called TVEL 2nd generation fuel) 
were taken into use at the Loviisa NPP in 2009. 
The fuel enrichment is slightly higher which has 
an impact on shutdown margin of the reactor. Also 
six rods in the bundle contain burnable poison. 
Acceptable control rod positions in the Operational 
Limits and Conditions were also changed in order 
to keep the shutdown margin of the reactor core at 
the same level as before.
A minor fuel leak was observed at the Loviisa 
unit 1 on 2009. One leaking fuel assembly was 
found in the investigation carried out during 
the annual maintenance outage of 2010, and the 
leaking assembly was removed from the reactor. 
Another minor fuel leak has been observed at the 
Loviisa unit 2 late 2012. A fuel leak was observed 
at the Olkiluoto unit 1 about one week before 
the 2010 annual maintenance. The leak remained 
small, and the leaking fuel assembly was removed 
from the reactor during the outage. Olkiluoto unit 
2 had two fuel leaks in 2010–2011. The leaking fuel 
assemblies were identified and removed from the 
reactor during the 2011 and 2012 annual mainte-
nances.
Inspections of the reactor pressure vessel and 
piping have revealed no deterioration of the ma-
terials at the Finnish NPPs. No significant issues 
with safety implications were observed in the peri-
odic inspections of the pressure equipment. STUK 
has renewed the operating licences of the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 reactor pressure vessels until the 
end of the operating licence of the units. However, 
safety of the pressure vessel operation must be 
assessed in connection with the Periodic Safety 
Reviews.
The Loviisa unit 2 primary and secondary cir-
cuits were subjected to pressure tests in 2010. The 
pressure tests are performed every eight years. In 
the tests, the structural strength and leak tight-
ness of the circuits are tested using a pressure 
1.3 times the design pressure, i.e. 178 bar abs for 
the primary circuit and 73 bar abs for the second-
ary circuit. Results of the tests were accepted by 
STUK. The inner parts of the reactor pressure 
vessel of the Olkiluoto unit 1 were subjected to a 
visual video inspection during the 2011 refuelling 
outage. The Olkiluoto unit 1 faults being monitored 
have remained unchanged, and the inspections did 
not reveal any new faults with important safety 
implications.
The steel liner of the Loviisa NPP containment 
is subjected to a leak tightness test at four-year 
intervals using the design pressure of 1.7 bar 
abs. The test has been carried out in 2010 at the 
Loviisa unit 2 and in 2012 at the Loviisa unit 1. 
Results of the tests have fulfilled the acceptance 
criteria. The reactor containment at the Olkiluoto 
NPP is subjected to a leak tightness test three 
times during a 12-year period. In addition, leak 
tightness tests have been made systematically to 
containment isolation valves, personnel airlocks 
and containment penetrations during the annual 
outages. The results show that the leak tightness 
of the containment building has remained accept-
able at the both NPPs. The overall leak tightness 
of the Olkiluoto unit 2 reactor containment was 
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tested during the annual outage of 2010 and that 
of the Olkiluoto unit 1 containment during the out-
age of 2012. Results of the test have fulfilled the 
acceptance criteria.
During the period 2010–2012, no significant 
failures were observed at the Loviisa plant in the 
safety functions or in the systems, equipment and 
structures executing them. No significant faults or 
signs of wear have been detected during in the in-
tegrity of equipment or structures critical to plant 
safety.
In accordance with a periodic testing pro-
gramme, TVO carried out testing of the relief train 
valves of the blowdown system at the Olkiluoto 
unit 1 during the 2010 annual maintenance. The 
purpose of the blowdown system is to limit the 
pressure in the reactor by letting out steam from 
the reactor to the suppression pool if the normal 
route of the steam to the turbine is not available. 
When tested, two relief valves did not operate as 
planned. TVO carried out inspection of the electric 
pilot valves of the relief valves which revealed that 
three electric pilot valves had jammed. All three 
jammed valves were of a new type that had been 
installed at the Olkiluoto unit 1 the year before. 
The reason for the jamming was the oxidation of 
the internal coating material of the valve guide 
bushing. The manufacturer had changed the coat-
ing material without informing TVO.
In 2011 maintenance outage at the Olkiluoto 
unit 2, TVO discovered that there were cracks in 
the pistons of the blowdown system valves. The 
inspections revealed other damage as well; for 
example, the hard chrome plating of the pilot cyl-
inder had been damaged. However, the cracks and 
other damage had not affected the operation of 
the valves; they had operated correctly in periodic 
tests. TVO replaced the parts of the worst damaged 
valves during the annual maintenance. Based on 
the requirement by STUK, new spare parts were 
changed to the valves immediately when a suffi-
cient number of new spares had been received from 
the manufacturer. STUK also required that TVO 
must inspect the similar valves at the Olkiluoto 
unit 1. The events are described in more detail in 
Annex 3.
Incorporation of proven technologies
It is stated in the Government Decree 733/2008 
that proven or otherwise carefully examined high-
quality technology shall be employed in the de-
sign, construction and operation of a nuclear power 
plant. The respective detailed requirements are 
provided in many YVL Guides.
Practical implementation of the new safety 
requirements and procedures to ensure adequate 
reliability of software based instrumentation and 
control systems in the modernisation projects of 
the operating power plants and in the design of 
the new nuclear power plant can be considered as 
one of the major challenges for the next years. This 
includes also the issues related to the highly inte-
grated control rooms.
At the Loviisa NPP, I&C systems are currently 
being renewed. The project began in 2002 with 
basic conceptual design; implementation begun in 
2004 with construction of new buildings to accom-
modate the new systems. Safety classified parts of 
the project are intended to be completed in 2017. 
The first phase was implemented at the Loviisa 
unit 1 during the 2008 annual maintenance, in-
cluding the upgrade of I&C of reactor preventive 
and control rod position measurement and control 
functions, part of reactor in-core monitoring sys-
tem and I&C of some non-safety auxiliary systems. 
Control room facilities are also renewed in phases 
with the system renewal.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, changes in I&C 
systems are made gradually. Software based in-
strumentation and control technology has already 
been implemented in the modernised systems. The 
safety systems, with the exception of new protec-
tive relays of electrical systems and neutron flux 
measurement system, are still of conventional 
technology.
STUK has reviewed the licensing documents 
related to the modernisation project of the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 and the construction project of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3. The licensing path covers differ-
ent layers of the design from architectural design 
of I&C (including Defence-in-Depth, separation 
and diversity assessments) to system level design 
and down to I&C platform and equipment suit-
ability and licensing. During the licensing, STUK 
is reviewing that proven and qualified solutions 
are used.
The critical part of the licensing is how to dem-
onstrate that the prevention of failure propagation 
and independency of different defence-in-depth 
levels are adequate. Proofing that platforms and 
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equipment fulfils requirements can also be labo-
rious work and must be carefully planned if the 
equipment is not originally designed for safety 
critical use. Cyber security threats must also be 
considered.
Design for reliable, stable and 
manageable operation
Government Decree 733/2008 requires that a nu-
clear power plant’s control room shall contain 
equipment which provide information about the 
plant’s operational state and any deviations from 
normal operation as well as systems which moni-
tor the state of the plant’s safety systems during 
operation and their functioning during operational 
transients and accidents. Furthermore, it requires 
that a nuclear power plant shall contain automatic 
systems that maintain the plant in a controlled 
state during transients and accidents long enough 
to provide the operators a sufficient time to con-
sider and implement the correct actions. Special 
attention shall be paid to the avoidance, detection 
and repair of human errors. The possibility of hu-
man errors shall be taken into account both in the 
design of the nuclear power plant and in the plan-
ning of its operation so that the plant withstands 
well errors and deviations from planned opera-
tional actions.
Plant systems reliability and human factors 
are systematically considered in the probabilistic 
risk assessments (PRA). The analyses support the 
efforts to eliminate accidents or to mitigate their 
consequences. The probabilistic risk assessments 
are subject to the approval of STUK. Human fac-
tors in relation to the monitoring and control of 
Finnish nuclear power plants area described under 
Article 12. Significant effort has been devoted by 
the regulator and utilities involved in the assess-
ment of modern control room concepts. Existing 
plants are moving towards so-called hybrid control 
rooms, where normal operation is based on digital 
controls and video screens, but safety backups are 
still implemented also using traditional mosaic 
displays, analogy indicators and switches.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 18.
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Article 19. Operation
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the initial authorization to operate a nu-
clear installation is based upon an appro-
priate safety analysis and a commissioning 
programme demonstrating that the instal-
lation, as constructed, is consistent with 
design and safety requirements;
ii. operational limits and conditions derived 
from the safety analysis, tests and opera-
tional experience are defined and revised 
as necessary for identifying safe bounda-
ries for operation;
iii. operation, maintenance, inspection 
and testing of a nuclear installation are 
conducted in accordance with approved 
procedures;
iv. procedures are established for re-
sponding to anticipated operational occur-
rences and to accidents;
v. necessary engineering and technical sup-
port in all safety-related fields is available 
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear instal-
lation;
vi. incidents significant to safety are re-
ported in a timely manner by the holder of 
the relevant licence to the regulatory body;
vii. programmes to collect and analyse op-
erating experience are established, the re-
sults obtained and the conclusions drawn 
are acted upon and that existing mecha-
nisms are used to share important experi-
ence with international bodies and with 
other operating organizations and regula-
tory bodies;
viii. the generation of radioactive waste 
resulting from the operation of a nuclear 
installation is kept to the minimum prac-
ticable for the process concerned, both in 
activity and in volume, and any necessary 
treatment and storage of spent fuel and 
waste directly related to the operation and 
on the same site as that of the nuclear in-
stallation take into consideration condi-
tioning and disposal.
Initial authorisation
According to Government Decree 733/2008 Section 
22, in connection with the commissioning of a nu-
clear power plant, the licensee shall ensure that 
the systems, structures and components and the 
plant as a whole operate as designed. At the com-
missioning stage, the licensee shall ensure that an 
expedient organisation is in place for the future 
operation, alongside a sufficient number of quali-
fied personnel and instructions suitable for the 
purpose.
Requirements for the commissioning pro-
gramme are set forth in the Guide YVL 2.5. 
According to the Guide YVL 2.5, the purpose of the 
commissioning programme is to give evidence that 
the plant has been constructed and will function 
according to the design requirements. Through 
the programme possible deficiencies in design and 
construction can also be observed. The Operating 
Licence is needed before fuel loading into the reac-
tor. Authorisation for fuel loading is given by STUK 
after its specific inspection where readiness of the 
power plant and operating organisation is checked. 
Furthermore, according to the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the various steps of the commissioning, i.e., 
criticality, low power operation and power ascen-
sion, are subject to the approval of STUK.
The commissioning programme is described in 
the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. 
The participation of the operating staff in the com-
missioning programme is a requirement of the 
Guide YVL 1.6. The commissioning programme is 
to be submitted to STUK for approval. The detailed 
commissioning test programmes and test reports 
for systems in safety classes 1, 2 and 3 are submit-
ted separately to STUK for approval. STUK wit-
nesses commissioning tests and assesses the test 
results before giving stepwise permits to proceed in 
the commissioning.
Olkiluoto unit 3 commissioning
Commissioning of the Olkiluoto unit 3 has started. 
On the turbine island, component and system com-
missioning tests are ongoing. On the nuclear is-
land, commissioning is pending for the installation 
of operational I&C. Commissioning is divided into 
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four actual commissioning phases followed by a 
30-day demonstration run before provisional take-
over of the plant. The first commissioning phase 
consists of component and system testing. This is 
followed by overall system tests – cold and hot 
functional tests – before core loading. For fuel load-
ing, Operating licence and STUK’s authorisation 
are required. Hot functional tests with core in sub-
critical state and first criticality can then follow. 
After first criticality, the commissioning proceeds 
with power tests at various power levels up to 
rated power. During power tests, transient tests 
are performed. The transient tests will cover at 
least reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of off-site power, 
house load operation, trip of one main circulation 
pump or main feedwater pump, as well as other 
minor operational transients.
All commissioning documentation is part of 
Commissioning Manual which includes also or-
ganisational procedures. Vendor has prepared an 
Overall Commissioning Programme as well as 
system level commissioning documentation and 
TVO and STUK have approved some of these docu-
ments. Preparations for plant level commissioning 
are still underway, e.g. preparation of detailed 
commissioning programs for the later phases of 
commissioning. STUK oversees the commissioning 
of safety classified systems and related result docu-
mentation is provided for STUK’s review.
Before commissioning activities of a system can 
be started, the system goes through a commission-
ing inspection. This step certifies that components 
and system are properly installed and all activities 
preceding commissioning have been completed. 
This is also part of the pressure vessel require-
ments.
As the Government Decree 733/2008 states, 
one aim of the commissioning is to ensure that an 
expedient organisation is in place for the future 
operation. TVO’s personnel (e.g. future operators 
and maintenance personnel) are participating in 
the commissioning activities in order to gain fa-
miliarity with the plant. The documentation for 
operation, like operating and testing procedures, 
is validated during the commissioning tests. The 
Operational Limits and Conditions are being pre-
pared, and trained to TVO’s personnel. TVO is 
also preparing itself for the future operation of the 
plant by planning refuelling outages, data systems, 
waste management, radiation protection and other 
issues related to the plant operation.
As part of the construction inspection pro-
gramme inspections, STUK oversees TVO’s actions 
for ensuring that the plant is commissioned ap-
propriately.
Operational Limits and Conditions
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that the applicant 
for an Operating Licence must provide STUK with 
the Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs). 
The OLCs shall at least define limits for the pro-
cess parameters that affect the safety of the facility 
in various operating states, provide regulations on 
operating restrictions that result from component 
failures, and set forth requirements for the test-
ing of components important to safety. Technical 
and administrative requirements and restrictions 
for ensuring the safe operation of a nuclear power 
plant shall be set forth in the plant’s OLCs. Guide 
YVL 1.1 requires that the minimum staff availabil-
ity in all operational states and the limits for the 
releases of radioactive substances are also defined 
in the document.
The OLCs have been established for each nu-
clear power plant unit and are updated based 
on operational experiences, tests, analyses and 
plant modifications. The OLCs are subject to the 
approval of STUK prior to the commissioning of 
a facility. Strict observance of the OLCs is veri-
fied by STUK’s continuous oversight, reporting 
requirements and through a periodic inspection 
programme. The OLCs, operating procedures and 
other plant documentation need to be updated as 
part of plant modification process.
Fortum has established the OLCs for the 
Loviisa units 1 and 2, and STUK has reviewed 
and accepted them. The OLCs are continuously 
updated, and all the changes need to be approved 
by STUK. The limitations and conditions of the 
reactor and plant operation, the requirements for 
periodic tests and the essential administrative in-
structions are presented in the OLCs.
The OLCs for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 deter-
mine the limits of process parameters that affect 
the plant safety, for different operating modes, 
set the provisions for operating limits caused by 
component inoperability and set forth the require-
ments for the tests that are conducted regularly for 
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Figure 18. Number of exemptions and deviations from the Operational Limits and Conditions in the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs.
components important to safety. Furthermore, the 
OLCs include the bases for the set provisions.
The OLCs for the Olkiluoto unit 3 are still 
under preparation. STUK received a preliminary 
version of the OLCs for information in 2011. STUK 
reviewed the general principles of the OLCs, but 
not yet the details. The OLCs for the Olkiluoto unit 
3 will define safety limits for the plant, limiting 
conditions and surveillance requirements for plant 
systems, as well as administrative controls. The 
OLCs will also include bases and justification for 
the conditions.
Figure 18 presents the number of exemptions 
and deviations from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. The main reason for the large number 
of exemptions at the Loviisa NPP in years 2002-
2003 was the project to renew the radiation moni-
tors that required exemptions in all operational 
states. Based on the results of the last 10 years, 
the Loviisa NPP applied for STUK’s approval for 
exemptions from the OLCs on the average six 
times per year. Hence, the number of applications 
in 2010–2012 (total 18) was equal to the average. 
During the period 2010–2012, most of exemption 
applications concerned I&C renewal or overdue 
repairs of component failures. In 2010–2012, there 
were nine events at the Loviisa plant in which the 
Operational Limits and Conditions were violated. 
Seven of these events occurred in 2012, which is 
notably higher than the average two events per 
year. Hence, Loviisa NPP has assigned an investi-
gation team to evaluate these events (see Annex 2).
Based on the results of the last 10 years, the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applied for STUK’s 
approval for exemptions from the OLCs on the 
average seven times per year. Hence, the number 
of applications in 2010–2012 (total 27) was a lit-
tle higher than the average. Most of the applica-
tions were related to modifications. In 2004 and 
2005, the number of deviations was increased 
because of work and installations related to the 
modernisation of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 and the 
construction of Olkiluoto unit 3. Similarly, major 
modifications were carried out during 2010 and 
2011. In 2010–2012, there were three events at the 
Olkiluoto plant in which the Operational Limits 
and Conditions were violated.
Procedures for operation, maintenance, 
inspection and testing
Government Decree 733/2008 Section 23 requires 
that the control and supervision of a nuclear power 
plant shall utilise written instructions that cor-
respond to the current structure and state of the 
plant. Written orders and related instructions 
shall be provided for the maintenance and repair 
of components. Section 26 requires that the plant 
shall have a condition monitoring and mainte-
nance programme for ensuring the integrity and 
reliable operation of systems, structures and com-
ponents. More detailed requirements are presented 
in the Guides YVL 1.1, YVL 1.8 and YVL 1.9. The 
procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection 
and testing have been established at both Finnish 
nuclear power plants. The procedures shall be ap-
proved by the licensee itself, and most of them are 
required to be submitted to STUK for information. 
STUK verifies by means of inspections and con-
tinuous oversight performed by resident inspec-
tors that approved procedures are followed in the 
operation of the facility.
72
STUK-B 164 Article 19 – oPerAtion
Loviisa NPP
A structured system of procedures exists at the 
Loviisa plant. The procedures cover work processes 
and functions important to safety and availability. 
The system of procedures is a part of the quality 
system of the plant. Strict requirements have been 
set in the Quality Assurance Manual for the cover-
age, responsibilities, updating and observance of 
the procedures. According to the Manual the evalu-
ation of the system of procedures is included in the 
annual review of the coverage and effectiveness of 
the quality assurance programme. The state of the 
plant procedures is acceptable at the Loviisa plant. 
Procedures are maintained, evaluated and devel-
oped systematically and in a controlled way. The 
most important procedure types are:
•	 Administrative procedures including Organisa-
tional Manual and Administrative Rules,
•	 Operating procedures and testing procedures,
•	 Procedures for emergency and transient situa-
tions,
•	 Fuel handling procedures,
•	 Radiation protection procedures, and
•	 Maintenance procedures.
Loviisa plant has upgraded computer systems used 
in managing documentation and permit-to-work 
system. By means of a work order system it is 
ensured that the plant operators are aware of the 
state and configuration of the unit. Fortum has 
developed, and develops further, its work order sys-
tem based on accumulated operating experiences. 
In addition to the work order system the operators 
in the main control room of the units follow fail-
ures, repairs and preventive maintenance of the 
components referred to in the Operating Limits 
and Conditions. A shift supervisor gives a permit 
to start a specific work when he has evaluated the 
work plans specified in the work order system, tak-
ing into account the operability requirements of 
the systems and components set in the Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Loviisa units 
1 and 2 cover preventive, predictive and repairing 
maintenance as well as implementation of modifi-
cation works, spare part maintenance and activi-
ties during outages. The scheduling of the modifi-
cation planning for the next maintenance outage is 
fixed in order to get enough time for preparations. 
Minor modifications are concentrated to every sec-
ond annual maintenance outage and major works 
are carried out every fourth year. This is accom-
plished by starting from a long term investment 
planning which converts into a long term modifica-
tion plan.
The functioning of the systems and components 
is ensured with regular tests. The systems and 
components to be tested and the time periods of the 
tests are presented in the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. At least the respective periodic tests 
are required after the modification and repair-
ing works and maintenance activities requiring 
dismounting. The performance test programme to 
be carried out after an essential modification is 
required to be approved by STUK in advance. In 
addition, inspections regarding to the functioning 
and condition of components are carried out when 
necessary based on operating experiences from 
other plants and on the advancement of techni-
cal knowledge. Other operating organisations of 
VVER-type reactors have been essential sources of 
operating experiences in this respect.
STUK oversees monitoring and maintenance 
activities as well as repair and modification works 
with regular inspections and continuous oversight 
performed by resident inspectors. During inspec-
tions it is aimed to make sure that the utility has 
adequate resources, such as a competent staff, 
instructions, a spare part and material storage 
as well as tools for the sufficiently effective im-
plementation of the monitoring and maintenance 
activities. Special subjects are the condition moni-
toring programmes for the carbon steel piping and 
their results. Special attention has also been paid 
to the reliable activities of subcontractors as well 
as to the technical competence of external human 
resources. Both the utility and STUK oversee com-
panies that perform inspection activities and the 
technical competence of organisations that carry 
out various duties.
Olkiluoto NPP
The measures that are followed in the operation 
and maintenance of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are 
based on written procedures. The administrative 
and technical procedures needed in the operation 
of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been gathered 
into the Operating Manual. The Operating Manual 
contains also necessary transient and emergency 
procedures for unusual conditions. The most im-
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portant procedures have been reviewed by STUK. 
Updating and comprehensiveness of the proce-
dures are among the inspection issues included in 
the STUK’s periodical inspection programme. TVO 
updates the procedures when necessary and checks 
systematically that the procedures are up-to-date 
in four-year-intervals.
The Work Request System ensures that the 
operators of the plant are aware of the plant state. 
TVO has developed its Work Request System and 
will continue to do so, on the basis of operational 
experience. In the main control room of the plant 
units, the operators follow, in addition to the Work 
Request System, the failures, repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance of the components specified 
in the Operational Limits and Conditions. The 
Shift Supervisor grants the permission to begin a 
single work after inspecting the work plans and 
taking into account the operability requirements 
for the systems and components set forth in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 cover preventive and corrective 
maintenance as well as the design and execution 
of modifications, spare part service, outage actions 
and the related quality control. The Maintenance 
Department plans and implements the annual 
maintenance outages together with the Operation 
Department and Technical Support Department. 
Special attention has been paid to the reliable 
work of the subcontractors and to the technical 
competence of the external work force. The techni-
cal expertise of testing laboratories and contrac-
tors is controlled both by the power company and 
STUK.
The systems and the components that will be 
tested as well as the test dates are presented in 
the Operational Limits and Conditions. Periodical 
testing that corresponds at least to the aforemen-
tioned, is required after maintenance measures 
that require modifications, repairing or disassem-
bling. STUK’s approval is required in advance for a 
functional test programme that is conducted after 
a significant modification. Inspections that concern 
the operability and condition of components are 
also conducted, if necessary, on the basis of op-
erational experience received from elsewhere and 
development of technical knowledge. The most sig-
nificant sources of operational experience, in this 
sense, have been the Swedish BWR plants.
STUK oversees the condition monitoring and 
maintenance as well as the modification and re-
pair work by regularly repeated inspections. The 
inspections aim to ensure that the power company 
has adequate resources such as a competent per-
sonnel, instructions, a spare part and material 
storage as well as the tools for adequately efficient 
implementation of condition monitoring and main-
tenance actions. Special items are the condition 
monitoring programmes of the carbon steel pipe-
lines and their results.
Procedures for responding to operational 
occurrences and accidents
Government Decree 733/2008 Section 23 gives ba-
sic requirements for operating and emergency pro-
cedures.
At both Finnish nuclear power plants, proce-
dures for anticipated operational occurrences and 
accidents are in use. To the extent found necessary, 
the procedures have been verified during operator 
training at the plant simulators. At both nuclear 
power plants there are also advanced safety panels 
for monitoring critical safety functions. STUK has 
independently evaluated the appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of the procedures for antici-
pated operational occurrences and accidents.
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have event-oriented 
operating procedures for events within the scope 
of the design. To cope with emergency conditions 
beyond design, including severe accidents, a set of 
symptom-based emergency operating procedures 
(EOPs) is available. The focus of the severe acci-
dent EOPs is on ensuring the containment integ-
rity. The symptom oriented accident management 
procedures (included in EOPs) apply to shutdown 
states, as well, although prevention of core dam-
age is essential especially in situations with open 
containment. As a lesson learnt from the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the licensee will 
improve EOPs to support heat removal from spent 
fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying make-up 
water to the pools.
At the Loviisa NPP, immediate SAM measures 
are carried out within the EOPs. After carrying out 
immediate actions successfully, the operators con-
centrate on monitoring the SAM safety functions 
with SAM procedures. The SAM procedures focus 
on monitoring the leak tightness of the contain-
ment barrier, and on the long-term issues. As a 
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lesson learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident, the licensee will improve EOPs and SAM 
procedures to support heat removal from spent 
fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying additional 
water to the pools. New EOPs for shutdown states, 
which cover the immediate recovery of SAM sys-
tems, have been developed in 2012 and are going 
through implementation.
Engineering and technical support
Government Decree 733/2008 Section 30 requires 
that the organisation shall have access to profes-
sional expertise and technical knowledge required 
for the safe operation of the plant, the maintenance 
of equipment important to safety, and the manage-
ment of accidents. The requirements in the Guide 
YVL 1.7 also cover technical support. Competence 
of the engineering and technical support is super-
vised by the licensee. In addition, STUK carries out 
inspections and audits by which also the compe-
tence of the support staff is evaluated.
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj is an independent or-
ganisation and it has longstanding expertise in 
nuclear operations. TVO uses external expertise 
regularly in various design and modification activi-
ties when needed.
Fortum has under corporate structure own unit 
for technical support that provides support to the 
Loviisa NPP among other projects. There are also 
on-site experts at the Loviisa NPP for various engi-
neering and technical support functions.
Reporting of incidents significant to safety
Guide YVL 1.5 provides in detail the reporting 
requirements on incidents. The Guide provides a 
number of examples of operational disturbances 
and events, which have to be reported to STUK. 
It also defines requirements for the contents of 
the reports and the administrative procedures for 
reporting, including time limits for submitting of 
various reports. STUK publishes information con-
cerning significant events (INES ≥ 1) as press re-
leases. Information from other events is published 
on STUK’s website. STUK describes the events 
also in its quarterly and yearly reports on nuclear 
safety that are also available to the general pub-
lic through internet or paper reports in Finnish. 
STUK’s Annual Report on nuclear safety (see 
Reference 1) summarises events from the whole 
year and is available to the general public through 
internet or paper reports both in Finnish and in 
English.
Figures 19 and 20 present the total number of 
reported events and INES classified (≥ 1) events at 
the Finnish nuclear power plants.
INES-classified events
At the Loviisa NPP, three events in 2010, two 
events in 2011 and twelve events in 2012 were 
classified on the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES). Five of these events were rated at level 1, 
others being of level 0:
•	 Radioactive resin found in ventilation system in 
2010 (IRS report 8088)
•	 Spread of contamination in conjunction with 
transfers of spent fuel in 2010
•	 Deficiencies observed in the testing of radiation 
monitors at Loviisa unit 2 in 2012
•	 Excess fire load in the main coolant pump room 
at Loviisa unit 1 in 2012
•	 Incorrect settings in electrical motor protection 
relays at Loviisa unit 2 in 2012.
These incidents are described in more detail in 
Annex 2.
STUK discussed the increased number of inci-
dents with the licensee during the fall 2012. The 
licensee has started to assess the reasons behind 
the incidents. The assessment will be finalised dur-
ing 2013 after which the corrective actions will be 
implemented and followed at the Loviisa NPP.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, five events in 2010, three 
events in 2011 and six events in 2012 were classi-
fied on the International Nuclear and Radiological 
Event Scale (INES). Five of these events were 
rated at level 1, others being of level 0:
•	 Blowdown system failure at Olkiluoto 1 and re-
pair outage at Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2010
•	 Use of a wrong fresh fuel delivery lot in fuel 
transfer planning at Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2010
•	 Defects in the internal parts of the valves of the 
system required for overpressure protection of 
and residual heat removal from the primary 
circuit at Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 2011
•	 Deficiencies in the functioning of one outer iso-
lation valve of the reactor main steam system 
at the Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2012
•	 Deficiencies in the functioning of one outer iso-
lation valve of the reactor main steam system 
at the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2012.
STUK-B 164
75
Article 19 – oPerAtion
Number of operational transient reports, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 2 6 6 2 3 3 1 3 1 3
 3 3 3 3 5 3 0 0 0 4    
Number of operational transient reports, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 0 3 5 3 1 3 2 2 5 1
 8 3 1 1 2 2 3 0 4 2
Figure 19. Annual total number of event reports (operational transient reports) submitted by Loviisa and Olki-
luoto nuclear power plants.
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Figure 20. Annual total number of events at INES Level 1 and above at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
These incidents are described in more detail in 
Annex 3.
Operational experience feedback
According to the Section 24 of the Government 
Decree 733/2008, nuclear power plant operational 
experience feedback (OEF) shall be collected and 
safety research results monitored, and both as-
sessed for the purpose of enhancing safety. Safety-
significant operational events shall be investigated 
for the purpose of identifying the root causes as 
well as defining and implementing the corrective 
measures. Improvements in technical safety, re-
sulting from safety research, shall be taken into 
account to the extent justified on the basis of the 
principles laid down in Section 7 a of the Nuclear 
Energy Act.
STUK requires that all incidents at nuclear 
facilities and activities are analyzed and reported 
to STUK according to the reporting criteria and 
the reports are assessed by STUK. Based on the 
analysis, corrective actions are planned and imple-
mented by the operators. Regulatory requirements 
are given in STUK’s Regulatory Guides YVL 1.5 
(Reporting NPP Operation to STUK), YVL 1.11 
(Nuclear power plant operational experience feed-
back), and YVL 1.9 (QA during operation of NPPs). 
The Guide YVL  1.11 provides detailed require-
ments and administrative procedures for the sys-
tematic evaluation of operating experiences, and 
for the planning and implementation of corrective 
actions. Operational events at other nuclear power 
plants and foreign operational occurrences have 
to be systematically assessed as well, from their 
applicability and their significance for the nuclear 
facilities in Finland.
The licensees have developed the required pro-
cedures for analysing operating experiences and 
root causes for events. The licensees are using 
WANO and IRS reports as basic material to be 
screened for external OEF and they have OEF 
groups for screening, analysing of OE entry into 
processing and following the corrective actions. The 
licensees have also their internal audit programme 
and OEF is one topic in these programmes.
STUK verifies by means of inspections and by 
reviewing licensee’s event reports that the activi-
ties of the licensees as regards incident evaluation 
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are effective. In STUK’s periodic inspection pro-
gramme there are two inspections related to OEF, 
namely C1 Operations and B4 Operational experi-
ence feedback. When necessary, a special investiga-
tion team is appointed by STUK to evaluate a cer-
tain incident or group of incidents. The evaluation 
of foreign operational occurrences and incidents is 
based on the reports of the IRS Reporting System 
(IAEA/NEA) and on the reports of other national 
regulatory bodies.
For review and assessment of OE information 
abroad STUK has an internal IRS Group with a 
coordinator and sixteen technical experts covering 
all expertise areas of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
and Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation de-
partments. The group meets monthly and based 
on the expert assessment in STUK’s own IRS 
database the group members make together an 
judgement whether there is a need for regula-
tory or licensee measures on the basis of lessons 
learned assigning the IRS report into categories 
with respect to actions to be taken (categories 1 to 
3), or not needed (category 0). In the case that an 
expert to whom the report is assigned for review 
cannot immediately say if an event requires ac-
tions at Finnish plants the report is classified into 
category 1 (particular issues need clarification) and 
clarifications of the applicability are initiated with 
the plant contact persons. After clarifications the 
event is reclassified. Classification into category 
2 (Lessons learned need to be taken into account 
in certain activities) means that concrete actions 
are not required but the report contains informa-
tion which should be considered in inspections by 
STUK. If actions are required at the Finnish nu-
clear power plants in operation or under construc-
tion the report is classified into category 3 (Actions 
required). Examples of such events are unexpected 
failures of components being installed also into the 
systems or equipment of Finnish plants, or events 
revealing deficiencies in procedures of the plants. 
Category 4 (Good practise in Finland) means that 
actions to prevent an event have already taken or 
an occurrence of such an event has taken into ac-
count in the original design of the plant, or there 
are procedures and regulatory requirements in 
place (YVL Guides) preventing a similar event.
Figure 21 shows the distribution of IRS reports 
into different categories in STUK’s review and 
assessment from 2009 to 2012. Altogether 212 
IRS-reports were assessed during that period and 
most of them (73%), 155 reports, fell into category 
0 requiring no actions. 10 % (22 IRS reports) of re-
viewed reports were classified into category 2 and 
applicability of lessons learned were checked in 
the inspections of STUK’s periodic inspection pro-
gramme. In the case of 14 reported events (7% of 
all reviewed reports) caused actions at the Finnish 
nuclear power plants. Nearly in the equal number 
of cases (13 events) it was realised that similar 
kind of events were prevented by technical or ad-
ministrative arrangements.
One example of foreign IRS reports which 
caused actions at the Finnish plants in 2012 was 
‘Reactor Pressure Vessel Flaw Indications at Doel 
3, Belgium’ (IRS report number 8244). STUK 
asked clarifications by a mandatory request (let-
ter on 19th March 2012), with deadline end of May 
2013 for TVO and end of August 2013 for Fortum. 
Number of IRS reported events classified in catego-
ry 2 (Lessons learned need to be taken account in 
certain activities) is increasing: 14 events in 2012.
A fire that took place during a containment 
leak test carried out at the 2011 annual outage 
of Ringhals unit 2, as well as the obstructions 
in the containment spray systems of Ringhals 
units 2 and 4 observed during the cleaning and 
inspections carried out after the fire, were iden-
tified as issues relevant to the Finnish nuclear 
power plants eventhough not reported to IRS. 
STUK received the first information on the fire 
in the meeting with the Swedish Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (SSM) in mid of June 
2011. STUK took the event and licensees’ actions 
as one item in its periodic inspection program 
inspection on “Utilization of International OE”. 
The Finnish nuclear power plants have decided 
No further actions (155)
Particular issues need clarification (8)
Lessons learned need to be taken into 
account in certain activities (22)
Actions required (14)
Good practise in Finland (13)
73%4%
10%
7%
6%
Distribution of  IRS-report’s into different categories 
in STUK‘s review and assessment in 2009–2012
Figure 21. Distribution of IRS-reports into different catego-
ries in STUK’s review and assessment in 2009–2012.
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on several corrective actions based on this event 
considering containment leaktightness test pro-
cedures (control of fire load in the containment), 
movable and pressure-resistant fire detectors in 
the containment, inspection of pipes with x-ray 
or endoscope procedures, and re-evaluation of pe-
riodic testing methods in general (scope, criteria, 
conditions).
Reports for the IRS System on safety-signif-
icant occurrences at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants are written by STUK. STUK’s international 
OEF group oversees the utilisation of international 
OE by licensees.
STUK has also participated in co-operation 
between international organisations such as the 
IAEA, the OECD/NEA and the EU, which ex-
change information on safety issues and operating 
events. Other forums that STUK uses to obtain 
information are WENRA, the VVER Forum and 
the NERS Forum as well as some bilateral agree-
ments. A special exchange of information between 
Rostechnadzor and STUK on the operation of the 
Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants and of 
Finnish nuclear power plants is also ongoing activ-
ity. The similar information exchange is arranged 
between SSM and STUK on the operation of the 
Swedish and Finnish NPPs.
At the Loviisa NPP, VVER reactor operating 
experience is collected, screened and evaluated by 
a dedicated operating experience feedback group 
composed of engineers from the plant operation or-
ganisation and from Technical Support. The main 
information to be handled comes from WANO 
(World Association of Nuclear Operators) Moscow 
Centre which links all the VVER reactor operators. 
Additional reports are received from the IAEA, 
OECD/NEA and NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission). The activities of the operating expe-
rience feedback group are not limited only to VVER 
reactors. The plant managers of VVER-440 reac-
tors have periodic meetings. The plant operation 
problems, modernisation, back-fitting, plant life 
management and safety questions are handled and 
experiences are exchanged in these meetings and 
in further individual contacts.
TVO has also an operating experience feedback 
group. This onsite group gives recommendations 
to the line organisation that makes decisions on 
eventual corrective actions. The industry operating 
experience from similar reactor types is followed 
by several means. The main sources of informa-
tion are ERFATOM (the owners group for Nordic 
BWR operators), KSU (Swedish nuclear training 
centre), WANO and the Swedish Forsmark NPP. 
Information is also coming directly from sever-
al sources (IAEA and OECD/NEA, IRS), Loviisa 
power plant (e.g. operating experience meetings 
and reports), vendors (Westinghouse Atom, Alstom 
Power Sweden AB), component manufacturers, the 
WANO Network, BWROG (BWR Owners Group) 
and BWR Forum (FANP).
IRS reports are also received directly by the li-
censees via WBIRS and evaluated by them. Almost 
all plant modifications, as improvements in sys-
tems, structures, and components, which have 
emerged from foreign experience originate from 
plants that are of the same type as the Finnish 
plants.
Management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste on the site
Management of the operational low and intermedi-
ate nuclear level wastes and the final disposal of 
these wastes takes place at the NPP sites. Final 
disposal facilities for low and intermediate level 
waste are in operation at Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
sites. Since the disposal facilities are operated by 
the nuclear power plant operators, the technical 
feasibility and economic motivation to minimise 
the generation of radioactive waste are evident.
The detailed requirement for radioactive waste 
minimisation is included in the Guide YVL 8.3. It 
calls for a limitation of waste volumes in particular 
from repair and maintenance works, and segrega-
tion of wastes on the basis of activity. Clearance of 
wastes from regulatory control, prescribed in the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and in the Guide YVL 8.2, 
aims at limiting the volumes of waste to be stored 
and disposed of. The Guide YVL 6.2 provides for 
prevention of fuel failures, which also contributes 
to the limitation of activity accumulation in waste 
from reactor water cleanup systems.
The Guide YVL 8.3 also requires that besides 
the short-term radiation protection objectives, also 
the long-term properties of waste packages with 
respect to final disposal shall be taken into account 
in the conditioning and storage of waste. The Guide 
includes also more specific requirements for the 
conditioning and interim storage of wastes. The 
Guide YVL 8.1 calls for a waste type description, to 
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be approved by STUK, for each category of reactor 
waste to be disposed of. In the description of waste 
type, the most important characteristics of waste 
with respect to the safety of disposal are defined.
Low and intermediate level waste
In 2007–2009 the policy to minimise the waste pro-
duction at the Olkiluoto NPP has included the high 
quality requirements for the fuel, careful planning 
of the maintenance work and decontamination. 
The segregation and monitoring of the operation-
al wastes have been effective, enabling the clear-
ance from the regulatory control of waste below the 
clearance limits. In 2010, TVO transported mois-
ture separator reheaters removed from Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 during refurbishment in 2005 and 
2006 to Studsvik Nuclear AB for treatment.
At the Loviisa NPP, the design, construction 
and commissioning activities of the liquid waste 
solidification plant has continued. The plant is de-
signed for conditioning and disposal of liquid low 
and intermediate level waste. Based on the results 
of the commissioning tests of the plant some sys-
tem modifications were designed and implemented 
during 2011–2012. The commissioning continues 
in 2013 with operating personnel training activi-
ties and updating the plant design documentation 
and procedures. The tests of modified systems will 
be finalised in 2013. The target date for the start 
of the solidification plant operation is spring 2014 
after the regulatory commissioning inspections 
and approval. The management of solid low and 
intermediate level waste has been developed by 
building new facilities for the treatment, activity 
monitoring and interim storage of waste. New fa-
cilities were commissioned in 2010.
At the Loviisa NPP site, the repository for the 
low and intermediate level waste is located at the 
depth of 110 meters in granite bedrock. It consists 
of three tunnels for solid low level waste and a 
cavern for immobilised intermediate level waste. 
The third tunnel was built during 2010–2012 for 
the sorting and temporary storing of a low level 
maintenance waste. Construction was completed 
in 2012. The commissioning of the third tunnel will 
be done in 2013, after the commissioning inspec-
tion made by STUK.
The repository for the low and intermediate 
level waste at the Olkiluoto NPP site consists of 
two silos at the depth of 60 to 95 meters in tonalite 
bedrock, one for solid low level waste and the other 
for bituminised intermediate level waste.
The original plan presented in the construc-
tion licence application for unit Olkiluoto 3 was to 
dispose all the low and intermediate level waste in 
the existing repository in Olkiluoto. However, the 
waste packages of the conditioned intermediate 
level waste have different dimensions compared 
to the waste packages from operating units in 
Olkiluoto. Therefore TVO will in the operating 
licence application propose that the conditioned in-
termediate level waste is first stored on-site in the 
existing waste storage facility, and later disposed 
of in the extension of the repository. The solid low 
level waste from Olkiluoto unit 3 can be disposed of 
in the existing repository.
At the end of 2012, 5965 cubic meters of low and 
intermediate level operating waste has accumu-
lated at the Olkiluoto NPP and 3545 cubic meters 
at the Loviisa NPP. About 94 % of Olkiluoto waste 
and 52 % of Loviisa solid waste has been disposed 
of in the on-site repositories. Low and intermediate 
level waste not yet disposed of is stored inside the 
plants.
Decommissioning
The Guide YVL 1.0 requires that provision for a 
nuclear power plant’s decommissioning shall be 
made already during the plant’s design phase. One 
criterion when deciding the plant’s materials and 
structural solutions shall be that volumes of de-
commissioned waste are to be limited. The Guide 
YVL  7.18 calls for selection of such construction 
materials that limit the degree of activation and 
spread of contamination and makes decontamina-
tion of surfaces feasible.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree the 
licence applications must include the plans for 
decommissioning. The utilities are obliged to keep 
the decommissioning plans up-to-date and sub-
mit them to the Ministry of Employment ant the 
Economy every six years, last in 2008. STUK re-
viewed the plans and submitted its opinion to the 
Ministry in 2009. A new decommissioning plan for 
Loviisa NPP was submitted in the end of 2012.
The assumption in the decommissioning plan 
of the Loviisa NPP is that both units will be shut 
down after 50 years operation in 2027 and 2030. 
The dismantling starts immediately and lasts un-
til 2035. Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are planned to be 
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shut down after 60 years operation in 2038 and 
2040. The dismantling starts after 30 years delay. 
The final planning and building of disposal facili-
ties will start already during the safe storage pe-
riod and all together the decommissioning project 
will last about 15 years. The reason for delayed 
dismantling is the radiation protection of the per-
sonnel. Olkiluoto unit 3 is planned to shut down 
after 60 years operation in 2070’s. The dismantling 
will start after the dismantling of the older units 
has been completed.
According to STUK’s opinion expressed to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the 
decommissioning plans at this phase of the NPP 
operation are reasonably comprehensive and de-
tailed. The decommissioning can be carried out as 
planned, and the plans are sufficient to be used in 
the cost estimations.
Spent fuel
Spent fuel from the Loviisa NPP was transport-
ed back to Russia until 1996. Amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Act issued in 1994 requires that 
spent fuel generated in Finland has to be treat-
ed, stored and disposed of in Finland. Accordingly, 
spent fuel shipments to Russia were terminated, 
and the necessary extension of the wet type spent 
fuel storage facility was commissioned in 2001. The 
installation of the dense racks into the storage fa-
cility started in 2007 and continues until 2018. The 
capacity of the storage facility will be adequate for 
the total amount of the spent fuel 1100 tU allowed 
in the operating licence issued in 2007.
After the stress tests due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident some safety improve-
ments were identified for the Loviisa NPP spent 
fuel interim storages. The improvements concerned 
the availability of external cooling water and con-
nections to feed the cooling water from external 
sources. The water level and temperature monitor-
ing of the fuel pools were planned to be modified to 
function in all conditions. Also exhaust routes for 
the vapour were considered to be modified.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, the wet type spent fuel 
interim storage facility was commissioned in 1987. 
The current capacity about 1200 tU is adequate 
until 2014. TVO has started the construction works 
for enlarging the Olkiluoto interim storage in 
summer 2010. The extension includes construc-
tion of three new pools and it will be done accord-
ing the updated safety requirements (Government 
decision 733/2008). Extension has been included 
in Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 operating li-
cence and has been handled as plant modification. 
STUK reviewed TVO’s application and gave ap-
proval for construction during first half of the 2010. 
Extension has been planned to be ready in the end 
of 2013.
After the stress tests some safety improvements 
for the Olkiluoto NPP spent fuel interim storage 
were identified. The possibility to feed the cooling 
water from external source and to monitor spent 
fuel pool water level and temperature in all cases 
were the most important safety features to be im-
plemented. The connection for feeding the cooling 
water from external source was already included 
in the design of enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent 
fuel interim storage before Fukushima accident.
At the end of 2012, the spent fuel accumulation 
at the Olkiluoto NPP was 1388 tons of uranium 
and at the Loviisa NPP 542 tons of uranium.
The power companies Fortum and TVO estab-
lished in 1995 the joint company Posiva to take 
care of spent fuel final disposal. Research, develop-
ment and planning work for spent fuel disposal is 
in progress and the disposal facility is envisaged 
to be operational in about 2022. The Decision-in-
Principle on the spent fuel disposal facility in deep 
crystalline bedrock was made by the Government 
in 2000 and ratified by the Parliament in 2001. It 
covers the final disposal of the spent fuel from the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 and Loviisa units 1 and 2. 
Two separate Decision-in-Principles for the dis-
posal of the spent fuel from the Olkiluoto units 3 
and 4 were made in 2002 and 2010, consequently. 
The spent fuel disposal facility will be constructed 
in the vicinity of Olkiluoto NPP site. To confirm 
the suitability of the site, construction of the un-
derground rock characterization facility ONKALO 
was started in 2004. The excavation of ONKALO 
was almost completed during 2012, but some ex-
tensions will be excavated during 2013-2014.
Posiva submitted a construction licence ap-
plication for an encapsulation and final disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel to the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy in the end of 2012. 
The detailed technical documentation of the ap-
plication is planned to be reviewed by STUK dur-
ing 2013–2014 and based on the review STUK 
will give a safety assessment for the Ministry 
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of Employment and Economy during 2014. The 
construction licence application includes both the 
encapsulation plant and the underground disposal 
facility. The capacity of the repository in the ap-
plication is 9000 tU and it covers the spent nuclear 
fuel from the NPP units in operation (Olkiluoto 1 
& 2, Loviisa 1 & 2), under construction (Olkiluoto 
3) as well as a new reactor unit (Olkiluoto 4) for 
which the Decision-in-Principle was ratified by the 
Parliament in July 2010.
Fennovoima presented in their Decision-in-
Principle application similar general principles as 
Posiva for the spent nuclear fuel disposal. The posi-
tive Decision-in-Principle for a new reactor unit rat-
ified by the Parliament in 2010 included a require-
ment for Fennovoima either to negotiate a contract 
with the other Finnish NPP operators under waste 
management obligation to use the same repository, 
or to start an environmental impact assessment 
process for another disposal facility for the spent 
nuclear fuel from Hanhikivi 1 unit. Based on the 
Decision-in-Principle, Fennovoima has six years to 
fulfill this requirement. During 2012 the Ministry 
of Employment and Economy formed a working 
group to start the discussions on the waste man-
agement co-operation options. Participants of the 
working group were from Ministry of Employment 
and Economy, Fennovoima, Posiva, Fortum and 
TVO. The working group produced a report which 
compared expanding the repository in Olkiluoto 
for Fennovoima’s spent fuel and building a second 
disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, and rec-
ommended that companies continue negotiations 
about cooperation in waste management to im-
plement a optimal solution. Fennovoima has also 
started planning the environmental impact assess-
ment process for a separate disposal facility.
A new separate favourable Government resolu-
tion (DiP) is anyway required for either the pos-
sible expansion of the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal 
facility for Fennovoima´s spent fuel disposal or 
alternatively for a separate spent fuel disposal 
facility. For both options before the DiP a recom-
mendation on constructing the facility by the mu-
nicipality intended as the site, and an assessment 
by STUK on the safety of implementation are re-
quired. Furthermore, Parliament may either adopt 
or repeal the resolution. After that, a construction 
licence and operating licence are needed for the 
chosen option.
Safety regulation for spent fuel disposal is in-
cluded in the Government Decree on the safety of 
disposal of nuclear waste 736/2008 and STUK’s 
Guides YVL 8.4 and YVL 8.5.
A detailed description of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management and related regulation 
is included in the 4th Finnish National Report as 
referred to in Article 32 of the Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 
(STUK-B 138, October 2011).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 19.
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Legislation (as of 15th April 2013)
1. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
2. Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988)
3. Act on Third Party Liability (484/1972)
4. Decree on Third Party Liability (486/1972)
5. Radiation Act (592/1991)
6. Radiation Decree (1512/1991)
7. Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (733/2008)
8. Government Decree on the Security in the Use 
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008)
9. Government Decree on Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008)
10. Government Decree on the Safety of Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste (736/2008)
11. Act on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety (1069/1983)
12. Decree on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety (618/1997)
13. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safe-
ty (164/1988)
YVL Guides
General guides
Guide YVL 1.0 Safety criteria for design of nuclear 
power plants, 12.1.1996
Guide YVL 1.1 Regulatory control of safety at nu-
clear facilities, 10.2.2006
Guide YVL 1.2 Documents pertaining to safety 
control of nuclear facilities, 11.9.1995
Guide YVL 1.3 Mechanical components and struc-
tures of nuclear facilities. Approval of testing and 
inspection organizations, 17.3.2003
Guide YVL 1.4 Management systems for nuclear 
facilities, 9.1.2008
Guide YVL 1.5 Reporting nuclear facility opera-
tion to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, 
8.9.2003
Guide YVL 1.6 Nuclear power plant operator com-
petence, 5.10.2006
Guide YVL 1.7 Functions important to nuclear 
power plant safety, and training and qualification 
of personnel, 28.12.1992
Guide YVL 1.8 Repairs, modifications and preven-
tive maintenance at nuclear facilities, 2.10.1986
Guide YVL 1.9 Quality assurance during operation 
of nuclear power plants, 13.11.1991
Guide YVL 1.10 Requirements for siting a nuclear 
power plant, 11.7.2000
Guide YVL 1.11 Nuclear power plant operating 
experience feedback, 22.12.1994
Guide YVL 1.12 INES classification of events at 
nuclear facilities, 16.1.2002
Guide YVL 1.13 Nuclear power plant outages, 
9.1.1995
Guide YVL 1.14 Mechanical equipment and struc-
tures of nuclear facilities. Control of manufactur-
ing, 4.10.1999
Guide YVL 1.15 Mechanical components and struc-
tures in nuclear installations. Construction inspec-
tion, 28.4.2008
Guide YVL 1.16 Regulatory control of nuclear li-
ability insurances, 22.3.2000
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Systems
Guide YVL 2.0 Systems design for nuclear power 
plants, 1.7.2002
Guide YVL 2.1 Nuclear power plant systems, struc-
tures and components and their safety classifica-
tion, 26.6.2000
Guide YVL 2.2 Transient and accident analyses for 
justification of technical solutions at nuclear power 
plants, 26.8.2003
Guide YVL 2.4 Primary and secondary circuit pres-
sure control at a nuclear power plant, 24.3.2006
Guide YVL 2.5 The commissioning of a nuclear 
power plant, 29.9.2003
Guide YVL 2.6 Seismic events and nuclear power 
plants, 19.12.2001
Guide YVL 2.7 Ensuring a nuclear power plant’s 
safety functions in provision for failures, 20.5.1996
Guide YVL 2.8 Probabilistic safety analysis in safe-
ty management of nuclear power plants, 28.5.2003
Pressure equipment
Guide YVL 3.0 Pressure equipment of nuclear fa-
cilities, 9.4.2002
Guide YVL 3.1 Nuclear facility pressure vessels, 
1.7.2005
Guide YVL 3.3 Nuclear facility piping, 26.6.2006
Guide YVL 3.4 Approval of the manufacturer of 
nuclear pressure equipment, 14.1.2004
Guide YVL 3.5 Ensuring the firmness of pressure 
vessels of a NPP, 5.4.2002
Guide YVL 3.7 Pressure equipment of nuclear fa-
cilities. Commissioning inspection, 26.9.2008
Guide YVL 3.8 Nuclear power plant pressure 
equipment. In-service inspection with non-destruc-
tive testing methods, 22.9.2003
Guide YVL 3.9 Nuclear power plant pressure 
equipment. Construction and welding filler materi-
als, 5.11.2004
Buildings and structures
Guide YVL 4.1 Concrete structures for nuclear fa-
cilities, 22.5.1992
Guide YVL 4.2 Steel structures for nuclear facili-
ties, 19.12.2001
Guide YVL 4.3 Fire protection at nuclear facilities, 
1.11.1999
Other structures and components
Guide YVL 5.1 Nuclear power plant diesel genera-
tors and their auxiliary systems, 23.1.1997
Guide YVL 5.2 Electrical power systems and com-
ponents at nuclear facilities, 24.6.2004
Guide YVL 5.3 Nuclear facility valve units, 
28.4.2008
Guide YVL 5.5 Instrumentation systems and com-
ponents at nuclear facilities, 13.9.2002
Guide YVL 5.6 Air-conditioning and ventilation 
systems and components of nuclear facilities, 
25.11.2004
Guide YVL 5.7 Nuclear facility pump units, 
28.4.2008
Guide YVL 5.8 Hoisting and transfer functions at 
nuclear facilities, 26.9.2008
Nuclear materials
Guide YVL 6.1 Control of nuclear fuel and other 
nuclear materials required in the operation of nu-
clear power plants, 19.6.1991
Guide YVL 6.2 Design bases and general design 
criteria for nuclear fuel, 1.11.1999
Guide YVL 6.3 Regulatory control of nuclear fuel 
and control rods, 28.5.2003
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Guide YVL 6.4 Transport packages and packagings 
for radioactive material, 4.4.2005
Guide YVL 6.5 Transport of nuclear material and 
nuclear waste, 4.4.2005
Guide YVL 6.7 Quality management of nuclear 
fuel, 17.3.2003
Guide YVL 6.8 Storage and handling of nuclear 
fuel, 27.10.2003
Guide YVL 6.9 The national system of accounting 
for and control of nuclear material, 23.9.1999
Guide YVL 6.10 Reports to be submitted on nu-
clear materials, 23.9.1999
Radiation protection
Guide YVL 7.1 Limitation of public exposure in 
the environment of and limitation of radioactive 
releases from a nuclear power plant, 22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.2 Assessment of radiation doses to 
the population in the environment of a nuclear 
power plant, 23.1.1997
Guide YVL 7.3 Calculation of the dispersion of 
radioactive releases from a nuclear power plant, 
23.1.1997
Guide YVL 7.4 Nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness, 9.1.2002
Guide YVL 7.5 Meteorological measurements of a 
nuclear power plant, 28.5.2003
Guide YVL 7.6 Monitoring of discharges of radi-
oactive substances from a nuclear power plant, 
22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.7 Radiation monitoring in the envi-
ronment of a nuclear power plant, 22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.8 Environmental radiation safety re-
ports of a nuclear power plant, 22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.9 Radiation protection of workers at 
nuclear facilities, 21.1.2002
Guide YVL 7.10 Monitoring of occupational expo-
sure at nuclear facilities, 29.1.2002
Guide YVL 7.11 Radiation monitoring systems and 
equipment of a nuclear power plant, 13.7.2004
Guide YVL 7.18 Radiation safety aspects in the 
design of a nuclear power plant, 26.9.2003
Radioactive waste management
Guide YVL 8.1 Disposal of low and intermediate 
level waste from the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 10.9.2003
Guide YVL 8.2 Clearance of nuclear waste and de-
commissioned nuclear facilities, 18.2.2008
Guide YVL 8.3 Treatment and storage of low and 
intermediate level waste at a nuclear power plant, 
29.6.2005
Guide YVL 8.4 Long-term safety of disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel, 23.5.2001
Guide YVL 8.5 Operational safety of a disposal fa-
cility for spent nuclear fuel, 23.12.2002.
The guides are available at http://plus.edi-
lex.fi/stuklex/en/lainsaadanto/luettelo/ydin-
voimalaitosohjeet/ (not all published in 
English).
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1 and 2 under operation
The Loviisa plant comprises of two VVER units 
that are operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy 
(Fortum). The plant units were connected to the 
electrical grid in February 8, 1977 (Loviisa 1) and 
November 4, 1980 (Loviisa 2). The nominal ther-
mal power of both of the Loviisa units is 1500 
MW (109% as compared to the original 1375 MW). 
The increase of the power level was licensed in 
1998. The Operating Licences of the units are valid 
until the end of 2027 (unit 1) and 2030 (unit 2). 
According to the conditions of the licences, two 
periodic safety reviews are required to be carried 
out by the licensee (by the end of the year 2015 and 
2023).
Most significant plant modifications at the 
Loviisa NPP during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out dur-
ing Loviisa NPP plant lifetime. The most impor-
tant projects since the plant commissioning have 
been modifications made for protection against 
fires, modifications based on the development of 
the PRA models, severe accident mitigation pro-
gramme, reactor power uprating, and contruction 
of training simulator, interim storage for spent fuel 
and repository for reactor operational waste.
In some of the earliest modifications in 1982, 
a hydrogen removal system was installed in the 
containment building in order to eliminate the risk 
of explosion during an accident when hydrogen is 
released from the core. The system consisted of 60 
glow plugs that can ignite a controlled hydrogen 
burn.
In 1993, strainer area in the floor sumps of the 
emergency cooling system and the containment 
spray system was significantly enlarged by new de-
sign, and the sump systems were improved so as to 
provide more reliable pumping of the water accu-
mulated in the two sumps during a loss of coolant 
accident (when the emergency make-up water tank 
is empty) back into the reactor and to the spray 
nozzles. The sumps were equipped with several 
hundreds of strainer units, a nitrogen flush system 
to blow any insulation debris off the strainers, and 
control instrumentation. The amount of debris the 
strainer system can cope with increased ten-fold.
In connection with the PRISE project in 1994–
1995 (protection from primary to secondary leaks), 
the plant protection system was modified to pro-
vide automatic isolation of the damaged steam 
generator at high water level (the steam and feed 
water lines are closed), and to stop the respective 
reactor coolant pump. The aim was to protect the 
steam line from water hammer. Also new measur-
ing equipment, based on the detection of nitro-
gen-16 isotope, was installed in the steam lines in 
order to ensure the detection of any leaks from the 
primary circuit.
Protection against fires at the Loviisa NPP
The possibility of fires and nuclear accident risks 
caused by them were not adequately taken into ac-
count initially in the functional design and the lay-
out design of the Loviisa plant. Therefore, fire com-
partments were not implemented so that the plant 
safety functions could be maintained during all fire 
situations considered possible. For this reason the 
significance of an active fire fighting (fire alarm 
and extinguishing systems as well as operative fire 
fighting) is important along with structural fire 
protection arrangements.
Fire safety has been improved with several 
measures at the Loviisa plant after its commis-
sioning. These measures have been implemented 
in various fields of fire protection. As a result, the 
plant safety against the effects of fires has been es-
sentially improved.
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For a provision against oil fires in the turbine 
hall several measures have been taken. Fire insu-
lators of the load-bearing steel structures of the 
turbine building have been installed. The turbine 
hall has been equipped with an automatic sprin-
kler system and the significant parts of the tur-
bines have been protected. Later on, the fire wall of 
the turbine hall has been built up to protect com-
ponents important to reactor decay heat removal. 
Furthermore, the additional emergency feedwater 
system has been built for the case that all feedwa-
ter and emergency feedwater systems would be 
lost in a turbine hall fire. At the Loviisa NPP the 
decay heat removal systems are in the turbine hall. 
That´s why a separate building for additional de-
cay heat removal system outside turbine hall was 
built in 2005. The new system is needed for cooling 
the plant to cold shutdown, if normal systems are 
not operable.
The main transformers have been protected 
with a sprinkler system which essentially reduces 
the risk that a fire would spread into the sur-
rounding buildings, especially into the turbine 
hall. The risk to lose the AC-power (station black-
out) during transformer fires has been reduced by 
protecting the diesel generators against fires. The 
110  kV net connection has been physically sepa-
rated from the 400 kV connection so that the loss 
of both connections as a result of a transformer fire 
is improbable. Several improvements against fires 
have been done in off-site power supply arrange-
ments and in diesel generators. The original fire 
water pumps are supplied only from the off-site 
electrical network. Therefore, an additional fire 
water pump station has been constructed at the 
plant. It has been equipped with diesel-driven fire 
water pumps and with a separate fire water tank. 
Fire water piping and fire extinguishing systems 
as well as their coverage have been improved. A 
new addressed fire alarm system was completed in 
1999 at Loviisa 1 and in 2001 at Loviisa 2. Several 
structural improvements for fire safety have been 
done, or are under design.
The level of the operative fire protection has 
been improved by establishing a plant fire fight-
ing crew which is permanent, constantly ready to 
depart and has the proper equipment. As regards 
fire protection and fire risks also plant instructions 
have been complemented.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident programme, which 
includes plant modifications and severe accident 
management procedures, was initiated in the end 
on 1980’s in order to meet the requirements of 
STUK. For Loviisa NPP, the severe accident man-
agement approach focuses on ensuring the follow-
ing top level safety functions:
•	 depressurisation of the primary circuit
•	 absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen burns
•	 coolability and retention of molten core in the 
reactor vessel
•	 long term containment cooling
•	 ensuring subcriticality
•	 ensuring containment isolation.
The developed severe accident management (SAM) 
strategy lead to a number of hardware changes at 
the plant as well as to new severe accident guide-
lines and procedures.
The primary system depressurisation is an 
interface action between the preventive and miti-
gation parts of SAM. If the primary feed function 
is operable, the depressurisation may prevent the 
core melt (primary system cooling by feed and 
bleed). If not, it sets in motion the mitigation ac-
tions and measures to protect the containment 
integrity and mitigate large releases. Manual de-
pressurisation capability has been designed and 
implemented through motor-operated high capac-
ity relief valves. Depressurisation capacity will 
be sufficient for bleed & feed operation with high-
pressure pumps, and for reducing the primary 
pressure before the molten corium degrades the 
reactor vessel strength. Depressurisation is to be 
initiated from indications of superheated tempera-
tures at core exit thermocouples. The depressurisa-
tion valves were installed at the same time with 
the replacement of the existing pressuriser safety 
valves in 1996.
The cornerstone of the SAM strategy for Loviisa 
is the coolability of corium inside the reactor pres-
sure vessel (RPV) through external cooling of 
the vessel. Since the RPV is not penetrated, all 
the ex-vessel phenomena such as ex-vessel steam 
explosions, direct containment heating and core-
concrete interactions can be excluded. Some of the 
design features of the Loviisa plant make it most 
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amenable for using the concept in-vessel retention 
of corium by external cooling of the RPV as the 
principle means of arresting the progress of a core 
melt accident. Such features include the low power 
density of the core, large water volumes both in the 
primary and in the secondary side, no penetrations 
in the lower head of the RPV, and ice condensers 
which ensure a passively flooded cavity in most 
severe accident scenarios. On the other hand, if 
in-vessel retention was not attempted, showing 
resistance to energetic steam generation and cool-
ability of corium in the reactor cavity could be labo-
rious for Loviisa NPP, because of the small, water 
filled cavity with small floor area and tight venting 
paths for the steam out of the cavity.
An extensive research programme regarding 
the thermal aspects was carried out by Fortum. 
The work included both experimental and analyti-
cal studies on heat transfer in a molten pool with 
volumetric heat generation and on heat transfer 
and flow behaviour at the RPV outer surface. 
Based on experiments, the in-vessel retention con-
cept for Loviisa was finalised. STUK approved the 
conceptual design in December 1995. The modifica-
tions were completed in 2002. The most laborious 
one of them was the modification of the lower neu-
tron and thermal shield such that it can be lowered 
down in case of an accident to allow free passage 
of water in contact with the RPV bottom. Also a 
strainer facility was constructed in the reactor cav-
ity in order to screen out possible impurities from 
the coolant flow and thereby prevent clogging of 
the narrow flow paths around the RPV.
Based on plant-specific features, the only real 
concern regarding potential energetic phenomena 
is due to hydrogen combustion events. The Loviisa 
NPP reactors are equipped with ice-condenser con-
tainments, which are relatively large in size (com-
parable to the volume of typical large dry contain-
ments) but have a low design pressure of 0.17 MPa. 
The ultimate failure pressure has been estimated 
to be well above 0.3 MPa. An intermediate deck 
divides the containment in the upper (UC) and 
lower compartments (LC). All the nuclear steam 
supply system components are located in the lower 
compartment and, therefore, any release of hydro-
gen will be directed into the lower compartment. 
In order to reach the upper compartment, which 
is significantly larger in volume, the hydrogen and 
steam have to pass through the ice-condensers.
In the 1990’s an extensive research programme 
was carried out at Fortum to assess the reliability 
and adequacy of the existing igniters system. The 
experiments and the related numerical calcula-
tions demonstrated that the global convective loop 
around the containment for ensuring well mixed 
conditions will be created and maintained reliably 
provided that the ice-condenser doors will stay 
open. A new hydrogen management strategy for 
Loviisa was formulated which concentrates on two 
functions: ensuring air recirculation flow paths 
to establish a well-mixed atmosphere (opening 
of ice condenser doors) and effective recombina-
tion and/or controlled ignition of hydrogen. Plant 
modifications included installation of autocatalytic 
hydrogen recombiners, modifications in the ignit-
ers system (igniters were removed from the upper 
compartment and left only in the lower compart-
ment) and a dedicated system for opening the ice-
condenser doors. The modifications were completed 
in 2003.
The studies on prevention of long term over 
pressurisation of the containment showed that the 
concept of filtered venting was not possible at the 
Loviisa NPP because the capability of the steel 
liner containment to resist subatmospheric pres-
sures is poor. An external spray system was then 
designed to remove the heat from the containment 
in a severe accident when other means of decay 
heat removal from the containment are not oper-
able. Due to the ice condenser containment, the 
time delay from the onset of the accident to the 
start of the external spray system is long (18–36 
hours). Thus the required heat removal capacity is 
also low, only 3 MW (fraction of decay power is still 
absorbed by thick concrete walls). The system is 
started manually when the containment pressure 
reaches the design pressure 1.7 bar. Autonomous 
operation of the system independently from plant 
emergency diesels is ensured with dedicated local 
diesel generators. The active parts of the system 
are independent from all other containment decay 
heat removal systems. The containment external 
spray system was implemented at the two units in 
1990 and 1991.
The SAM strategy implementation included 
also a new, dedicated, limited scope instrumenta-
tion and control system for the SAM systems, a 
dedicated AC-power system and a separate SAM 
control room which is common to both units. These 
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were implemented mainly in year 2000 for Loviisa 
unit 1 and in 2002 for Loviisa unit 2.
In addition to the hardware modifications, se-
vere accidents guidance for the operating person-
nel has been implemented. It consists of SAM pro-
cedures for the operators and of a so-called Severe 
Accident Handbook for the Technical Support 
Team. The SAM procedures are entered after a 
prolonged uncover of the reactor core indicated by 
highly superheated core exit temperatures. The 
procedures are symptom oriented and their main 
objective is the protection of containment integ-
rity through ensuring the top level severe accident 
safety functions.
Modernisation and power uprating 
of Loviisa NPP in 1994–1997
The key aspects in the project for the modernisa-
tion and power uprating of Loviisa NPPs were to 
verify the plant safety, to improve production ca-
pacity and to give a good basis for the extension of 
the plant’s lifetime to 50 years, which corresponds 
to the additional 20 years of operation applied for 
both units of the Loviisa NPP in 2006.
In the first phase, before starting the project, a 
feasibility study for uprating of the reactor ther-
mal power was carried out. The main result was 
in short that no technical or licensing issues could 
be found which would prevent the raising of the 
reactor thermal output up to 1500 MW from the 
original level of 1375 MW. The feasibility study 
gave also a good picture of the necessary plant 
modifications. It focused on the following tasks: 
the optimisation of the power level and definition 
of the new parameters of the main process, reactor 
core and fuel studies, including RPV irradiation 
embrittlement, safety analyses and licensing, the 
main components and systems, and project plan-
ning and risk assessment.
The reactor power uprating from 1375 MW to 
1500 MW was planned on the basis of optimising 
the need for major plant modifications. In the pri-
mary side and the sea water cooling system, the 
mass flow rates were not affected, but the tempera-
ture difference has been increased in proportion to 
the power upgrading. In the turbine side, the live 
steam and the feedwater flow rate were increased 
by about 10%; the live steam pressure was not 
changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the 
basis of the previous limits set for the maximum 
fuel linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase in 
the reactor thermal output was carried out by op-
timising the power distribution in the core and the 
power of any single fuel bundle was not increased 
above the maximum level before power upgrading. 
In parallel with this work, more advanced options 
related to the mixing rate of the cooling water in 
the fuel subchannels and the increasing of fuel en-
richment were investigated. The dummy elements 
installed on the periphery of the core at the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 were preserved to minimise irradia-
tion embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the pri-
mary side are rather large and the hardware 
modifications needed there were quite limited. 
Replacement of the pressuriser safety valves was 
indicated already during the feasibility study as a 
necessary measure because of the power upgrad-
ing. Most of the other substantial measures in the 
primary side were carried out on the basis of the 
continuing effort to maintain and raise the safety 
level of the plant, and they were not directly in-
cluded in the power upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive 
measures in the turbine plant and to the electrical 
components. Steam turbines were modified to a 
higher steam flow rate. Because of these measures, 
also the efficiency and operation reliability has im-
proved. Certain modifications were carried out in 
the electrical generators and the main transform-
ers to ensure reliability in continuous operation 
with the upgraded power output.
The implementation of the modernisation 
project was carried out in co-operation between 
Loviisa NPP and Fortum Nuclear Services (for-
mer Fortum Engineering). In addition, many oth-
er organisations such as the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT) participated in the work. 
The last step in the process to uprate the reac-
tor thermal power was the long-term trial run 
to verify the main process parameters as well as 
plant operation in both steady state and transient 
situations. Normal operation and in a limited way 
also transient behaviour of the plant were studied 
in the trial tests. Studies were made by means of 
the plant simulator and the results of transient 
analyses were used in the planning of the trial 
test programme. Due to the small number of plant 
modifications required for the power increase of 
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the Loviisa plant, a simple trial test programme 
supported by the simulator studies was considered 
as appropriate and acceptable.
The first trial run at 103% reactor power could 
be started in January 1997. Test runs continued 
step by step during the year, and the last transient 
test at final reactor power 109% was completed 
successfully in December 1997. Transient tests de-
fined in the test programme were performed with a 
reactor thermal power of 105% and 109%. The test 
results corresponded very well with all analyses 
and calculations. All the acceptance criteria for 
the tests were fulfilled. Measures to improve the 
efficiency of the steam turbines continued in the 
annual maintenance outages until the year 2002.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of 
the project, from the early planning of the concept 
to the evaluation of the results from the test runs. 
STUK examined all the modification plans that 
might be expected to have an impact on plant 
safety. Individual permits were granted stage by 
stage, based on the successful implementation of 
previous work.
The renewal of the operating licence for the 
increased reactor power was carried out according 
to the nuclear safety legislation. First the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy (former Ministry 
of Trade and Industry) gave a permission to make 
plant modifications and test runs with upgraded 
reactor power under the existing operating licence 
and under the control of STUK. Then the assess-
ment of the environmental impact (EIA-procedure) 
of the project was carried out. STUK approved the 
Final Safety Analyses Report (FSAR), the safety-re-
lated plant modifications, and the test programmes 
and the results. Finally the Government granted 
the renewed operating licence in April 1998. The 
licence was awarded to 1500 MW nominal reactor 
thermal power until the end of the year 2007.
The revision of emergency operating 
procedures (2000–2005)
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were revised in the so called 
HOKE project, launched in 2000. The project en-
compassed the drawing up of diagnosis procedures 
for transients and emergencies arising from prima-
ry and secondary leaks, procedures for operators 
and the safety engineer as well as action sheets for 
onsite measures.
In accordance with the new procedures, nuclear 
power plant operators follow their own separate 
procedures and initiate the necessary actions in 
their fields of responsibility in the event of an emer-
gency or a transient. The shift manager co-ordinates 
these actions and reviews the main actions and pa-
rameters using his own procedures. The safety en-
gineer in parallel with the operators independently 
oversees safety functions using separate procedures 
to ensure that plant behaviour is as planned.
The revised procedures consist of guidelines 
and instructions presented as flow charts. The 
guidelines define strategy and give grounds for 
operator actions during emergencies and tran-
sients. It serves as a basis for actual control room 
procedures containing operator procedures. The 
guidelines are used for training purposes as well.
The validation and verification of the proce-
dures and their background material ascertains 
authenticity of the procedures i.a. by comparison 
with the plant and by simulator tests. Verification 
authenticates i.a. correlation and functioning of 
the new procedures with other plant procedures. 
The project included training given to the control 
room personnel of the Loviisa plant in the use of 
the new procedures. Due to the revision’s signifi-
cance STUK required that shift supervisors and 
operators working in the control room have given 
shift-specific proof of workmanship prior to the in-
troduction into use of the revised procedures.
In December 2005, STUK authorised the in-
troduction into service of the revised emergency 
operating procedures.
Examples of latest plant modifications 
at the Loviisa NPP (2010–2012)
Improvement of safety system 
suction strainers
The suction strainers of the low pressure emergen-
cy cooling system and the containment spraying 
system, which are required in accident conditions, 
were improved by means of installing higher den-
sity mesh elements in them. In accident conditions 
caused by a pipe break, fibres coming loose from 
pipe heat insulation can accumulate in the suction 
strainers. The aim is to prevent fibres from enter-
ing the reactor core via the emergency cooling sys-
tem, because blockages caused by large amounts of 
fibres could lead to overheating of the reactor core. 
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Higher density mesh elements improve the filter-
ing capacity of the suction strainers, thus reducing 
significantly the amount of fibres being carried 
into the reactor core compared with the old suction 
strainer structure.
Modernisation of the primary 
system pressure management
Modernisation of the pressuriser system at the 
Loviisa unit 1 was carried out in 2012. The modi-
fication was done because of restrictions to use the 
emergency spray of the pressuriser in a pressure 
higher than 12 bars. At the same time, the valves of 
the pressuriser spray system were replaced and the 
spray lines coming from the high pressure emergen-
cy core cooling system were moved to the low pres-
sure core cooling system. In addition, the capacity 
of the relief train of the pressuriser was increased. 
The modification also envolved I&C, electrical and 
piping changes. The same modification is planned 
for implementation at the Loviisa unit 2 during the 
2014 annual maintenance outage.
Construction of new off-
site diesel power plant
Construction of a new diesel powered off-site gener-
ator plant was carried out in 2011-2012. The power 
of the plant is 10 MW and it can be used as a peak 
power plant for electrical grid or as a power supply 
for the nuclear plants. It is not safety classified, but 
it can feed power as a last resort to the safety and 
non-safety classified systems of the nuclear plants.
Examples of latest incidents at 
the Loviisa NPP (2010–2012)
Radioactive resin found in 
ventilation system
Resin tanks and their overflow lines were being 
rinsed with pure water at the radioactive liquid 
waste solidification plant of the Loviisa power 
plant in March 2010. The tanks and overflow lines 
had minor resin residues from previous use. Resin 
is used, among other things, for purifying the pri-
mary circuit coolant water. This makes the resin 
radioactive. The level measurement of one of the 
tanks was unreliable, which is why the tank was 
overfilled as a result of human error and slightly 
radioactive water-resin mixture entered the gas 
exhaust line of the tank and from there to the 
auxiliary building ventilation system. The entry of 
water in the ventilation system was quickly discov-
ered because maintenance work was in progress in 
the corridor along which the ventilation channel 
runs. A temporary bypass line had been made in 
the ventilation channel for the maintenance opera-
tion. The maintenance workers noticed that water 
was seeping from the joint between the regular 
and temporary channels and reported this to the 
control room.
The corridor in the auxiliary building was cor-
doned off and actions were initiated in the area 
for limiting the spread of radioactivity. The venti-
lation system was set in filtering mode, the area 
was cleaned and the resin-containing water was 
collected.
The power company performed radiation meas-
urements on the ventilation lines, even further 
away from the location of the event. Small quanti-
ties of radioactive resin were found in the ventila-
tion system in places unaffected by the migration 
of resin and water that had now taken place. This 
led to the conclusion that radioactive resin had 
already entered the auxiliary building ventilation 
system on some previous occasion. The scope of 
cleaning operations at the power plant was ex-
tended and all dry resin was also collected from the 
ventilation systems.
The total activity of the mildly radioactive resin 
and water entering the ventilation channel was es-
timated to be less than 100 MBq. The total volume 
of water collected from the system was about 100 
litres, and about 5 litres of wet resin and 8 litres of 
dry resin were also collected. The employees accu-
mulated a collective radiation dose of 0.2 mmanSv 
in the course of the cleaning operation, which 
means that the operation did not cause a risk to 
personnel safety.
Because the auxiliary building ventilation sys-
tem leads the exhaust air to the vent stack, the 
filters in the vent stack sampling lines were meas-
ured. No radioactive particles were found in them, 
nor were there any indications that radioactive 
particles would have spread into the environment.
The power company performed comprehensive 
measurements outside the plant buildings in order 
to verify that particulate resin had not escaped 
into the environment through the vent stack. 
The measurements concentrated on the natural 
drainage routes of melting waters and rain water. 
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The measurements did not reveal any radioactive 
particles. However, the power company did find 
small amounts of radioactivity (Co-60) from the 
samples of grit used for sanding the parking lot. 
The quantity was 0.2 Bq/kg. The quantity allows 
for the conclusion that the quantity of activity pos-
sibly released into the environment in connection 
with the event is so small that it is insignificant for 
the vicinity of the plant and the people living in it.
The event showed that liquid substances may 
escape through the venting lines as a result of 
various process measures and erroneous actions 
and end up in places where they do not belong. The 
operation of the liquid waste solidification plant 
has not been continued after the event. Fortum 
performed a root cause analysis of the event. 
Fortum will investigate the process planning and 
instructions at the plant. The entry of liquids into 
the ventilation system through the venting lines 
will be prevented by modifications to process tech-
nology. The liquid level measurement in the tanks 
will be improved so that overfilling of the tank can 
no longer occur. The operating instructions for the 
solidification plant will also be further specified.
On the seven-level International Nuclear Event 
Scale (INES), the event was rated at level 1. STUK 
has also prepared an IRS report concerning the 
event.
Spread of contamination in conjunction 
with transfers of spent fuel
Radioactive particles fell on the security-fenced 
yard of the Loviisa NPP from an inadequately 
cleaned transport vessel for spent nuclear fuel dur-
ing the period 10 May to 9 June 2010 when spent 
fuel was being moved to the spent fuel interim 
storage from the Loviisa unit 1. The storage is lo-
cated at the Loviisa unit 2. The power plant discov-
ered the event on the evening of 9 June 2010 when 
measuring radioactivity on the transfer route. The 
power plant notified STUK of the event the follow-
ing morning.
Spent fuel is moved from the reactor hall to the 
fuel storage using a purpose-built transfer contain-
er. The radioactive particles found on the transfer 
route were small metal particles that are present 
in the fuel storage pool water in the reactor hall. 
The particles had been deposited on the surface of 
the transfer container while it was in the pool, and 
because the container was not properly cleaned, 
they fell to the ground when the container was be-
ing transported.
About 50 radioactive particles were found in 
the vicinity of the transfer route on the plant yard 
when the power plant carried out measurements 
on 9–10 June 2010. The measurements were con-
tinued on the yard area using a more accurate 
method, and 35 particles more were found around 
the transfer route. The particles mainly contained 
Co-60, Mn-54, Co-57 and Co-58 nuclides. The total 
activity of the particles was determined and found 
to be about 10 MBq. This is a small amount of 
activity, but it should not be present outside the 
controlled area at all.
The storage and transfer route of spent nu-
clear fuel are in the controlled area of the power 
plant where radioactivity is regularly monitored. 
Particles were only found near the transfer route 
and at the landfill site. The yard was cleaned of 
any radioactive particles in connection with the ra-
dioactivity measurements. The event did not cause 
any hazard to people or the environment.
The Loviisa power plant took corrective action 
in order to prevent similar events. The methods 
and instructions for the transfers will be revised, 
and advanced radiation protection training will 
be organised for the fuel team. In addition, im-
provements will be made to the container transfer 
trolley in order to prevent the spread of contamina-
tion. STUK will follow the implementation of these 
actions. The event was classified at INES Level 1.
Deficiencies in the testing 
of radiation monitors
In May 2012, the Loviisa power plant informed 
STUK that it had found deficiencies in the test-
ing procedure of certain radiation monitors at the 
Loviisa unit 2. The monitors in question are used 
to measure the radioactivity of the water let out of 
the secondary circuit and discharged into the sea. 
The procedures had not been fully observed when 
testing the monitors, resulting in the process con-
trol function being left untested in some tests. In 
addition, some periodic tests had been completely 
ignored.
The testing requirements of radiation monitors 
are recorded in the operational limits and condi-
tions (OLC) that the power plant must comply with. 
According to the OLC, a general inspection of the 
monitors must be performed every two weeks, a 
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functional test every month, and a calibration check 
every six months. Based on the investigations of 
Fortum, there have been deficiencies in all these.
After the detection of the deficiencies, the ra-
diation monitors and the related process control 
functions were tested in accordance with the proce-
dures. The tests showed that the equipment func-
tioned in the normal manner. Radiation monitors 
have a self-diagnostics function in case of failures 
and, in addition to periodic testing, the operation 
of the monitors is followed in the process computer 
trend displays. As the equipment functions in the 
normal manner, deficient testing had no immedi-
ate importance to the safety of the plant or the 
environment.
The preliminary classification of the event on 
the INES scale was 0. Fortum delivered a special 
report of the event to STUK, describing the reasons 
and corrective measures for the event. As the event 
involved deficient quality management and unjus-
tified ignoring of procedures, STUK rated the event 
as an anomaly belonging to INES category 1.
Excess fire load in the containment
On STUK’s oversight rounds during the Loviisa 
unit 1 annual outage on 7th September 2012, ten 
one-litre plastic bottles containing flammable sol-
vent were found in a plastic bag at the shoe bound-
ary of a reactor pit access opening located in the 
containment’s reactor coolant pump room. The sol-
vent was intended for the washing of the reactor 
pit’s steel lining. According to the plant procedure, 
three litres of flammable solvents may be kept in 
the open at once. Other tools meant for the clean-
ing of the reactor pit, including cleaning cloths, 
were also stored at the same location.
The reactor coolant pump room has plenty of 
fixed fire load, such as 5,000 kg of cable insulation. 
Washing agents do not essentially increase the fire 
load but together with flammable materials, they 
create the preconditions for a rapidly progressing 
fire that ignites cables. When PVC cables burn, the 
temperature in the containment can increase to 
200 times the normal value, and high quantities of 
hydrogen chloride would be released.
The fire safety of the Loviisa power plant’s con-
tainment is partially based on keeping fire loads as 
low as possible and minimising the ignition poten-
tial. This is particularly important in spaces which 
have no fixed fire extinguishing systems, such as 
the containment’s reactor coolant pump room, and 
where the success of first aid extinguishing is un-
certain.
STUK also observed a similar event at the 
Loviisa unit 1 during the 2010 annual outage, with 
a considerably higher quantity of connectors being 
stored. Since the 2010 event, the power plant has 
improved the procedures and supervision of the 
work.
Due to the repeated nature of the event, STUK 
rated it as a INES category 1 event.
Incorrect settings of protective 
relays of motors
At the Loviisa unit 2, thermal relays (overload pro-
tections) were replaced in the electrical motors of 
pumps important to safety in the annual outage in 
autumn 2012. Approximately one month after the 
completion of the annual outage, Fortum observed 
that wrong settings had been entered for the re-
lays, potentially resulting in the pumps stopping in 
the case of low motor supply voltage. The thermal 
relays are used as overload protection for the elec-
trical motor, meant to protect the motor and to cut 
the motor’s power supply if the motor overheats.
STUK’s inspection in November revealed irreg-
ularities in the protections of the electrical motors 
of certain pumps important to safety. Further in-
vestigations by Fortum showed that incorrect set-
tings existed in the new thermal relays installed 
into motors during the 2012 annual outage at the 
Loviisa unit 2. There were incorrect thermal relay 
settings in a total of ten different pump motors in 
the emergency cooling and feed water circuits, with 
the normal supply voltage values used instead of 
undervoltage values. The incorrect relay settings 
could have led to stopping of the pumps in under-
voltage situations.
The safety significance of the event was low, and 
the event caused no immediate risk for the safety 
of the plant unit or the personnel. The pumps 
were operational in normal voltage conditions, 
but could have stopped in undervoltage situations. 
Undervoltages and pump malfunctions are indi-
cated in the control room, which allows operators 
to take the necessary measures following the pro-
cedures. The plant unit is designed to cope with un-
dervoltage of the external 400/110 kV power grids 
using its four emergency diesel generators.
According to Fortum, the root cause behind the 
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event was a design error in the definition of ther-
mal relay settings. The plant documentation used 
as a basis of design work does not include under-
voltage information for the pump motors in ques-
tion. The design error was not observed in connec-
tion with the modification work or the inspection.
After the incorrect thermal relay settings had 
been detected, Fortum informed the control room 
personnel of the proper procedures in undervolt-
age situations. As an immediate corrective meas-
ure, Fortum implemented the appropriate thermal 
relay settings. The power company will also add 
further details to the setting and testing proce-
dure, develop the plant information system and 
documentation, and make additional checks to 
ensure that the thermal relay settings used in the 
plant unit’s electrical motors are correct. Fortum 
also inspected the corresponding thermal relays of 
pump motors at the Loviisa unit 1, and no errone-
ous settings were found.
The event was rated as category 1 on the inter-
national INES scale, because the erroneous relay 
settings simultaneously affected the reliable un-
dervoltage operation of several systems important 
to safety.
Several reported incidents during 2012
Increasing number of incidents occured at the 
Loviisa NPP during 2012. Three of them were 
classified at INES Level 1 and seven of them at 
INES Level 0. Several of them occurred during 
the plant outage. Incidents included deficiencies in 
the periodic testing of equipment included in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions (2 incidents), 
incorrect separations and repairs (4 incidents), ad-
ditional fire load inside the containment, indistinct 
operability of the renewed valves of the pressuriser 
system during the plant start-up, incorrect set-ups 
in the motor relays of the safety related pumps, 
and deficiencies in the testing periods of preventive 
maintenance. Several incidents included deficien-
cies in the operations and procedures of the plant.
STUK discussed the increased number of inci-
dents with the licensee during the fall 2012. The li-
censee has started to assess the reasons behind the 
incidents. The assessment was finalised in the end 
of May 2013 after which the corrective actions will 
be implemented and followed at the Loviisa NPP.
Periodic safety reviews at the Loviisa NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety re-
view of the Loviisa plant was carried out by the 
licensee and independently by STUK in connection 
to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear pow-
er plant units. The safety documentation, includ-
ing safety assessments done by the licensee, was 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996. In addition 
to the review of the licensing documents such as 
Final Safety Analysis Report, STUK also made an 
independent safety assessment. The statement of 
STUK was given to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (former Ministry of Trade and 
Industry) in March 1998. As regards radiation and 
nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the state-
ment were that the conditions of the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation are complied with.
The latest overall safety review of the Loviisa 
plant took place in 2005–2007 in connection of 
the relicensing of the operation of the plant. The 
operating licence application was addressed to the 
Government and was handled by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. Fortum filed the 
application to the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy in November 2006. Legislative and 
regulative requirements for the application of the 
operating licence are described in the Nuclear 
Energy Decree (161/1988) Sections 33, 34, 36 and 
in the Guide YVL 1.1 Regulatory control of safety 
at nuclear facilities.
The Loviisa plant was reaching its original 
design age in 2007–2010, but the technical and 
economical lifetime of the plant is estimated to be 
at least 50 years according to the current knowl-
edge of the plant ageing. Due to consistent plant 
improvements, the safety level of the plant has 
been increased as shown by the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA).
Based on the application, STUK carried out a 
comprehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 
when STUK provided the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy with it’s statement on the safety 
of the plant. The Finnish Government granted in 
July 2007 to Fortum new licences for unit 1 until 
the end of 2027 and for unit 2 until the end of 2030. 
The length of the operating licences corresponds to 
the current goal for the plant’s lifetime, which is 
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50 years. Two periodic safety reviews (by the end 
of the year 2015 and 2023) are to be carried out by 
the licensee as a licence condition.
The statement of safety included also STUK’s 
safety assessment which provided a summary of 
the reviews, inspections and continuous oversight 
carried out by STUK. Based on the assessment, 
STUK considered that the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant meets the set safety requirements for op-
erational nuclear power plants but there are some 
reservations related to the redundancy and separa-
tion of components needed for performing safety 
functions (e.g. fire compartmentalisation). These 
reservations are originating from the design basis 
laid down during the 1970s. However, substan-
tial modernisations have been carried out at the 
Loviisa NPP since its commissioning to improve 
safety. Risk factors have been systematically iden-
tified and eliminated using operating experience, 
research and development and probabilistic risk 
analysis. Examples of such plant modifications 
include the development of fire detection and fire 
extinguishing systems, as well as operative fire 
protection in parallel with structural fire protec-
tion. The most recent risk reducing modifications 
include also improvements to the plant residual 
heat removal and emergency cooling systems and 
ensuring the cooling of reactor coolant pump seals. 
Fortum has also many ongoing projects for enhanc-
ing safety and reducing the accident risk. They 
include e.g., improvements aiming at prevention 
reactor coolant pump seal leaks with regard to fire 
and flood conditions, precautions against oil ac-
cidents in the Gulf of Finland, and improvements 
aiming at reducing the risk arising from heavy 
load lifting with the structural reliability of the po-
lar crane and developing the procedures relating to 
lifting. This is in line with the principle of continu-
ous improvement of safety provided in section 7 a 
of the Nuclear Energy Act.
As a summary of the review of the issues and 
documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK 
noted that the prerequisites for safe operation of 
Loviisa NPP have been met.
Reactor pressure vessel relicensing
Plant lifetime management includes credible pro-
cedures for following the plant ageing. The condi-
tions of components which are practically impos-
sible to be replaced by new ones (pressure vessel, 
steam generators, etc.) are monitored most actively.
Several modifications have been made at the 
both Loviisa plant units to reduce the risk of reac-
tor vessel brittle fracture. In 1980, 36 fuel bundles 
at the outer edge of the reactor core were replaced 
with by stainless steel elements (dummies) to re-
duce the risk of reactor vessel brittle fracture in 
the long term. The purpose was to reduce the im-
pact of neutron radiation on the reactor pressure 
vessel thereby preventing premature embrittle-
ment of the pressure vessel. The reactor pressure 
vessel of Loviisa unit 1 was heat treated in 1996 to 
restore quality of one of the mostly affected weld-
ings.
Fortum stated during the last operating licence 
renewal process that the brittle fracture risk can 
be managed until the end of the 50 years plant 
lifetime. The primary circuits of both Loviisa plant 
units are still in good condition. The validity of the 
operating licence of the reactor pressure vessel 
of the Loviisa unit 2 was extended in 2010 until 
the end of 2030, i.e, to the end of the plant unit’s 
current operating licence. Similarly, STUK as-
sessed the renewal of the reactor pressure vessel 
operating licence for the Loviisa unit 1 in 2012 and 
the validity of the operating licence of the reactor 
pressure vessel of the Loviisa unit 1 was extended 
until the end of the plant unit’s current operating 
licence. In the future, the safety of the reactor will 
be assessed in connection with the plant’s periodic 
safety reviews.
Planned and ongoing activities to 
improve safety at the Loviisa NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and 
enhancement approach is presented in the nu-
clear legislation. Actions for safety enhancement 
are to be taken whenever they can be regarded 
as justified, considering operating experience, the 
results of safety research and the advancement 
of science and technology. The implementation of 
safety improvements has been a continuing pro-
cess at the Loviisa nuclear power plants since its 
commissioning and there exists no urgent need to 
upgrade the safety of this plant in the context of 
the Convention.
For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest ongo-
ing investment is the complete renewal of the plant 
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I&C system. Also some improvement measures 
will be done based on the lessons learnt from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
Safety assessments and improvements 
based on the lessons learnt from 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Based on the results of assessments conducted af-
ter the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident on 11 
March 2011, it is concluded that no such hazards 
or deficiencies have been found as would require 
immediate actions at the Loviisa NPP. However, 
the areas where safety can be further enhanced 
have been identified and there are plans on how 
to address these areas. Main changes are aimed at 
decreasing the dependency on plant’s normal elec-
tricity supply and distribution systems as well as 
on the sea water cooled systems for residual heat 
removal from the reactor, containment and spent 
fuel pools. The licensee has also been required to 
submit plans to improve protection against exter-
nal flooding by the end of 2013.
Natural hazards
According to the PRA results, the risk caused to 
the operating units by external events is a rela-
tively small fraction of the total risk. However, 
there are areas where possibilities for further risk 
reduction exist, for example improving the protec-
tion against high seawater.
Safety margins were assessed by the licensee 
and reviewed by STUK. Based on the results, 
STUK required further clarifications on the follow-
ing main points:
•	 seismic resistance of spent fuel pools including 
situations with water temperature exceeding 
the design bases;
•	 seismic resistance of fire fighting systems; and
•	 plans for improving flooding margin for the 
Loviisa plant by end of 2013.
Seawater level variations in the Baltic Sea are 
moderate. Due to geological conditions and the 
shallow water strong tsunami type phenomena 
are not considered possible in the Baltic Sea. At 
the Loviisa NPP, the observed maximum seawater 
level is +1.77 m above the mean sea level (N60 
reference system). The design basis of the Loviisa 
NPP is about +3 m during power operation and 
about +2.1 m during refueling shutdown. Based 
of extreme value distribution fitting, the annual 
probability of exceeding the level +3 m is about 
4·10-7. The refueling shutdowns are scheduled for 
summer and early autumn when the seawater 
level variations are small. The design basis of the 
Loviisa NPP is considered sufficient in the short 
term. Although the estimated annual probability 
of exceeding the design value is very small, the 
consequences of flooding of the basement of the 
Loviisa NPP would be severe, as all cooling systems 
might be lost. Therefore, to ensure safe operation 
in the long term, the possibilities for decreasing 
the risk of seawater flooding have to be examined.
Loviisa NPP has improved in 2012 flood protec-
tion during certain annual shutdown states with 
open hatches in the condenser cooling seawater 
system; the design water level was increased from 
+2.1 m to +2.45 m and further increase to +2.95 m 
is considered.
The licensee has been required to submit plans 
to improve protection against external flooding by 
the end of 2013. The licensee is examining site area 
protection with levees and the protected volume 
approach and also their combination to improve of 
the flooding resistance of the Loviisa plant. The li-
censee will make decisions based on updated flood-
ing hazard estimates contracted from the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute.
Design issues
At the Loviisa NPP, the systems needed for residu-
al heat removal from the reactor, containment and 
fuel pools require external power and the ultimate 
heat sink is the sea. A reliable supply of electrical 
power to the systems providing for basic safety 
functions at the Loviisa NPP is ensured by the 
Defence-in-Depth concept. As a result of multiple 
and diversified electrical power sources at differ-
ent levels, the probability of loss of all electrical 
supply systems is considered very low. However, 
as a result of the studies made after the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, further changes are 
expected to be implemented. Main changes are 
aimed at decreasing the dependency on plant’s nor-
mal electricity supply and distribution systems as 
well as on the sea water cooled systems for residu-
al heat removal from the reactor, containment and 
spent fuel pools.
At the Loviisa NPP, the availability of an alter-
nate heat sink depends on the plant state and feed 
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water availability. If primary circuit can be pres-
surised (i.e. reactor vessel head is in place), atmos-
phere can be used as an alternate heat sink as long 
as there is enough water available for dumping 
steam into atmosphere from the secondary circuit. 
There is a separated diesel driven auxiliary emer-
gency feed water system with two pumps which 
feeds water to the steam generators in case of loss 
of AC power. It is also possible to transfer heat to 
spent fuel cooling system and hence to intermedi-
ate cooling system, giving time for restoring ulti-
mate heat sink.
The licensee at the Loviisa NPP considers a 
plant modification to ensure the long-term decay 
heat removal in case of loss of seawater by imple-
menting an alternative ultimate heat sink. The 
modification consists of two air-cooled cooling units 
per plant unit powered by an air-cooled diesel-gen-
erator. The other cooling unit would remove decay 
heat from the reactor and the other one ensures 
the decay heat removal from in-containment spent 
fuel pool and from the spent fuel storage pools. 
The cooling unit is connected to the intermediate 
cooling circuit, and it backs up the seawater cooled 
heat exchangers. The cooling units for the reactors 
are dimensioned to be able to remove the deacy 
heat after 72 h, and until then the heat removal 
can be carried out by steam dumping into the 
atmosphere from the steam generator secondary 
side. The modifications in consideration would 
create a possibility to closed-loop operation also in 
case of loss of ultimate heat sink. The conceptual 
design plan is ready and the cooling towers are 
planned to be realised in 2014.
In addition, the licensee has evaluated meas-
ures needed to secure the availability of the aux-
iliary emergency feedwater system in the case of 
loss of electrical power, water supply for the diesel 
driven auxiliary emergency feed water pumps, and 
electricity supply for instrumentation needed in 
accidents. The modifications will be realised during 
2012 and 2013, with the exception of improving the 
instrumentation by 2015.
The experiences from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident will be taken into consideration in the 
ongoing renewal of the Finnish Regulatory Guides 
(YVL Guides). For example there will be a new re-
quirement for arrangements that enable the decay 
heat removal from the reactor out of the contain-
ment and arrangements to ensure sufficient cool-
ing of the fuel in fuel storages. In spite that there 
are fixed severe accident management systems in-
stalled at Loviisa operating units, STUK required 
the licensee to investigate needs and possibilities 
to use mobile power supply and mobile pumps 
in accidents. Loviisa NPP has studied the possi-
bilities to utilise mobile power supply and mobile 
pumps to support safety functions.
At the Loviisa NPP, the current AC power sup-
ply systems include connections to 400 kV and 
110  kV power grids, main generator (house load 
operation), four emergency diesel generators per 
unit, a diverse diesel power plant and a dedicated 
connection to a nearby hydropower plant, two SAM 
diesel generators, and the possibility to supply 
electricity from the neighbouring NPP unit. No 
modifications are planned to the current design 
concerning AC power supply.
At the Loviisa NPP, there is enough diesel fuel 
in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) tanks for 
at least 72 h of operation, and with realistic loads 
in case of an accident, the duration is evaluated 
twice as long. Currently the emergency diesel gen-
erators (EDGs) at the Loviisa NPPs use conven-
tional diesel fuel, which is available only in limited 
scope. An investigation of replacing conventional 
diesel with widely available biodiesel is being 
performed by the licensee and the diesel engine 
manufacturer. In 2012, the licensee of the Loviisa 
NPP purchased a container to transfer diesel fuel 
at the site. The purpose of this container is to make 
fuel transfer between the tanks on-site easier and 
faster. In addition, the licensee has started an in-
vestigation to build a new fuel storage tank, from 
which it is possible to deliver fuel to the diesel gen-
erators’ day tanks.
At the Loviisa NPP, some DC batteries deple-
tion times are considered to be rather short. The 
duration of DC power supply is considered to be 
enhanced. Especially the reactor coolant pump seal 
water system functionality must be ensured. The 
licensee will submit a plan to STUK. There is also 
an ongoing automation renewal project in which 
the depletion time of the batteries will be length-
ened substantially. It is possible to charge the 
batteries using the AC power sources. The licensee 
will install two new separate underground cables 
from the new diesel power plant to the 6.3 kV die-
sel busbar in 2012–2013, which will furthermore 
ensure and enhance battery charging possibilities.
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Regarding spent fuel pools, the approach in 
Finland is to “practically eliminate” the possibil-
ity of fuel damage. The licensee have evaluated 
alternative means of decay heat removal from fuel 
storage pools in case of loss of existing systems, 
and to supply coolant to fuel storage pools (includ-
ing potential need for new instrumentation). The 
plant modifications will require further analy-
sis before starting the detailed design work. The 
more detailed analysis will be performed in 2013. 
Furthermore, the licensee will improve EOPs and 
SAM Guidelines to support heat removal from 
spent fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying ad-
ditional water to the pools. Licensee is also study-
ing the seismic resistance of the fuels pools as well 
as the influence of pool water boiling to the pool 
structures.
Severe accident management
A comprehensive severe accident management 
(SAM) strategy has been developed and imple-
mented at Loviisa 1&2 plant units during 1990’s 
after the accidents in TMI and Chernobyl (see 
above). These strategies are based on ensuring the 
containment integrity which is required in the ex-
isting national regulations. STUK has reviewed 
these strategies and has made inspections in all 
stages of implementation.
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major changes at 
the plants are considered necessary. However, the 
licensee is expected to consider spent fuel pools in 
the SAM procedures as well as any implications 
on them possibly arising from simultaneous multi 
unit accidents. In addition, there are many actions 
related to the update of the emergency plans.
At the Loviisa NPP, the design basis for all 
SAM safety functions is that the actions can be 
done, when the other supplies have been lost, with 
dedicated independent SAM electrical systems and 
dedicated independent SAM I&C from SAM con-
trol room or main control room. The SAM strate-
gies and their implementation at the Loviisa NPP 
follow the requirements set in the Government 
Decree 733/2008 and the YVL Guides. The ap-
proach and the plant modifications have been 
approved by STUK. Since the systems for manage-
ment and mitigation of severe accidents have al-
ready been implemented at Loviisa operating units 
and the corresponding procedures are in place, no 
further measures for this purpose are foreseen at 
the moment. However, the soundness and adequa-
cy of the accident management schemes is being 
constantly assessed against the latest knowledge 
and experience obtained from different interna-
tional sources.
Loviisa NPP is investigating possibilities to 
implement additional injection points for mobile 
pumps to provide more flexibility to the water sup-
ply of the containment external spray. These con-
nections could provide capability to inject enough 
water for both units with one pump. The different 
possibilities will be analysed in more detail in 
2013. Currently, the containment external spray-
ing for heat removal from the containment can 
be carried out by fire trucks, individually for both 
of the units, in case of failure of the fixed pumps. 
Investment decision for mobile power supply and 
mobile pumps will be made after related assess-
ments on the need and purpose of mobile devices 
have been completed. Implementation is planned 
to be made in 2013.
At the Loviisa NPP, immediate SAM measures 
are carried out within the Emergency Operation 
Procedures (EOP). After carrying out immediate 
actions successfully, the operators concentrate on 
monitoring the SAM safety functions with SAM 
procedures. The SAM procedures focus on monitor-
ing the leak tightness of the containment barrier, 
and on the long-term issues. At the Loviisa NPP, 
licensee will improve EOPs and SAM procedures 
to support heat removal from spent fuel pools by 
pool boiling and supplying additional water to the 
pools. New EOPs for shutdown states, which cover 
the immediate recovery of SAM systems, have been 
developed in 2012 and are going through imple-
mentation.
I&C renewal project at Loviisa NPP
I&C systems of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
units are being renewed stepwise in a project that 
will continue for several years. Some modifications 
will also be made to the functions of the plant sys-
tems. Furthermore, a new emergency control room 
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will be provided for each unit to replace the emer-
gency control panels currently located mutually 
in the main control rooms of the other unit. I&C 
renewal will be implemented in several project 
phases so that each phase will be adopted during 
maintenance outages.
Preliminary planning of the renewal project 
started several years ago and in the beginning of 
2005 the licensee signed the delivery contract with 
the consortium of Framatome and Siemens. New 
buildings at the plant site have been constructed 
and will accommodate the main equipment of the 
safety and operational I&C. The first phase of the 
project included e.g. the renewal of the reactor 
preventive protection I&C and was implemented 
in the outage 2008 at Loviisa unit 1 and at Loviisa 
unit 2 in the outage 2009. The second phase of 
the project including the renewal of the reactor 
protection system is planned to be implemented at 
the Loviisa unit 1 during the outage 2015. Safety 
classified parts of the project are intended to be 
completed in 2017.
Construction and commissioning of a 
liquid waste solidification facility
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
has been constructed on the Loviisa plant site. 
The solidification facility processes the evapora-
tion residues generated at the power plant and 
the radioactive ion exchange resins from the pu-
rification filters. The power company initiated the 
commissioning phase of the solidification facility 
implementation project during 2006 by carrying 
out system and plant level tests using inactive 
substances. Plant level tests continued in 2008 us-
ing radioactive evaporation residues and in 2009 
with radioactive ion exchange resins. Based on 
the results of the commissioning tests of the plant 
some system modifications were designed and im-
plemented during 2011–2012. The commissioning 
continues in 2013 with operating personnel train-
ing activities and updating the plant design docu-
mentation and procedures. The tests of modified 
systems will be finalised in 2013. The target date 
for the start of the solidification plant operation 
is spring 2014 after the regulatory commissioning 
inspections and approval.
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1 and 2 under operation
The Olkiluoto plant comprises of two BWR units 
that are operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj 
(TVO). The plant units were connected to the elec-
trical network in September 2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) 
and February 18, 1980 (Olkiluoto 2). The nominal 
thermal power of both Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW, 
which was licensed in 1998. The new power level 
is 115.7% as compared to the earlier nominal pow-
er 2160 MW licensed in 1983. The original power 
level of both units was 2000 MW. The Operating 
Licences of the units are valid until the end of 
2018. According to the conditions of the licences, 
the licensee carried out a periodic safety review 
and submitted it to the regulator in the end of 
2008.
Most significant plant modifications at the 
Olkiluoto NPP during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out dur-
ing Olkiluoto NPP plant lifetime. The most impor-
tant projects since the plant commissioning have 
been two reactor upratings, severe accident miti-
gation programme, modifications based on the de-
veloment of the PRA models, contruction of train-
ing simulator, interim storage for spent fuel and 
repository for operational waste, and investigation 
programme for disposal of spent fuel. The first 
power uprating project was carried out in 1983–
1984. Thermal power was uprated from 2000 MW 
to 2160 MW (8%). The plant modifications included 
for example a new relief valve that was installed in 
the reactor primary system, changes in the reactor 
protection system, and increase of cooling capacity 
of some heat exchangers.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at the Olkiluoto NPP
Several new research programmes were launched 
in the beginning of 1980’s, whose objective was both 
to clarify the character and magnitude of loads 
arising from a severe accident and to find means 
for controlling the loads on the containment. The 
main provisions for severe accident management 
were installed at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 dur-
ing the SAM project which was finished in 1989. 
The measures implemented were
•	 containment overpressure protection
•	 containment filtered venting
•	 lower drywell flooding from wetwell
•	 containment penetration shielding in lower dry-
well
•	 containment water filling from external source
•	 containment instrumentation for severe acci-
dent control
•	 Emergency Operating Procedures for severe 
accidents.
The means for managing severe accidents had to 
be adjusted to the existing design, and so an opti-
mal implementation of all chosen solutions was not 
possible. Subsequent development of the accident 
management procedures and additional minor 
plant modifications at Olkiluoto plant have taken 
place during the years after that when new aspects 
on the issue have emerged.
To secure depressurisation of the reactor pri-
mary system in severe accident situations and to 
prevent a new pressurisation of the reactor, two 
valves of the relief system were modified. It is now 
possible to keep the valves open with the help of 
nitrogen supply or water supply from outside the 
containment.
One of the most significant deficiencies at the 
Olkiluoto plant containments, from the standpoint 
of controlling severe accidents, has been the small 
size of the containment, which may cause the 
containment to pressurise due to the hydrogen 
and steam generation during an accident (com-
mon feature for BWRs). Another deficiency is the 
location of the reactor pressure vessel inside the 
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containment, which is such that the core melt 
erupting from the pressure vessel may expose the 
structures and penetrations that ensure the tight-
ness of the containment, to pressure loads and 
thermal stresses. To eliminate these deficiencies, 
the containment was e.g. provided with a filtered 
venting system. Gases that pressurise the contain-
ment can be removed through a filter designed for 
the purpose, if the pressure inside the contain-
ment threatens to increase too much. The part of 
the containment underneath the reactor pressure 
vessel can be flooded with water in order to protect 
the containment bottom and penetrations from 
the thermal effect of core melt. Some penetrations 
of the containment have been protected from the 
direct effect of core melt also by structural means. 
To ensure the cooling of reactor debris, the plant 
units are also provided with a water filling system, 
by the means of which the water level inside the 
containment can be raised all the way to the same 
level with the upper edge of the reactor core.
The cooling of reactor core melt and the protec-
tion of containment penetrations requires that the 
lower dry well of the containment is flooded at such 
an early stage of the accident that if the pressure 
vessel melts through, the erupting core melt falls 
into a deep water pool. When the core melt falls 
into the water a so-called steam explosion, which 
causes a strong and quickly propagating pressure 
wave in the water pool, may occur. A lot of research 
has been done on steam explosions. The results 
show that the core melt discharged through the 
pressure vessel cools down as it travels through 
the water pool and cannot create a steam explo-
sion. However, the structures of the lower equip-
ment hatch have been enforced to decrease the 
risk for loss of containment integrity due to loads 
caused by limited steam explosions.
Research results have demonstrated that in 
unfavourable conditions iodine may form organic 
compounds that are not easily absorbed in the 
containment or in the filter. Such conditions may 
occur at the Olkiluoto plant, if the water inside the 
containment is acidified due to chemicals released 
during the accident. Organic iodine may also be 
generated in the primary circuit, if iodine reacts 
with the hydrocarbons that are released, when 
the boron carbide contained in the control rods be-
comes oxidised during the core damage. To improve 
the possibilities for retaining organic iodine in the 
filtered venting system, chemicals have been added 
to the water in the scrubber tank of the system. 
To minimise the formation of organic iodine, it is 
also possible to control the pH of the containment 
water volume by a specific system. The function 
of the system is based on addition of NaOH to the 
fire fighting water reservoir which is used for fill-
ing of the containment in post-accident conditions. 
The lower drywell will be flooded from the wetwell 
prior to the NaOH supply and the lower drywell 
water pool pH will be kept above 7.
Protection against fires at the Olkiluoto NPP
The possibility of fires and the risks of nuclear 
power plant accidents arising from fires have been 
taken into account in the functional and layout 
design of the existing Olkiluoto plant. Fire safety 
has been improved in different areas of the fire 
protection at the existing Olkiluoto plant after 
commissioning. Although the loss of external elec-
trical supply has been taken into account in the 
plant design, both units were provided with e.g. 
second start-up transformer, based on the experi-
ence gained from the fire of the electric supply unit 
in 1991, to improve the independency of plant’s 
external grid connections. Furthermore, the main 
transformers, in-house transformers and start-up 
transformers are protected with a sprinkler ex-
tinguishing system, which reduces essentially the 
risks arising from transformer fires. The use of 
halon is forbidden in Finland since the year 1999 
with the exception of some special items. Due to 
this the halon extinguishing systems at the exist-
ing Olkiluoto plant were replaced with other extin-
guishing systems by the year 2000. Fire risks have 
been assessed in a probabilistic risk assessment 
that concentrates on fire issues. Based on this the 
fire protection of cables, that are crucial to safety, 
have been improved by renewing fire detectors and 
improving fire extinguishing systems in cable tun-
nels. On the basis of the probabilistic risk assess-
ment these improvements reduce the risks arising 
from fires considerably.
Modernisation and power uprating 
of Olkiluoto NPP in 1994–1998
The main goals of the modernisation project at 
the Olkiluoto NPP were the reviewing of safety 
features and enhancing safety, when feasible, im-
proving the production related performance, find-
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ing factors limiting the plant lifetime and elimi-
nating them, when feasible, and enhancing the 
expertise of the own staff and improving productiv-
ity. In order to achieve the safety goal, the exist-
ing plant design was reviewed and compared by 
the TVO to the present and foreseeable safety re-
quirements. Compliance with the European Utility 
Requirements (EUR) was also reviewed. The feasi-
bility of fulfilling new requirements set for the new 
nuclear power plants was considered case by case. 
The living PRA model of the plant was utilised in 
this context.
The most important safety related modifica-
tions included in the modernisation programme 
are listed below:
•	 Reactor pressure relief system was diversified 
by installing two additional relief valves.
•	 ATWS behaviour was improved by modifying 
some trip signals and making boron injection 
automatic and more effective.
•	 Additional severe accident mitigation measures 
were implemented.
•	 Earthquake resistance of the plant was checked 
and related modifications were made.
•	 Partial scram function was strengthened.
•	 Generator breaker was replaced with a new 
one, which is able to break also short circuit 
current.
•	 Protection against frazil ice at the seawater in-
take was improved.
•	 Protection against snowstorms at the air intake 
of the emergency diesels was improved.
Modification of the safety features in connection 
with the modernisation programme as a whole re-
duced the severe core damage frequency estimate 
by a factor of three.
The radiation exposure of the population was 
reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
Liquid releases were reduced by a factor of ten 
by improving the liquid waste handling systems. 
Also occupational doses were reduced. In practice, 
this meant minimising the cobalt content in the 
primary circuit. Renewal of steam dryers reduced 
the occupational doses remarkably, because the 
moisture of the steam was reduced.
The development of the BWR technology, mar-
gins revealed by operational experience, and plant 
modifications due to other reasons made also pow-
er uprating possible. Thermal power was uprated 
from 2160 MW to 2500 MW (15.7%). The most im-
portant changes were made in fuel technology. The 
operation was changed from with 8×8 bundles to 
10×10 bundles. The new bundles have 40 percent 
lower average linear heat rating than the old ones. 
Some additional design changes implemented due 
to the uprating were the increasing of inertia of the 
main circulation pumps electrically, steam separa-
tors replacement, high-pressure turbine and feed 
water system modifications, decay heat removal 
system capacity increasement, and generator and 
main transformers replacements. The low pressure 
turbines were also replaced and in that way about 
30 MW additional production capacity in each unit 
was achieved.
The modernisation programme of the Olkiluoto 
plant units 1 and 2 was started in 1994 and com-
pleted in 1998. The installations were performed 
during the refuelling outages of the years 1996–
1998. Some later installations were realised during 
outages in 1999. In spite of large modifications the 
refuelling outage times were reasonable, between 
15 and 20 days. The test programme was quite the 
same as in the case of a new plant.
Test operations were conducted in stages at 
different power levels under STUK’s supervision 
and within the frames permitted by STUK. Before 
uprating the reactor power to a higher power level 
STUK conducted a safety review concerning the 
test operation for the power level in question and 
asked the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee for 
a statement concerning the review before granting 
the test operating licence.
Test operation programmes that included the 
entire plant units and were drawn up by TVO, were 
based on the original commissioning programmes 
that were run through during the start-up phase 
and that were modified taking into account the test 
requirements caused by the modernised systems. 
For the long-term test operation of the plant units 
the thermal power of reactor units were uprated 
step by step from the nominal power of 2160 MW 
to 2500 MW.
The most significant plant transient tests of 
the test operation were the load rejection test, 
turbine trip test and the by-pass test of the high-
pressure preheaters. STUK considered it necessary 
to continue the test operation at the 2500 MW 
power level for about two months before issuing 
a statement in favour of continuing the operation 
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of the plant units at the 2500 MW power level.
Licensing steps related to the modernisation 
programme included an uprated Safety Analysis 
Report (PSAR, for example) and an uprated 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (level 1 PSA), 
which were reviewed and approved by STUK. 
Design modifications and test runs were accepted 
by STUK before implementation. The Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) and the related Topical 
Reports were rewritten. It meant also that al-
most all transient and accident analyses were 
redone taking into account the uprated power 
level and modified plant design. The FSAR and 
Topical Reports were submitted to STUK at the 
end of 1996. An operating licence renewal applica-
tion, covering design modifications and the power 
uprating, was submitted to the Government at the 
end of 1996. The licence was granted in 1998. The 
power uprating was reviewed also according to the 
Environmental Impact Legislation.
Modernisation and power uprating project con-
tained several safety, ageing and efficiency rem-
edies. Mostly influences of modifications have been 
positive. A negative finding has been a slight 
increase of steam moisture. To improve this in 
both units steam dryers were replaced in out-
ages 2005–2007. Another slightly negative finding 
was increase of condensate clean up temperature, 
which decreased the life cycle of clean up resins. 
To avoid this problem the location of condensate 
clean up system was changed in the process. In this 
context even the first LP-preheaters were replaced 
and modernised.
The modernisation of turbine plant was contin-
ued with replacement of steam reheater moisture 
separators (MSR). They were replaced with mod-
ern two stage MSR’s. This replacement required 
modernisation of HP-turbine as well. These re-
placements were performed in outages 2005 and 
2006. In the same outages the I&C system of the 
turbine plant process was be replaced with a mod-
ern digital one.
Turbine plant process automation 
system renewal (2004–2006)
A new computerised turbine plant automation sys-
tem was installed in the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2005 
annual maintenance outage (equivalent modifica-
tion was performed at Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2006). 
One reason to switch from analogue to programma-
ble technology was the obsolescence the old system. 
In addition, the modifications made in the turbine 
plant process in 2005, and in 2006, required some 
additional modifications to the automation system. 
The new system improves information manage-
ment and control of the turbine plant as well as 
facilitates component maintenance. Another sys-
tem renewal objective is increased reliability and 
reduced susceptibility to malfunctions by added 
redundancy.
The new automation system is implemented 
by programmable technology. This allows an in-
creased number of process status measurements 
and versatile information handling possibilities. As 
regards turbine automation, it facilitates for tur-
bine operators improved information management, 
process control at operating work stations, trend 
monitoring and setting of safety limits. Safety limit 
settings enable turbine operator reaction to even 
minor process changes. The control desk for the 
turbine side in the control room was replaced with 
a safety function control desk and a turbine sys-
tems control and monitoring board with operator’s 
work stations. The control room was also fitted 
with a screen display. In addition, the process com-
puter system capacity had to be upgraded in con-
nection with the control system renewal to handle 
the large volume of data yielded by the turbine au-
tomation. The automation interface was introduced 
at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 training simulator in 
September 2004, which made possible the training 
of operating personnel in its use.
Examples of latest plant modifications 
at the Olkiluoto NPP (2010–2012)
During the years 2010 and 2011, the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant implemented large modifications 
improving plant safety and the availability of the 
plant. During the maintenance outage 2010 at the 
Olkiluoto unit 1, the implementation of the PELE 
project (Plant Efficiency improvement Lifetime 
Extension) started with the replacement of the in-
ner isolation valves of the main steam system, up-
grade of the low pressure turbines, modernisation 
of the main service water pumps and the upgrade 
of the generator cooling water system. The project 
continued in the following years with the upgrade 
of the generator and the low voltage switchgear. 
At the Olkiluoto unit 2, a corresponding upgrade 
project started during the 2011 outage.
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Replacement of the inner isolation 
valves of the main steam pipes
The main steam line isolation valves inside the 
containment were replaced at the Olkiluoto unit 
1 during annual maintenance in 2010 and at the 
Olkiluoto unit 2 during annual maintenance 2011. 
The function of the valves is to isolate the reactor 
pressure vessel and prevent the loss of reactor 
coolant and releases of radioactivity outside the 
containment. The valves also function as a backup 
for the isolation valves outside the containment.
One reason for the valve replacement was the 
tendency of the old valves to close as the steam 
flow increases. In a situation where one valve 
closes, the steam flow through the other valves 
increases and this can make them close, too. The 
near simultaneous closing of all the steam line 
isolation valves causes a greater pressure rise and 
load on the reactor pressure vessel than the closing 
of one valve only.
The new valves are wedge gate valves, which 
operate on a medium (steam) and on pressurisa-
tion principle. This type of valve does not have the 
risk of self closing caused by a steam flow increase. 
The factory acceptance test of the valves revealed 
that the partial stroke function intended for peri-
odic testing did not operate as planned, and the 
partial stroke related parts were removed from 
the valves before their installation at the power 
station. Provisions have been made for reinstalling 
the partial stroke function, and it will be possible 
when the manufacturer has demonstrated through 
extensive factory acceptance tests that partial 
stroke functions as planned.
STUK reviewed and assessed the valve de-
sign documentation before manufacturing, over-
saw that manufacturing was in compliance with 
requirements, oversaw the factory acceptance tests 
at the manufacturer’s site, installation and test 
runs at the power plant. The test runs of the valves 
were carried out in June according to the test pro-
gramme. Leak-tightness tests, valve movement 
tests in cold and hot state, and testing with steam 
flow at 60% power of the plant were carried out ac-
ceptably.
Upgrade of the plant radiation 
measurement systems
In a radiation measurement equipment up-
grade project, practically all stationary radiation 
measurement equipment will be replaced at the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. The first new devices were 
installed and operational in 2008. Apart from the 
existing measurements, some completely new 
measurements will be installed in the project. The 
purpose of the test operation is to compare the 
measurement results of the new devices with the 
measurement results of the old devices. The aim 
has been to place the new devices in more repre-
sentative places according to operating experience 
gained. Another aim has been to find alarm limit 
set values that would be optimal in terms of ra-
diation safety and plant process monitoring. The 
radiation measurement system upgrade will still 
continue in the next few years.
Low-voltage switchgear replacement project
TVO has initiated a project (the SIMO project) for 
replacing the switchgears of the low-voltage distri-
bution systems at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. The 
primary reason for replacing the switchgears is the 
increase in maintenance costs due to the ageing of 
original equipment, as well as the need to modern-
ise the switchgear to correspond to the current re-
quirements regarding plant and personnel safety. 
The replacement mainly concerns the switchgears 
and associated transformers of electrical systems 
important to safety. TVO has already replaced the 
medium-voltage switchgear (6.6 kV) in 2005 and 
2006. The voltages in the low-voltage networks of 
the units vary from 24 V DC to 660 V AC. The 
switchgears are used to supply the required elec-
trical power to the I&C systems and components 
of the units.
TVO made the first switchgear installations of 
the project in the 2010 annual maintenance. They 
concerned an electrical system less important to 
safety. During the 2011 annual maintenance out-
age of the Olkiluoto unit 2, TVO implemented the 
first switchgear replacement to systems important 
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to safety so that the low-voltage switchgear in one 
of the plant’s four subsystems was replaced with 
the associated transformers. TVO continued the 
project at the Olkiluoto unit 1 during the 2012 an-
nual maintenance outage by replacing the switch-
gear of one subsystem.
Examples of latest incidents at the 
Olkiluoto NPP (2010–2012)
Blowdown system failure at Olkiluoto 1 and 
repair outage at Olkiluoto 2 in June 2010
The purpose of the blowdown system is to limit 
the pressure in the reactor by letting out steam 
from the reactor to the containment building if 
the normal route of the steam to the turbine is 
not available. The system consists of a total of 14 
pipelines. Each pipeline has a valve, controlled by 
the I&C system of the reactor, that opens when 
the reactor pressure must be reduced. The valves 
can be opened either by an electric pilot valve or a 
pressure-operated pilot valve.
In a test carried out just before the shutdown 
of the Olkiluoto unit 1 for the annual mainte-
nance outage in May 2010, two blowdown valves 
did not function as planned, so TVO decided to 
inspect their electrical pilot valves during the an-
nual maintenance outage. The inspections revealed 
that three electrical pilot valves were jammed. All 
jammed pilot valves were of a new type. Five of 
these valves had been installed at the Olkiluoto 
unit 1 a year before. The five other electrical pilot 
valves were of the old type that has operated well 
for several years. Originally the decision to replace 
the valves was taken for the purpose of making 
their maintenance easier.
The jamming was caused by oxidation of the 
plating material inside the guide bushes that 
reduced the clearance between the valve piston 
and the guide bush and jammed the valve. TVO 
removed the electrical pilot valves of a new type 
during the annual maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 1 and reinstalled the old-type valves. 
Operation of the blowdown system (overpressure 
protection of the reactor) was not at risk due to 
the faults detected, because the pressure-operated 
pilot valves were in operating condition.
Ten electrical pilot valves of a new type were 
installed at the Olkiluoto unit 2 in the annual 
maintenance in early May before the faults at 
the unit 1 were discovered. TVO verified the oper-
ability of the installed valves by tests carried out 
during the start-up of the Olkiluoto unit 2. As the 
valves installed at the unit 2 were similar to the 
ones at the Olkiluoto unit 1, the experience from 
the unit 1 suggested that there was a risk of the 
valves failing during the 2010–2011 operating 
cycle. TVO decided to replace eight valves with old-
type valves. Two valves were replaced with new-
type valves that had been modified after the fault 
was discovered. These two valves have a different 
coating on the guide bush, and the piston has a big-
ger clearance. The valves operated during start-up 
of the plant unit as well as in the tests performed 
in November 2010.
The fault did not endanger the safety of the 
plant or its surrounding environment. On the 
INES scale, the event was rated at level 1.
Use of a wrong fresh fuel delivery lot in 
fuel transfer planning at Olkiluoto unit 2
About one-fifth of the reactor fuel was to be re-
placed during the annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2010. The fresh fuel assemblies 
had been moved to the fuel pool in the reactor hall 
earlier in the spring to wait for their transfer to 
the reactor core. In early June 2010, TVO realised 
that 36 fuel assemblies of the wrong delivery lot 
had been transferred to the pool. These assemblies 
were left in the fuel pool, and the correct assem-
blies were transferred from the store to the reactor.
The fuel assemblies are not of identical compo-
sition, because different lots may differ from each 
other, for example, with respect to their uranium 
235 content and neutron-moderating materials. It 
is important from the point of controlling reactiv-
ity that the different properties of fuel assemblies 
are taken into account. In this case, the properties 
of the wrong fuel assembly lot did not significantly 
differ from those of the correct lot, which is why the 
reactor safety would not have been compromised 
even if the subject lot of fuel had ended up in the 
reactor. As a corrective action TVO developed its 
procedures so that similar events can in the future 
be prevented. The event was caused by an error 
in the document concerning the transfers of fresh 
fuel.
The safety of the reactor or the employees was 
not compromised. On the INES scale, the event is 
rated at level 1.
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Defects in the internal parts of 
blowdown system valves at Olkiluoto 
2 and repair outage at Olkiluoto 1
TVO discovered in the inspections performed 
during the annual maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2011 that there were cracks 
in the valve pistons of the system required for 
overpressure protection of and residual heat re-
moval from the primary circuit. The inspections 
revealed other damage as well; for example, the 
hard chrome plating of the pilot cylinder had been 
damaged. However, the cracks and other damage 
had not affected the operation of the valves; they 
had operated correctly in regular tests.
TVO replaced the parts of the worst damaged 
valves during the annual maintenance. Not all 
damaged parts could be replaced due to an in-
sufficient inventory of spare parts. On the basis 
of results from tests carried out during the pre-
ceding operating cycles, the valve manufactur-
er’s assessment and analyses performed by VTT, 
TVO assessed that these valves were operable as 
well. Immediate replacement of the parts was not 
deemed necessary. Nevertheless, STUK found, on 
the basis of the reports produced by TVO regarding 
the faults discovered, that the original pistons and 
pilot cylinders of the valves were approaching the 
end of their life span. It was nevertheless not likely 
that the valves would quickly become inoperable, 
which is why STUK gave, on in June 2011, per-
mission to start up the Olkiluoto unit 2 after the 
annual maintenance outage. STUK required that 
new spare parts should be changed to the valves 
immediately when a sufficient number of new 
spares has been received from the manufacturer. 
The requirement was to carry out the replacement 
by 15 September.
Olkiluoto unit 1 is using similar valves, which 
is why STUK required that TVO must also inspect 
them. During the repair outage of 26–29 June 
2011, damage was observed in the pistons of four 
valves and in the pilot cylinders of 11 valves. TVO 
replaced them with flawless spare parts.
The faulty valves were part of a system in-
tended for protecting the nuclear reactor against 
overpressure and for removing its residual heat in 
a situation where the steam generated in the reac-
tor cannot enter the turbine plant. The necessary 
number of valves is opened, and the steam generat-
ed in the reactor is led along the system’s pipelines 
to a condensation pool in the reactor containment 
building. From the condensation pool, the heat is 
transferred to the sea by other systems.
On the INES scale, the event was rated at 
level 1.
Deficiencies found in the operation 
of main steam isolation valves at 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
During the 2012 annual outage of Olkiluoto 1, TVO 
found that one of the reactor’s main steam isola-
tion valves would not have closed as planned when 
required. A missing valve control conductor was 
revealed as the cause of the deficiency. The conduc-
tor had been removed when four inner main steam 
isolation valves had been replaced in the 2010 an-
nual outage. The conductor had not been replaced 
due to a modification design error. TVO carried 
out additional checks and tests at both plant units 
after the observation, and found the same defi-
ciency also at Olkiluoto 2. In a turbine automation 
renewal carried out in 2005, a conductor had been 
unnecessarily removed. As a result, the same isola-
tion valve as at Olkiluoto 1, and another isolation 
valve beside it, would not have closed automati-
cally when required.
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 both have four 
steam lines for conveying the steam generated in 
the reactor to the turbine plant. Each steam line 
has two isolation valves, one inside the contain-
ment wall and one on the outside. Their purpose is 
to close the steam lines in certain transient and ac-
cident situations, thus isolating the reactor and its 
containment in order to retain radioactivity within 
the containment. The missing control conductors 
did not belong to these main valves. Instead, the 
concerned isolation valves were located side by 
side outside the containment on a pipeline that is 
used to let the steam released from under the valve 
piston of closing pressure-operated isolation valves 
into the containment condensation pool. These two 
external isolation valves are located on a closed 
circuit, which means that steam and radioactive 
substances carried by the steam could not have 
been released outside the containment even if the 
valves had been left open.
The events did not put the safety of the plant 
or the environment at risk, but revealed deficien-
cies in modification planning and the coverage of 
testing. TVO installed the missing conductors im-
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mediately after the events were detected. TVO will 
also investigate the coverage of testing more exten-
sively and improve the process used to ensure that 
modifications are ready to be implemented.
The events of both plant units were rated as 
INES category 1. The classification is based on a 
modification error.
Periodic safety reviews at the Olkiluoto NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety re-
view of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out by the 
licensee and independently by STUK in connection 
to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear pow-
er plant units. The safety documentation, includ-
ing safety assessments done by the licensee, was 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996. In addi-
tion to the review of the licensing documents such 
as Final Safety Analysis Report, STUK also made 
an independent safety assessment. The statement 
of STUK was given to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in June 1998. As regards radiation and 
nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the state-
ment were that the conditions of the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation are complied with.
The latest overall safety review of the Olkiluoto 
plant took place in 2007–2009 in connection of 
the periodic safety review. The operating licence 
for Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2, required that a 
comprehensive periodic safety review (PSR) shall 
be carried out by the end of 2008. The operating 
licence also covers the interim storage facilities 
for spent fuel and medium and low activity opera-
tional waste, so these facilities were also included 
in the PSR. Regulatory guide YVL 1.1 specifies 
the contents of the PSR. For a separate periodic 
safety review, STUK shall be provided with similar 
safety-related reports as in applying for the operat-
ing licence.
TVO began preparations for the periodic safety 
review a few years after the current operating 
licence was granted. The PSR documentation was 
submitted to STUK for approval in the end of 2008. 
STUK made a decision concerning the PSR in 
October 2009. In the STUK’s decision the licensee’s 
PSR was approved as a comprehensive periodic 
safety review according to the licence condition. 
The decision included also STUK’s safety assess-
ment which provided a summary of the reviews, 
inspections and continuous oversight carried out 
by STUK.
The issues addressed in the assessment and 
the related evaluation criteria are set forth in the 
nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation and 
the regulations issued thereunder. Based on the 
assessment, STUK considered that the Olkiluoto 
Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 meet the set 
safety requirements for operational nuclear power 
plants, the emergency preparedness arrangements 
are sufficient and the necessary control to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been 
appropriately arranged. The physical protection 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was not yet 
completely in compliance with the requirements 
of Government Decree 734/2008, which came into 
force in December 2008. Further requirements 
concerning this issue based also on the principle of 
continuous improvement were included in the deci-
sion relating to the periodic safety review.
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
was assessed in compliance with the Government 
Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(733/2008), which came into force in 2008. The 
decree notes that existing nuclear power plants 
need not meet all the requirements set out for new 
plants. Most of the design bases pertaining to the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units were 
set in the 1970s. Substantial modernisations have 
been carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units since their commissioning to 
improve safety. This is in line with the principle 
of continuous improvement of safety provided in 
section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act. The safety 
of the plant will be further improved during the 
current operating licence period. Based on the 
periodic safety review, TVO submitted to STUK 
action plans for the observed points requiring im-
provement. STUK included also some additional 
requirements in the decision relating to the peri-
odic safety review. Systematic assessment and de-
velopment of the diversity principle was required, 
including investigation of possibilities for residual 
heat removal to be independent of seawater. TVO 
submitted a report regarding the adequacy of the 
diversification at the plants and an action plan for 
developing the plants at the end of 2010. STUK 
approved the report in 2012. Another require-
ment considered plant modifications to improve 
safety in situations involving spurious opening 
of the turbine bypass valves. TVO has submitted 
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required report and STUK has approved TVO’s dis-
quisition and action plans to improve the situation.
As a summary of the review of the issues and 
documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK 
noted that the safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant units 1 and 2 is sufficient and the licensee 
utilises the necessary arrangements to continue 
the safe operation of the plants.
Planned and ongoing activities to 
improve safety at the Olkiluoto NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and 
enhancement approach is presented in the nuclear 
legislation. Actions for safety enhancement are to 
be taken whenever they can be regarded as justi-
fied, considering operating experience, the results 
of safety research and the advancement of science 
and technology. The implementation of safety im-
provements has been a continuing process at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 since 
their commissioning and there exists no urgent 
need to upgrade the safety of these plant units in 
the context of the Convention.
There are several ongoing and planned safe-
ty upgrading measures at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant. For example diversification of reac-
tor water level measurements and construction of 
an emergency control room are under design. In 
addition, in the last periodic safety review, STUK 
requested TVO to perform a comprehensive survey 
on the sufficiency of diversification at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 and a plan on measures to develop 
diversification by the end of 2010.
The reactor water level measurement system 
consists of four parallel subsystems, two of which 
are sufficient for implementing the protection func-
tion (from high and low level). The subsystems are 
based on differential pressure measurement. TVO 
has studied possibilities to supplement the cur-
rently used low level measurement system with 
another system based on a different measuring 
principle. TVO’s plans to implement the modifica-
tion has been delayed. The current plan is to install 
the new devices for test use in annual outages 2015 
and 2016.
Safety assessments and improvements 
based on the lessons learnt from 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Natural hazards
Safety margins were assessed by the licensee and 
reviewed by STUK. Based on the results, STUK re-
quired further clarifications on the following main 
points:
•	 seismic resistance of spent fuel pools including 
situations with water temperature exceeding 
the design bases; and
•	 seismic resistance of fire fighting systems.
The licensee of the Olkiluoto NPP was also re-
quested to carry out a more detailed assessment on 
the effects of exceptionally high seawater level on 
the cooling systems of the spent fuel interim stor-
age and their electric power supply. Cooling system 
pumps are situated at the +0.5 m level. The spent 
fuel interim storage is designed as watertight up 
the seawater level +1.2 m. At higher seawater lev-
els some seepage of water through the soil to the 
drainage system is anticipated. According to the 
licensee, the seepage would be stable and slow 
and the water could be removed with submersible 
pumps. Fast flooding of the interim storage would 
be possible through the doors if the seawater level 
exceeds +3.5 m and through the seam between the 
seawater pumping station and seawater pipe cul-
vert at the level +2.5 m. The licensee has submit-
ted plans for tightening the aforementioned seam 
and submitted by the end of 2012 plans for further 
improving the protection of the interim storage 
against flooding, including increase of the capacity 
of the submersible pumps.
Design issues
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, sea water is the pri-
mary ultimate heat sink and an alternative heat 
sink exists only partially. Both units can evapo-
rate residual heat from the reactor core to atmos-
phere by conducting the steam produced inside 
the reactor pressure vessel to the condensation 
pool through the safety relief valves, by letting the 
condensation pool to boil, and by venting the steam 
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from the containment to atmosphere through the 
filtered venting system. However, the systems re-
quired to pump water into the reactor pressure 
vessel are either dependent on the sea water based 
component cooling systems or on the condensation 
pool water, which means that the complete loss of 
sea water as the ultimate heat sink will eventually 
prevent the supply of water to the reactor pressure 
vessel.
Licensee is planning plant modifications on 
the current residual heat removal chain to de-
crease the dependence on the sea water cooling. 
A modification in the auxiliary feed water system 
is planned to enable cooling of the components 
by demineralised water in addition to sea water 
based cooling chain. By this modification system 
can remain operational for a significant period of 
time even during the loss of the primary ultimate 
heat sink (sea water). Modifications are scheduled 
for 2014-2015. In addition, an independent way 
of pumping water to the reactor pressure vessel 
is being planned by the licensee in case of loss of 
AC power. The arrangement will be based on the 
fire fighting water system with additional booster 
pumps and an own diesel aggregate. Also a steam 
driven pump is considered for the early phases of 
the accident to cool reactor in high pressure.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the current AC 
power supply systems include connections to 400 
kV and 110 kV power grids, main generator (house 
load operation), four emergency diesel generators 
per unit, a gas turbine, a dedicated connection to 
a nearby hydropower plant, and the possibility to 
supply electricity from the neighbouring NPP unit. 
The licensee has decided to renew all the eight 
emergency diesel generators. Several plans, sur-
veys and studies have been prepared for this pro-
ject and the investment decision was made in May 
2013. The renewal plan includes several safety 
improvements. First of all, the new EDGs would be 
equipped with two diverse component cooling sys-
tems. The primary EDG cooling would be provided 
by the sea water based cooling system, similar to 
present EDGs units. An alternative, automatically 
activated air based cooling system would be added 
to cope with the loss of sea water situations. This 
would provide extra protection against external 
hazards, internal hazards such as fires, as well as 
component failures. Also one extra diesel generator 
is under consideration to supply water to reactor in 
case of loss of other AC power.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the depletion 
times of DC batteries are well above 10 h, in some 
cases tens of hours. It is possible to charge the bat-
teries using the AC power sources. DC batteries 
supplying the severe accident monitoring systems 
can be also charged by mobile generators. The 
licensee is investigating the possibilities for fixed 
connection points for recharging of all safety im-
portant batteries using transportable power gen-
erators.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the licensee has 
evaluated that water injection into the pool and 
boiling of the pool water could be used as an alter-
native means to remove decay heat from the pools 
inside the reactor building. To support monitoring 
of the water level in the reactor building spent fuel 
pools, there is a plan to equip the fuel pools with a 
level measurement system. Possibilities for add-
ing makeup water from the fire fighting system to 
the pools from safe locations will be provided. The 
pool water level indications will also be routed to 
those locations. Modifications will be done during 
2013-2014. External junctions to the interim spent 
fuel storage pool (outside the reactor buildings) 
water system will be added at the Olkiluoto NPP 
during the enlargement project of spent fuel stor-
age in 2013. Feed of water to the fuel storage pools 
will be possible from fire-fighting vehicle via those 
junctions.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the licensee 
started the investigation of needs and targets for 
mobile power supply in autumn 2011. Investigation 
includes also renewal of the present mobile SAM 
diesel generators. Five aggregates stored on the 
site are under consideration. Enhancing charging 
of batteries has also been found feasible to improve 
the availability of DC power. The licensee is inves-
tigating the possibilities for fixed connection points 
for recharging of the safety important batteries us-
ing transportable power generators. Investigation 
of needs and targets for mobile power supply has 
been started in autumn 2011 and is expected to be 
completed by the end of 2012. Procurement of the 
devices and needed modifications are expected to 
begin in 2013.
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Severe accident management
A comprehensive severe accident management 
(SAM) strategy has been developed and imple-
mented at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 during 
1980’s and 1990’s after the accidents in TMI and 
Chernobyl (see above). These strategies are based 
on ensuring the containment integrity which is re-
quired in the existing national regulations. STUK 
has reviewed these strategies and has made in-
spections in all stages of implementation.
As a result of the studies made after the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major 
changes at the plants are considered necessary. 
However, the licensee is expected to consider also 
spent fuel pools in the SAM procedures as well as 
any implications on them possibly arising from 
simultaneous multi unit accidents. In addition, 
there are many actions related to the update of the 
emergency plans.
Hydrogen leakages out of the containment dur-
ing severe accidents has been analysed for all 
Olkiluoto NPP units, and the results show that de-
sign leakages do not cause a threat to the contain-
ment integrity. For spent fuel pools, the approach 
in Finland is to “practically eliminate” the possibil-
ity of fuel damage. The possibility of top venting of 
reactor hall will be designed at the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2 in 2013 for the steam release in case of 
spent fuel pool boiling. Hydrogen possibly formed 
in the spent fuel pools could be exhausted through 
this route as well.
Enlargening of the spent fuel storage
TVO is in the process of expanding capacity of the 
the spent fuel interim storage (the so-called KPA 
storage) at Olkiluoto by three additional pools, and 
the storage structures will also be modified at the 
same time to comply with the current safety re-
quirements. The current KPA storage capacity in 
Olkiluoto will be sufficient until 2014, and the ex-
pansion will increase the capacity for the spent 
fuel coming from the Olkiluoto plant units 1, 2 
and 3. TVO submitted the documentation regard-
ing expansion of the storage to STUK for approval 
at the end of 2009. The extension of the storage is 
designed to fulfil the current safety requirements, 
the most significant of which are its ability to with-
stand the crash of a large airliner and its seismic 
resistance. At the same time, the structures of the 
existing part of the storage will be modified with a 
view to the current requirements. In conjunction 
with assessing the safety of the expansion, STUK 
inspected the needs to update the earlier design 
basis and safety analyses, the resources and op-
erational methods of TVO’s project organisation, 
the structural design basis of the storage, as well 
as the methods with which TVO will ensure the 
safety of the storage in operation. Following its in-
spections, STUK found that the storage expansion 
meets the safety requirements. STUK has also re-
viewed the plans for the systems that will change 
with the expansion. The design and implementa-
tion of construction engineering structures are 
overseen by an inspection organisation approved 
by STUK. STUK has been overseeing and guiding 
the work of the inspection organisation.
Renewal of the diesel generators
TVO has investigated the possibilities for replacing 
all current emergency diesel generators (EDGs) of 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 with their auxiliary 
systems to correspond with the changed need for 
power, taking also into account any increases in 
the need for power due to possible future plant 
modifications as well as the lessons learnt from 
the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in re-
lation to securing the power supply. The nuclear 
safety requirements dictate that a power margin 
of at least 10% is available in all load conditions. 
Furthermore, both main components of the EDGs 
(the diesel engine and the generator) are old mod-
els, whose development and manufacture has been 
discontinued, and the availability of spare parts 
and the supplier’s technical support are declining.
The purpose of the emergency diesel generators 
and their associated auxiliary systems is to sup-
ply electrical power to the 660 V emergency power 
system in case of loss of supply from the 6.6 kV 
main bar. Both plants have four subsystems, and 
each subsystem has its own standby diesel genera-
tor. Replacement of the diesel generators will also 
mean that the main switchgear in the 660 V emer-
gency power network has to be replaced; this will 
be done as part of the replacement of low-voltage 
switchgear as a modification project separate from 
the replacement of the EDGs.
The intention is to implement the EDG replace-
ment project during the normal operation of the 
plant units as far as possible. According to the 
plan, the new EDGs will be installed and commis-
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sioned during power operation so that one new 
EDG is installed to both plant units during one 
power operation cycle. For this purpose, a ninth 
EDG unit has to be constructed to replace any one 
of the current EDGs of the Olkiluoto units 1 or 2. 
In the future, the ninth EDG can be connected to 
replace an EDG undergoing periodic maintenance 
at the Olkiluoto units 1 or 2, or it can replace a 
failed EDG. A new building will be constructed for 
the ninth EDG, while the replacement EDGs will 
be installed at the same premises where the cur-
rent units are located.
In late autumn 2011, TVO submitted a con-
ceptual design plan regarding the replacement of 
EDGs to STUK for approval. The conceptual design 
plan was approved by STUK. According to the pre-
liminary schedule, the EDGs will be installed and 
commissioned during 2016–2020.
Construction of an emergency control room
Pursuant to a Government Decree, a nuclear power 
plant shall have an emergency control room inde-
pendent of the main control room, and the neces-
sary local control systems for shutting down and 
cooling the nuclear reactor, and for removing re-
sidual heat from the nuclear reactor and spent fuel 
stored at the plant in a situation where operations 
in the main control room are not possible.
TVO is in the process of constructing emergency 
control rooms for the Olkiluoto units currently in 
operation in compliance with the requirements set 
out in STUK’s implementation decision regarding 
Guide YVL 5.5 and in the periodic safety review of 
the Olkiluoto NPP. The project is currently in its 
pre-planning phase, and STUK has reviewed and 
approved the conceptual design plan of the emer-
gency control rooms in 2012.
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Licensing steps
Decision-in-Principle procedure was carried out 
during the period November 2000 – May 2002 when 
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) applied a Decision-
in-Principle for the fifth NPP unit in Finland and 
the Government approved it and the Parliament 
confirmed the approval. Construction Licence ap-
plication for the Olkiluoto unit 3 was submitted by 
TVO to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (pre-
decessor of the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy) in January 2004. The new unit, Olkiluoto 
3 is a 1600 MWe European Pressurised Water 
Reactor (EPR), the design of which is based on the 
French N4 and German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn 
key delivery is provided by the Consortium Areva 
NP and Siemens. The technical requirements 
for Olkiluoto unit 3 were specified by using the 
European Utility Requirements (EUR) document 
as a reference. TVO’s specifications complemented 
the EUR mainly in those points where Finnish 
requirements are more stringent. STUK gave its 
statement and safety assessment in January 2005 
based on the review of the licensing documenta-
tion and the Government issued the Construction 
Licence in February 2005.
Construction of the Olkiluoto unit 3 still con-
tinues. In the turbine island, Siemens has started 
cold commissioning of the systems after finalising 
Figure 22. Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 construction site in April 2013. Source: TVO.
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construction and installation works. In the nu-
clear island, erection of systems, structures and 
components continues. Next major licensing step 
is the Operating Licence. Operating Licence is 
needed prior to loading nuclear fuel into the reac-
tor core. IAEA has agreed to carry out a pre-OS-
ART (Operational Safety Review Team) mission to 
Olkiluoto NPP before core loading.
Challenges
Currently, the licensee and the vendor don’t have 
commonly approved schedule for the project. The 
licensee has given a notice that the start of the 
commercial electricity production of the Olkiluoto 
unit 3 may be postponed until year 2016. There 
are certain factors that have affected greatly 
the project progress. Olkiluoto unit 3 is the first 
European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) being con-
structed. Construction of the unit started after a 
long break in nuclear power plant construction in 
Europe, which had resulted in loss of experienced 
and qualified engineering and manufacturing re-
sources. Lack of knowledge on Finnish regulatory 
framework and safety requirements, insufficient 
completion of the design prior to construction, 
some difficulties with advanced manufacturing 
and construction technologies and lacks in safety 
culture in the earlier phase of construction works 
at site have been challenging aspects in the project 
and caused delays. On the other hand parties have 
succeeded to find deviations induced during the 
project and the end products have finally fulfilled 
quality, performance and safety requirements.
The issue which at the moment set also the 
timeline of the project is the licensing of I&C archi-
tecture and systems. Using of integrated, software 
based I&C platforms sets new requirements for 
designing, safety analyses as well as for implemen-
tation and testing of the systems. Configuration 
and requirement management and verification & 
validation actions are more essential role during 
these phases than earlier when analog systems 
were used. The main issues where STUK has 
asked more clarification concern defining and man-
agement of interfaces of different I&C systems so 
that failure of one system can’t disturb other sys-
tems. STUK has also asked more clarification how 
possible spurious actions are taken into account in 
the design and corresponding safety analyses. The 
vendor and the licensee are now finalising plans 
for I&C system architecture as well as answers for 
STUK’s clarification requests.
Regulatory oversight
During the construction, STUK oversees the pro-
ject very comprehensively. The licensee’s perfor-
mance is evaluated via Construction Inspection 
Program. The purpose of the program is to verify 
that the performance and organisation of the li-
censee ensure high quality construction and im-
plementation in accordance with the approved de-
signs while complying with the regulations and 
STUK’s decisions. Under Construction Inspection 
Program STUK has performed around 15 inspec-
tions every year. Some of the inspections are unan-
nounced inspections.
In addition to Construction Inspection 
Programme, STUK has strong on-site presence 
by the resident inspectors at the construction site. 
There are three to four resident inspectors dedi-
cated for Olkiluoto unit 3 project. This provides 
STUK constant flow of information and oversight 
capabilities and gives additional information on 
licensee’s activities. STUK has therefore also very 
quick ability to response to any immediate safety 
concern or incident with short notice. Findings 
made by resident inspectors are also important 
inputs for the construction inspection programme 
inspections.
The construction of a nuclear facility shall not 
begin before the Government has granted the 
Construction Licence. After that, prior to start 
manufacturing, installation or commissioning of 
the system, structure or component, STUK’s ap-
provals for the detailed design or plans are needed. 
STUK also approves manufacturers of nuclear 
pressure equipment for their duties and inspection 
organisations and testing organisations for duties 
pertaining to the control of pressure equipment 
at nuclear facilities. During the Olkiluoto unit 
3 project, STUK has reviewed more than 14000 
documents – about 9000 of them are submitted to 
STUK for approval.
STUK also inspects the compliance of the de-
sign and manufacturing of mechanical components 
and structures. Inspections are performed dur-
ing and after the manufacturing in manufactur-
ers’ premises and at the site after installation 
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and during commissioning. In lower safety class-
es these inspections are conducted by Inspection 
Organisations.
Based on the findings made during the techni-
cal inspections, inspections under construction in-
spection programme, document reviews and other 
visits during construction, STUK prepares annu-
ally a comprehensive safety evaluation how safety 
aspects are fulfilled and taken into account during 
the construction. The experience has shown that 
STUK’s practice to oversee the project in all level 
of activities has been effective way to find possible 
weak points and deviations in early phase of the 
project. Translations of annual report can be found 
from the STUK’s website.
Safety assessments based on 
the lessons learnt from TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of March 
in 2011, safety assessment of Olkiluoto unit 3 was 
initiated. The topics included the preparedness 
against loss of electric power supply, loss of ulti-
mate heat sink and extreme natural phenomena. 
As being a unit under construction, any immediate 
actions were not necessary, but STUK required the 
licensee to carry out additional assessment and 
present an action plan for safety improvements. 
Assessment was conducted and reported by the 
licensee to STUK on 15 December 2011. STUK 
reviewed the assessment and made decision on 19 
July 2012 on the suggested safety improvements 
and additional analyses.
External conditions in Finland are moderate. 
No destructive earthquakes or tsunami waves have 
been observed. Storms are not comparable to tropi-
cal cyclones and strong tornadoes are quite rare. 
Olkiluoto unit 3 fulfils the current regulatory re-
quirements concerning external events. The design 
basis of Olkiluoto unit 3 for external events has 
been selected conservatively in the design phase. 
The design basis covers earthquakes, internal and 
external flooding, extreme weather and other natu-
ral hazards (like snowstorms, frazil ice formation 
and impurities in the seawater) as well as human 
induced hazards. The design values correspond to 
return periods of up to 100 000 years and much 
longer for events with “cliff edge” type consequenc-
es. As the estimated conditions corresponding to 
such long return periods involve large uncertain-
ties, considerable physical margins to the largest 
values observed in the neighbourhood of the site 
have also been ensured.
The ultimate heat sink of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is 
the sea. In case of the total loss of the availability 
of sea water for cooling, the residual heat from the 
reactor core would be released to the atmosphere 
via the steam generators. During refuelling outage 
the containment filtered venting could be used. 
Filtered venting system is not an original safety 
feature of EPR concept but it was required by 
STUK in an early phase of the conceptual design 
of Olkiluoto unit 3 to ensure the pressure manage-
ment of the containment during severe accidents. 
The licensee has assessed possibilities to imple-
ment external feed water connections to the steam 
generator secondary side, connections to external 
AC power supply and external make-up water 
injection into the reactor cooling system during 
refuelling outages in order to have independent 
means to fulfil residual heat removal function in 
case plant’s normal systems are lost. STUK is cur-
rently evaluating licensee’s plans.
In the fuel building, the spent fuel pools could 
be cooled by evaporation. The possibility to use 
fire water systems and boiling of the pool water 
has been evaluated. Additional mobile pumps to 
provide water injection into the fire fighting water 
system are to be acquired before the start of opera-
tion of the Olkiluoto unit 3. The needed external 
connection points, as well as temperature and level 
Figure 23. STUK’s resident inspector performing con-
struction inspection for primary circuit piping.
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measurements are included in the design of the 
fuel building systems. Additional measurements 
to monitor the water level in the pools are to be 
implemented.
The current AC power supply systems of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 include connections to 400 kV 
and 110 kV power grids, main generator (house 
load operation), four emergency diesel generators 
(EDGs), two station black out (SBO) diesel gen-
erators, a gas turbine and the possibility to supply 
electricity from the neighbouring NPP units via 
400 kV switchyard. To ensure long autonomy of 
SBO diesels the licensee has planed to add pos-
sibilities to move fuel from EDG storage tanks to 
SBO diesels.
For uninterrupted power supplies, there are 
separate and diversified 2 h and 12 h battery 
backed power supply systems. The first set of 
batteries supplies all electrical equipment which 
require uninterruptible power in the nuclear is-
land and the second set of batteries supplies loads 
which are important in case of a severe accident. 
The licensee evaluates that there is no need for 
upgrading the battery capacity.
Severe accidents have been considered in the 
original design of the Olkiluoto unit 3. STUK has 
reviewed the overall SAM strategy and the ap-
proach has been accepted. No changes to this ap-
proach are expected based on current knowledge 
from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
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Hanhikivi NPP unit 1 in planning phase
Environmental Impact Assessment of new 
nuclear power plants and candidate sites
In 2007, initiatives for building additional nucle-
ar power plant units in Finland were announced. 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was car-
ried out according to EIA legislation for the pos-
sible Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3 units in 2007–2009. 
The Competent Authority for EIA procedure for 
NPP’s in Finland is the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy.
A new nuclear power company, Fennovoima Oy, 
was founded in 2007. The company started a pre-
liminary site survey process, mainly on the coast 
of the Gulf of Bothnia (the northern gulf of the 
Baltic Sea) and on the eastern Gulf of Finland (the 
eastern gulf of the Baltic Sea), the northernmost 
candidate site being 20–30 km from the borderline 
of Sweden. Fennovoima prepared an EIA pro-
gramme and subsequently an EIA report for three 
(originally four) alternative new candidate sites in 
2007–2009.
The EIA process did not reveal any major nu-
clear or radiation safety issues as regards the pro-
posed new NPP sites or new units on the existing 
sites. EIA is a legal process to cope comprehensive-
ly with the environmental issues depending on the 
specific site (e.g. sea environment and eutrophica-
tion, special natural species and phenomena, biodi-
versity, Natura natural reserve assessment, fisher-
ies, salmon migration, combined heat and power 
production) and to increase the opportunity for 
citizens and other stakeholders to receive informa-
Figure 24. Hanhikivi site in Pyhäjoki selected for Fennovoima new NPP (FH-1). Source: Fennovoima.
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tion, become involved in the planning and express 
their satetments and opinions on the project.
Comments were requested from altogether nine 
countries near the Baltic See by the Finnish 
Environmental Ministry on the basis of so called 
Espoo convention. Several comments from e.g. 
Estonia, Sweden and Germany were given and 
considered by the Finnish authorities. Additionally, 
the Austrian Government as a party of the Espoo 
convention sent their statement on each EIA and 
requested for consultation in Finland. Thus, sub-
sequent meetings were arranged in 2008–2009 at 
the Finnish Ministry of the Environment where 
a Finnish delegation of experts from the utility 
concerned, STUK and the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy gave detailed explanations to the 
questions provided.
Separate applications for the Decision-in-
Principle for new NPP units were submitted to 
the Government in 2008 and 2009 by TVO, Fortum 
and Fennovoima. The relevant site-related factors 
potentially affecting the safety of a the planned 
new NPP units and the related nuclear facilities 
during their projected lifetime were evaluated for 
the existing Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites and for 
the alternative new sites at Pyhäjoki, Simo and 
Ruotsinpyhtää proposed by Fennovoima. In late 
2009, Fennovoima removed the Ruotsinpyhtää site 
from its application for the Decision-in-Principle. 
The evaluations were reviewed by STUK and other 
expert organisations in their respective fields. In 
addition to the Finnish regulations, IAEA Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides and WENRA re-
quirements were considered in the review.
Specific issues regarding the new sites are the 
size of precautionary action zone (5–6 km radius 
in Finland), the limitation of maximum population 
within it which may be affected in a severe acci-
dent situation and the possibility to evacuate the 
population. According to the Finnish regulations, 
an early evacuation before an expected release 
shall be possible within a time of four hours from 
the evacuation decision. The population in 2010 in 
the vicinity of the Finnish candidate sites is inter-
nationally compared relatively small (maximum of 
3000 inhabitants up to 6 km from the site at Simo). 
According to STUK’s preliminary safety as-
sessments, no site related factors were found at 
any of the sites which would prevent building the 
proposed new NPP units and the related other 
nuclear facilities according to the safety require-
ments. More detailed evaluation of the site related 
factors will be conducted and site characterisation 
is accepted in connection with the Construction 
Licence process.
Fennovoima completed site selection process 
in October 2011 by selecting Hanhikivi site in 
Pyhäjoki. The company stated that the main tech-
nical arguments for site selection were bedrock 
intackness, lower seismicity, shorter cooling water 
tunnels and population density.
Decisions-in-Principle and safety 
assessments of new nuclear power plant units
Three new nuclear power plant units have been 
under consideration in Finland (see more details 
of the licensing process under Articles 7 and 17). 
TVO submitted application for a Decision-in-
Principle (DiP) to the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy in 2008, Fennovoima and Fortum in 
2009. In addition, two DiP applications by Posiva 
Oy have been handled for the expansion of the 
planned capacity of spent fuel repository for 
Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3 units. The applications 
for NPP units were accompanied by documents of a 
total of seven alternative plant designs.
In the Decision-in-Principle (DiP) the Govern-
ment judges whether the proposed use of nuclear 
energy is in line with the overall good of society. 
STUK gave the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy preliminary safety assessments of all 
Decision-in-Principle applications in 2009. STUK’s 
preliminary safety assessments consisted of an as-
sessment of the safety of the plant alternatives and 
the sites as well as of an assessment of the organi-
sations, expertise and the quality management of 
the applicant. The assessments also covered the 
physical protection and emergency preparedness 
arrangements, nuclear fuel and nuclear waste 
management, nuclear liability and non-prolifera-
tion. STUK stated in its preliminary safety assess-
ment whether any factors have arisen indicating 
a lack of sufficient prerequisites for constructing 
a nuclear facility as prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Safety assessment was based on the 
Government Decrees issued under the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Furthermore, STUK took a stand on 
the possibility of fulfilling other requirements laid 
down in legislation and YVL Guides as regards 
the issues to be reviewed by STUK. The aim of 
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the preliminary safety assessment was to find any 
“show stoppers” in sites, organisations or plant 
design alternatives. Seven different plant design 
alternatives were assessed during the prelimi-
nary safety assessment period: ABWR (Toshiba-
Westinghouse), AES-2006 (Atomstroyexport), 
APWR (Mitsubishi Heavy Industry), APR-1400 
(Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power), ESBWR (GE 
Hitachi), EPR (AREVA) and KERENA (AREVA).
Most of the plant alternatives reviewed in the 
STUK’s preliminary safety assessments did not 
meet Finnish safety requirements as such. The 
nature and the extent of the required modifica-
tions vary between the plant alternatives. Some 
plant alternatives would only require fairly minor 
modifications; some would require more extensive 
structural modifications. The required technical 
solutions are still open for some alternatives.
All DiP applications were handled simultane-
ously and in May 2010 the Government granted 
two Decisions-in-Principle, one to Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO) and another to Fennovoima Oy. 
TVO’s DiP was granted according to the applica-
tion to build Olkiluoto unit 4 (OL4), single reac-
tor with maximum output of 4600 MWh. In the 
Fennovoima’s case Government granted DiP only 
for a single reactor with maximum reactor power of 
4900 MWth, although Fennovoima applied to build 
one or two reactors with maximum reactor power 
of 4300–6800 MWth.
The Government also granted a Decision-in-
Principle for Olkiluoto unit 4 spent fuel final 
disposal, applied by the spent fuel management 
company Posiva Oy. For Fennovoima’s spent fuel 
disposal, the Government gave two options. By mid 
2016, Fennovoima shall present an co-operation 
agreement of spent fuel final disposal with TVO 
and Fortum (the owners of Posiva) or start its 
own EIA process for the spent fuel final disposal. 
Regardless of the option chosen a separate DiP 
will later be required for disposing of the spent 
fuel from Fennovoima’s planned reactor unit. For 
this DiP process also the corresponding EIA report 
needs to be updated or prepared for a possible new 
site.
At the same time the Government rejected 
Fortum’s DiP application to construct a new reac-
tor to Loviisa site (Loviisa unit 3), as well as the 
DiP application for expanding the capacity of the 
spent fuel disposal facility to include also the spent 
fuel from the Loviisa unit 3 was rejected.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the grant-
ed DiP’s were sent without delay to the Parliament 
for confirmation. The Parliament may reverse the 
Decision-in-Principle as such or may decide that it 
remains in force as such. After the hearings in the 
all main permanent committees, the Parliament 
ratified both granted NPP applications on the 
1st of July 2010. The both Decisions-in-Principle 
for new reactors state that the construction li-
cence shall be applied within five years from the 
Parliaments confirmation. This sets the schedule 
for Fennovoima and TVO to conclude their prepa-
rations for the construction licence applications to 
the Government by mid 2015.
Preparations for the construction 
licence phase
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the applicant 
may ask advice or sent plans for STUK’s review be-
fore the applications are filed to the Government. 
With this mandate, the utilities and STUK have 
had meetings to be prepared for the construction li-
cence safety assessment process. STUK has organ-
ised seminars with licence applicants on construc-
tion licence application requirements in relation to 
the plant design processes and shared the lessons 
learned from the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction pro-
ject as well as had seminars on requirement man-
agement. Process system and plant engineering 
(layout) design maturity in PSAR phase is domi-
nating factor for successful construction licence ap-
plication review. Also both applicants have sent nu-
clear safety related bid requirements to STUK for 
information. These are the first steps for STUK to 
prepare regulatory project for construction licence 
review phase.
The main challenge for the upcoming construc-
tion licence application review is to conclude the 
renewal process of the legislation and the regula-
tory guides – new YVL guides. Another challenge 
for STUK is to recruit the needed competent regu-
latory staff if two new NPP projects will commence 
simultaneously.
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IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety
The transparency and international co-operation 
are one of the corner stones in the Finnish nu-
clear safety policy. Finland has signed the inter-
national conventions and treaties aiming on safe 
and peaceful use of nuclear energy. After the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, Finland 
signed among 130 other countries in the General 
Conference in September 2011 the IAEA Action 
Plan. The twelve main actions included in the 
IAEA Action Plan and the related Finnish meas-
ures are discussed in this Annex.
Safety assessments in the light of the 
accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP
Undertake assessment of the safety vulnera-
bilities of nuclear power plants in the light of 
lessons learned to date from the accident
Following the accident at the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 
11th of March in 2011, safety assessments in 
Finland were initiated after STUK received a 
letter from the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) on 15 March 2011. The Ministry 
asked STUK to carry out a study on how the 
Finnish NPPs have prepared against loss of elec-
tric power supply and extreme natural phenomena 
in order to ensure nuclear safety. STUK asked the 
licensees to carry out assessments and submitted 
the study report to MEE on 16 May 2011. Although 
immediate actions were not considered necessary, 
STUK required the licensees to carry out addi-
tional assessments and present action plans for 
safety improvements. Assessments were conducted 
and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 
15 December 2011. STUK has reviewed the results 
of national assessments, and made licensee specific 
decisions on 19 July 2012 on the suggested safety 
improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests 
and submitted the national report to European 
Commission at the end of 2011. An EU level peer 
review on the report was completed by April 2012. 
The recommendations of the EU peer review have 
been taken into account in the regulatory deci-
sions and will be considered in the development 
of national regulations. In addition, Finland par-
ticipated in the second Extraordinary Meeting of 
the Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) in August 
2012 and prepared a report introducing national 
actions in Finland initiated as a result of the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. STUK has 
prepared a National Action Plan in the framework 
of EU stress tests addressing the measures initi-
ated on a national level and at the nuclear power 
plants as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident. The National Action Plan takes into 
account the national safety assessments and relat-
ed regulatory decisions as well as the recommenda-
tions from the EU stress tests and Extraordinary 
CNS. All STUK’s related decisions, the national 
report to European Commission, the report to the 
Extraordinary CNS, and the National Action Plan 
have been published on STUK’s website.
Based on the results of assessments conducted 
in Finland to date, it is concluded that no such 
hazards or deficiencies have been found that would 
require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. 
Areas where safety can be further enhanced have 
been identified and there are plans on how to 
address these areas. The experiences from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are also tak-
en into consideration in the ongoing renewal of the 
legislation and Finnish Regulatory Guides (YVL 
Guides).
IAEA peer reviews
Strengthen IAEA peer reviews in order to 
maximize the benefits to Member States
Finland regularly hosts international peer re-
views and also offers its experts for the review in 
other countries. Finland also supports activities to 
improve peer review services and has already par-
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ticipated in the development of IAEA’s peer review 
services (e.g. IRRS and the OSART missions for 
construction).
The latest peer reviews in Finland are the fol-
lowing:
•	 IAEA OSART safety review at Loviisa NPP in 
March 2007, with a follow-up review in July 
2008
•	 WANO peer review at Loviisa NPP in March 
2010, with a follow-up in April 2012
•	 WANO peer reviews at Olkiluoto NPP in 2006, 
with a follow-up in August 2009, and in 2012
•	 IAEA’s International Physical Protection Ad-
visory Service (IPPAS) mission in Finland in 
2009, with a follow-up mission in April 2012
•	 A Peer Review of STUK’s waste management 
related activities in 2009 (all EU member states 
were invited and representatives from 11 coun-
tries participated in the peer review)
•	 In 2011 STUK hosted a peer review of the 
emergency preparedness with the OECD NEA 
countries
•	 STUK participated in the work carried out by 
the working group of European authorities 
(European Pilot Study on Demonstrating the 
Safety of Geological Disposal), which resulted in 
a recommendation for safety case content for fi-
nal disposal at different stages of final disposal. 
The recommendations were published in 2011.
•	 Finland had IRRT mission in 2001 and the 
follow-up mission in 2003. IRRS mission was 
carried out to the regulatory body in October 
2012 and the follow-up mission is planned in 
2015. An action plan has been prepared.
•	 IAEA has agreed to carry out a pre-OSART 
(Operational Safety Review Team) mission to 
Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 in 2013 depending on the 
project schedule with regard to fuel loading.
Finland continues the hosting and participation in 
the international peer reviews and will report the 
findings of these peer reviews as well as progress of 
the action plans in the CNS report.
Emergency preparedness and response
Strengthen emergency preparedness and re-
sponse
The Finnish concept of off-site nuclear emer-
gency response has been developed since 1976, 
when the first public authorities’ off-site emer-
gency plan was prepared. The development has 
been a continuous process since then. The require-
ments for off-site plans and activities in a radia-
tion emergency are provided for in the Decree of 
the Ministry of the Interior issued in 2011. Off-site 
emergency plans are prepared by regional rescue 
authorities. Legislation and plans define clearly 
the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders hav-
ing a role in an emergency. Emergency exercises 
are conducted annually between the licensee and 
STUK. Every third year all authorities are train-
ing together at each site.
As a result of the studies made after the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major 
changes are identified in the area of emergency 
preparedness so far. However, there is a need to 
ensure accessibility to the site in case of extreme 
weather conditions, a sufficient amount of radia-
tion protection equipment and radiation monitor-
ing capabilities for rescue services and communi-
cation capabilities. In addition, there is a need to 
ensure that the resources of rescue authorities can 
be reasonably coordinated between radiological 
and other emergencies, should they happen simul-
taneously. The coordination of activities and shar-
ing of resources between different regional rescue 
authorities also needs to be enhanced. Discussions 
between rescue authorities, STUK and the licen-
sees are ongoing. Futhermore, STUK conducted in 
2011 a self-assement of its own response during 
the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. As a 
general result, no major deficiences were identi-
fied. However, findings and experiences resulted 
in some minor modifications of STUK’s emergency 
plan, procedures and arrangements.
A close local co-operation between the regional 
rescue services, regional police departments, NPP 
licensees and STUK has taken place since several 
years. Permanent coordination groups have been 
established for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPP’s in 
order to ensure coordinated and consistent emer-
gency plans, to improve and develop emergency 
planning and arrangements and to share lessons 
from the exercises, regulations and other informa-
tion. Also extensive training is arranged by these 
groups. In addition, a National Nuclear Power 
Plant Emergency Preparedness Forum is needed 
in order to have co-operation and communication 
between permanent groups and establishment of 
the National Forum has been agreed. The Ministry 
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of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, the regional rescue service authorities, 
STUK and the NPP licensees will be participating 
in the Forum. The forum will handle at least issues 
related to:
•	 long term accidents of several NPP units
•	 recovery phase actions
•	 emergency measures outside the planning zones
•	 scope of the emergency exercises,
•	 radiation monitoring capability during pro-
longed emergency situations
•	 communication capability during prolonged 
emergency situations
•	 availability of the emergency centres with re-
spect to power supply, filtration of the intake air 
and the distance from the NPPs
•	 public information, information between the 
authorities
•	 clearance of the roads, alternative transport 
ways and means
•	 decontamination resources and facilities
•	 supply of contractor staff during the emergen-
cies
•	 warning the population.
In addition, a transportable, insulated and heated 
container for personnel protective equipment and 
radiation measuring instrument is to be purchased 
to quickly provide a certain amount of equipment 
in such a case when the normal storages in the 
NPP are unavailable e.g. due to the external haz-
ards or fallout. The container can be transported 
by a truck and it can be connected to the electricity 
grid or to the movable power engine. The container 
is estimated to be in use on 2014.
Further improvement of arrangements for the 
coordination of information to the public and me-
dia during emergencies is needed to ensure that 
the messages issued by different authorities are 
consistent. Guidelines for co-operation among au-
thorities have been written in a guidebook pub-
lished in November 2012. To help the implementa-
tion of guidelines seminars and workshops will be 
organised from the beginning of 2013.
Finland participates actively in the interna-
tional co-operation also in the field of emergency 
preparedness, such as IAEA, OECD/NEA and EU/
EC (WENRA and HERCA). These working groups 
discuss i.a. mutual assistance and communication, 
co-operation and co-ordination of actions during 
nuclear of radiological emergencies. STUK has also 
hosted in 2009 a peer review organised by OECD/
NEA on guides concerning protective measures in 
early and intermediate phases of a nuclear or ra-
diological emergency.
National regulatory bodies
Strengthen the effectiveness of national regu-
latory bodies
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, 
the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy 
is the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
It prepares for example licensing decisions for the 
Government. According to the Radiation Act, the 
overall authority in the field of the use of radia-
tion and other radiation practices is the Ministry 
of Social affairs and Health. According to Section 6 
of the Radiation Act and Section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, STUK is responsible for the regulatory 
control of the safety of the use of radiation and 
nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities of 
STUK are provided in the Radiation and Nuclear 
Energy Acts.
The regulatory control of the safe use of radia-
tion and nuclear energy is independently carried 
out by STUK. No Ministry can take for its decision-
making a matter that has been defined by law to 
be on the responsibility of STUK. STUK has no 
responsibilities or duties which would be in conflict 
with regulatory control.
STUK carried out a self-assessment concern-
ing i.a. the effectiveness of the regulatory body for 
the latest IRRS mission conducted in Finland in 
October 2012. STUK identified many topics to be 
further improved during the self-assessment and 
some additional recommendations and suggestions 
were also given during the mission. The IRRS mis-
sion team found that STUK is a competent and 
highly credible regulator and is open and transpar-
ent. It also concluded that STUK is very active in 
promoting experience sharing both nationally and 
internationally. Areas for further improvement to 
enhance overall performance of the regulatory sys-
tem, included for example the following:
•	 although STUK operates in practice as an 
independent regulatory body, the government 
should strengthen the legislative framework by 
establishing the regulator as a body separate in 
law from other arms of government
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•	 the government should seek to modify the 
Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly 
and unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal au-
thorities in the authorization process for safety. 
In particular, the changes should ensure that 
STUK has the legal authority to both specify 
any licence conditions necessary for safety and 
specify all regulations necessary for safety
•	 Finnish legislative framework should be further 
developed to cover authorization for the decom-
missioning of nuclear facilities and the final 
closure of nuclear waste repositories
•	 STUK can further enhance the effectiveness of 
its inspection activities by enhancing the focus 
of inspection on the most safety-significant ar-
eas and developing a formal qualification pro-
gramme for inspectors.
Based on the recommendations and suggestions an 
Action Plan has been prepared by STUK. The fol-
low-up mission is planned to be conducted in 2015.
Operating organizations
Strengthen the effectiveness of operating or-
ganizations with respect to nuclear safety
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as prescribed in the Finnish Radiation and 
Nuclear Energy Acts. Accordingly, it is the licen-
see’s obligation to assure safe use of radiation and 
nuclear energy. Furthermore, it shall be the licen-
see’s obligation to assure such physical protection 
and emergency planning and other arrangements, 
necessary to ensure limitation of nuclear damage, 
which do not rest with the authorities.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body 
to verify that the licensees fulfill the regulations. 
This verification is carried out through continuous 
oversight, safety review and assessment as well 
as inspection programmes established by STUK. 
In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s 
commitment to the strong safety culture. The ob-
vious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these 
responsibilities are strict adherence of regulations, 
prompt, timely and open actions towards the regu-
lator in unusual situations, active role in develop-
ing the safety based on improvements of technol-
ogy and science as well as effective exploitation of 
experience feedback.
The Finnish NPP licensees have regularly host-
ed international peer reviews (OSART, WANO). 
Several peer reviews have been carried out at the 
both Finnish NPPs during the last ten years (see 
above the section concerning peer reviews). The li-
censees have annually sent several peers to foreing 
peer reviews.
According to the Finnish regulatory guides, the 
licensees shall carry out a periodic safety review 
(PSR) at least every ten years. The Finnish PSR 
process and scope are in line with the IAEA guid-
ance (NS-G-2.10). PSR is seen as a very important 
tool for promoting the continuous safety improve-
ment approach. The last periodic safety reviews 
were finalised in Loviisa in 2007 and in Olkiluoto 
in 2009. STUK regularly updates the regulatory 
requirements based on the operational experience 
feedback, research and technical development. 
The procedure to apply new or revised regulatory 
guides to existing nuclear facilities is such that 
after having heard those concerned, STUK makes 
a separate decision on how a new or revised YVL 
Guide applies to operating nuclear power plants, or 
to those under construction.
IAEA safety standards
Review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards 
and improve their implementation
The most important references considered in 
rulemaking at STUK are the IAEA safety stand-
ards, especially the Requirements-documents, and 
WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association) Safety Reference Levels and Safety 
Objectives for new reactors. Finnish policy is to 
participate actively in the international discus-
sion on developing safety standards and adopt or 
adapt the new safety requirements into national 
regulations. The newly developed regulations are 
highly in line with the most recent development 
of the IAEA safety requirements. Lessons learned 
from the Forsmark event in 2006 and the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in 2011 are incorpo-
rated into the updated governement decrees and 
the new set of YVL guides to be published in 2013.
International legal framework
Improve the effectiveness of the international 
legal framework
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 
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January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 
24 October 1996. Finland has implemented the ob-
ligations of the Convention and also the objectives 
of the Convention are complied with. Finland has 
regularly reported and participated in the review 
meetings. Finland observes the principles of the 
Convention, when applicable, also in other uses 
of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. 
in the use of a research reactor. Finland has par-
ticipated in the working group on effectiveness and 
transparency of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
and is supporting the initiatives to improve the 
CNS process.
The financial provisions to cover the possible 
damages to third parties caused by a nuclear ac-
cident have been arranged in Finland according to 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to the 
revision of the Paris and Brussels Conventions in 
2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited licen-
see’s liability by law (the Finnish Nuclear Liability 
Act). This means, that insurance coverage will be 
required for a minimum amount of EUR 700 mil-
lion and the liability of Finnish operators shall be 
unlimited in cases where nuclear damage has oc-
curred in Finland and the third tier of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention (providing cover up 
to EUR 1500 million) has been exhausted. The 
revised law will also have some other modifica-
tions, such as extending the claiming period up to 
30 years for victims of nuclear accidents. The law 
amendment (2005) has not taken effect yet. It will 
enter into force at a later date as determined by 
government decree. The entering into force of the 
amending act will take place as the 2004 Protocols 
amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions will 
enter into force.
As the ratification of the 2004 Protocols has 
been delayed, Finland made a temporary amend-
ment in the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, 
implementing the provision on unlimited liability 
and requirement of insurance coverage for a mini-
mum amount of EUR 700 million. The temporary 
law came into force in January 2012 and will be 
repealed when the 2005 law amendment takes ef-
fect. In Finland, the finishing off the international 
ratification process of the convention amendments 
without any undue delay is considered to be ex-
tremely important.
Finland is a Member State of the European 
Union. In 2011 some amendments were done in 
the Nuclear Energy Act due to the Nuclear Safety 
Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom). In 
2013, the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation 
Act are under an amendment process to imple-
ment the Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 
2011 establishing a Community framework for the 
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste.
Member states planning to embark 
on a nuclear power programme
Facilitate the development of the infrastruc-
ture necessary for Member States embarking 
on a nuclear power programme
Providing support to embarking countries is 
considered important in Finland. Finland is a 
member of the IAEA Regulatory Co-operation 
Forum and has participated on the Integrated 
Nuclear Infrastructure Reviews (INIR) missions 
organized by the IAEA. In addition, Finland par-
ticipates in EU/EC INIS activities by providing 
experts and training to embarking countries as 
well as tutoring to experts from embarking coun-
tries. Finland has also organised and continues to 
organise training courses on the experience on reg-
ulatory oversight on new construction and project 
management, regulatory framework in Finland, 
and experts from embarking countries have par-
ticipated. Experts from Finland have also lectured 
in individual IAEA training courses focused on 
embarking countries.
Capacity building
Strengthen and maintain capacity building
The competence of the licensees as well as the 
vendor and main subcontractors is one of the key 
review areas in the licensing processes for the use 
of radiation and nuclear energy and during the 
lifetime of the facilities. STUK is currently updat-
ing the legislation and regulatory guides and is go-
ing to set goals and requirements on the resources 
needed to be available for the licensee during nor-
mal operation as well as during emergencies.
The management of STUK highlights the need 
for competent workforce. STUK has adopted a com-
petence management system and nuclear safety 
and regulatory competencies are also emphasised 
in STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy 
is reflected into the annual training programmes, 
on the job training and new recruitments.
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The national nuclear safety and waste manage-
ment research programmes have an important role 
in the competence building of all essential organi-
sations involved in nuclear energy. These research 
programmes have two roles: for the first ensuring 
the availability of experts and for the second en-
suring the on-line transfer of the research results 
to the organisations participating to the steering of 
the programmes and fostering the expertise. STUK 
has an important role in the steering of these pro-
grammes.
There is a basic professional training course on 
nuclear safety organised together with the Finnish 
organisations in the field. The first 6-week course 
commenced in September 2003 and the 11th basic 
professional training course will commence in au-
tumn 2013. At the moment, about 500 newcomers 
and junior experts, of whom about 80 have been 
from STUK, have participated in these courses. 
The content and structure of the course has been 
enhanced according to the feedback received from 
the participants.
Due to planned expansion of the use of nuclear 
energy in Finland, a comprehensive study has been 
conducted in Finland to explore the need of ex-
perts and education of experts in Finland to meet 
the needs from the organizations in the field. The 
study was completed in March 2012.
(http://www.tem.fi/files/33402/Report_of_the_
Committee_for_Nuclear_Energy_Competence_in_
Finland.pdf)
Protection of people and the 
environment from ionizing radiation
Ensure the on-going protection of people and 
the environment from ionizing radiation fol-
lowing a nuclear emergency
During nuclear or radiological incidents and 
emergencies STUK is responsible for safety assess-
ment of radiation situation and recommendations 
and advice for protective measures as defined in 
the Rescue Act. STUK provides recommendations 
of protective measures to authorities on local, 
provincial and governmental level. Furthermore, 
STUK provides advice to private sector for trade 
and commerce.
STUK has prepared so called VAL Guides, 
which contain the intervention strategy in Finland. 
VAL Guides contain protective measures and in-
tervention levels in early and intermediate phases 
of a nuclear or radiological emergency, for various 
types of emergencies (such as fallout from nuclear 
detonation, severe accident in a NPP, malicious 
acts, contamination due to radioactive substances 
etc.). VAL Guides contain reference levels of expo-
sure during the first year and factors, other than 
radiation, affecting choice of protective measures 
and protective measures to be considered during 
nuclear or radio-logical emergencies and transi-
tion to recovery. VAL Guides contain criteria when 
protective measures are needed and when those 
can be lifted or modified. Criteria are given for 
each countermeasure as a projected dose and as an 
operational intervention level. They also include 
triggers such as plant condition, or emergency ac-
tion levels such as duration of a protective meas-
ure. VAL Guides include principles for reducing 
exposure of various parts of society (e.g. actions 
concerning population, exercising own profession 
in a contaminated area, decontamination, handling 
of waste containing radioactive substances etc). 
VAL Guides are to be put into force by the Ministry 
of the Interior.
In Finland, there is an automatic external 
dose rate monitoring network consisting of about 
250 stations throughout the country. Results are 
available in real time (every 10th minute). In ad-
dition, a network has 22 stations with spectrom-
eters situated around the Finnish NPPs and in 
Helsinki. Nuclear power plants have trained moni-
toring teams capable of making dose rate and air 
concentration measurements. STUK has trained 
monitoring teams for dose rate monitoring, mobile 
spectrometers and a laboratory vehicle which has 
state of the art monitoring equipment for gamma 
(HPGe), alpha and air sampler. Results can be ob-
tained in 30 second interval.
There is also a network of environment and 
foodstuffs laboratories which have the capability 
to measure gamma radioactivity levels in the food 
and environmental samples. STUK coordinates 
operation and provides technical support if needed. 
In addition, STUK has delivered regional hospitals 
monitoring equipment for monitoring iodine in 
thyroid. This measuring capability is meant for 
screening the public for contamination of iodine.
In addition to actual emergency rescue plan-
ning, roles and responsibilities of authorities for 
longer-term actions following a nuclear accident 
have been defined. Longer-term actions include 
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e.g. decontamination of environment, management 
of waste containing radioactive substances, radia-
tion monitoring and surveys, health control of the 
population, measures concerning agricultural and 
other production and measures to ensure uncon-
taminated food and feeding stuffs.
Communication and information 
dissemination
Enhance transparency and effectiveness of 
communication and improve dissemination of 
information
The Decree on STUK defines STUK’s tasks. 
One of the tasks is to inform about radiation and 
nuclear safety matters and participate on training 
activities in the area. STUK utilises many means 
to communicate with public and interested stake-
holders, such as meetings, seminars, and training 
courses. All these are tailored and targeted to dif-
feren stakeholders and stakeholder groups.
STUK puts special interest in internet to in-
form public and interested stakeholders about 
nuclear and radiation safety in general, risks re-
lated to radiation and use of nuclear energy, safety 
requirements, roles and responsibilities of STUK, 
STUK’s organization, current activities and oper-
ating experience, significant regulatory decisions 
taken, events and publications and safety research. 
STUK web pages can be found (www.stuk.fi) in 
Finnish, Swedish and in English. STUK has also 
made itself available in social media (facebook and 
twitter).
What comes to radiation emergencies and haz-
ards, according to the Rescue Act and the Decree of 
the Ministry of the Interior concerning informing 
public during nuclear or radiological emergencies, 
the authority in charge is responsible for informing 
public on protective measures and other activities 
to be carried out. Authorities at governmental, pro-
vincial, and municipal level provide information on 
their own activities and give instructions regard-
ing their own sphere of responsibility. In case of 
a nuclear power plant accident there are many 
organisations providing information. Thus special 
attention needs to be paid to coordination of timing 
and content.
Further improvement of arrangements for the 
coordination of information to the public and me-
dia during emergencies is needed to ensure that 
the messages issued by different authorities are 
consistent. Guidelines for co-operation among au-
thorities have been written in a guidebook pub-
lished by the Ministry of Interior in November 
2012. To help the implementation of guidelines 
seminars and workshops are organised from the 
beginning of 2013. Even more general principles 
and guidance of coordination or public communica-
tion during emergencies are given in the guidance 
by prime ministers office. This guideance will be 
updated during 2013.
In an accident situation the principal informa-
tion route of warnings to the public is FM radio, 
TV and internet. The first outdoor warning to the 
public close the NPP is given by general warning 
signal via sirens or loudspeakers. By arrange-
ment with broadcasting companies, urgent RDS-
notifications can be transmitted promptly over the 
FM-radio and TV. There is a new specific law for 
warning messages via radio and TV. Law is enter-
ing into force on 1st June 2013.
Finland has several bilateral agreements for 
exchange of information on nuclear facilities and 
on notification of a nuclear and radiation emer-
gency, e.g. with Sweden, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, 
Denmark and Germany. In addition, STUK has 
done bilateral arrangements with several foreign 
regulatory bodies, which cover generally exchange 
of information on safety regulations, operational 
experiences, waste management etc. Such an ar-
rangement have been made with NRC (USA), ASN 
(France), FANR (United Arab Emirates), NSSC 
and KINS (Republic of Korea), TAEK (Turkey), 
ENSI (Switzerland), SUJB (Czech Republic), 
Rostechnadzor (Russian Federation), and CNSC 
(Canada).
Research and development
Effectively utilize research and development
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 
to ensure funding for a long term nuclear safe-
ty and nuclear waste management research in 
Finland. Money is collected annually from the li-
cence holders to a special fund. Regarding nuclear 
safety research the amount of money is propor-
tional to the actual thermal power of the licensed 
power plants or the thermal power presented in 
the Decision-in-Principle. For the nuclear waste 
research, the annual funding payments are propor-
tional to the current fund holdings for the future 
waste management activities.
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The research projects are selected so that they 
support and develop the competences in nuclear 
safety and to create preparedness for the regula-
tor to be able to respond on emerging and urgent 
safety issues. These national safety research pro-
grammes are called SAFIR and KYT. The key 
topics of the recent nuclear safety research pro-
gramme (SAFIR2014) are organisation and human 
factors, automation and control room, fuel and re-
actor physics, thermal hydraulics, severe accidents, 
structural safety of reactor circuit, construction 
safety, probabilistic safety analysis and develop-
ment of research infrastructure. The amount of 
money collected from the licensees in year 2012 
was about 5.6 million € for nuclear safety research. 
The research projects have also additional fund-
ing from other sources. The total volume of the 
programme in 2012 was 10 million €. The results 
of the research programme are public. More infor-
mation on the planning, steering and the research 
reports of the SAFIR and KYT programmes are 
available on the puclic websites (http://safir2014.
vtt.fi/ and http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/).
In 2011, research needs originating from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident were stud-
ied, and an appendix addressing the topics for 
further research (e.g. spent fuel pool accidents) was 
added to the research programme. The ongoing 
SAFIR2014 research programme already included 
research projects on extreme weather phenomena, 
extreme seawater level variations and seismic 
issues. As a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident, a reassessment was made how the 
accident should be taken into account, and the 
research projects were somewhat redirected. The 
research programme was supplemented with re-
search topics related to natural hazards and multi-
ple failure events, the adequacy and scope of nucle-
ar power plant design basis, mitigating the impact 
of accidents (e.g. high concentration of boron in the 
reactor circuit, hydrogen formation and transport, 
range of fission products released in core melt), and 
the overall life cycle of nuclear fuel including spent 
fuel pools. Some additional resources have also 
been allocated to the research of external events.
The objective of KYT2014 (Finnish Research 
programme on Nuclear Waste Management) is to 
ensure the sufficient and comprehensive availabil-
ity of the nuclear technological expertise and other 
capabilities required by the authorities when com-
paring different nuclear waste management ways 
and implementation methods. KYT2014 is divided 
into three main categories:
•	 new and alternative technologies in nuclear 
waste management
•	 safety research in nuclear waste management
•	 social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management
and the main emphasis is on safety related re-
search. The programme is conducted during 2011–
2014 and the total funding is 2.8 M€, of which 
State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) 
covers 1.7 M€.
In Finland, the Technical Research Centre of 
Finland (VTT) is the largest research organisa-
tion in the field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 
200 experts are working in the field of nuclear 
energy, half of them full-time. The total volume 
of the nuclear energy research in the year 2012 
was about 75 million € (estimate of the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy). This figure 
includes research related to use of nuclear energy 
made in all the stakerholder organisations. Two 
thirds of the research is focused on the final dis-
posal of spent fuel. The largest individual organiza-
tions are VTT, GTK (Geological Survey of Finland), 
LUT (Lappeenranta University of Technology) and 
Aalto University (former Helsinki University of 
Technology, HUT).
Finland also participates in international re-
search activities, such as OECD/NEA/CSNI work-
ing groups, consortium which builds a research 
reactor in France, scandinavian NKS research 
programme, EU programmes, and bilateral co-
operation with several countries. The Finnish tec-
nical support organisations are active parties of 
TSO organisations co-operation such as ETSON in 
Europe and IAEA TSO Forum.
